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INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural gas production has expanded rapidly in the United States in the last 
decade, largely due to a high natural gas price in the mid-2000s and technological 
advances that have made shale gas production economically viable (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2011). Deep shale formations have long been known to hold 
large quantities of oil and gas, but their characteristically low permeability made 
extraction challenging and previously unprofitable. In recent years, operators have 
combined two techniques to increase shale well productivity: horizontal drilling, which 
exposes more shale rock to the wellbore; and high-volume hydraulic fracturing 
(fracking), which injects large quantities of water mixed with chemicals and sand at high 
pressure to create and prop open tiny fractures that allow trapped gas to flow into the 
wellbore (U.S. Department of Energy 2013). These techniques are not new, but their 
widespread use in recent years has highlighted outstanding scientific uncertainty about 
the environmental, health, and safety impacts of rapid and extensive shale development 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2012). 
In this dissertation, I examine responses to perceived risks of shale development 
as revealed through property transactions and through the political process. In Chapter I, I 
use property sales data from Washington County, Pennsylvania to analyze how 
individuals evaluate the risks of nearby shale development. I find evidence that 
individuals differentiate between nearby vertical wells, which are not likely to be shale 
wells, and nearby horizontal wells, which are likely to employ high-volume fracking. 
Although an additional horizontal well within a mile of a property tends to increase the 
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property’s value, this positive effect is diminished for properties that rely on private wells 
for drinking water. In addition, the values of all properties with a nearby horizontal well 
decrease when state regulators find and reveal high numbers of environmental, health, 
and safety violations at shale wells. Thus, Chapter I demonstrates that perceived risks of 
shale development can cause real losses to property values. My findings suggest, 
however, that shale development could pass a local benefit-cost test—wherein winners 
could more than compensate losers —if drilling risks are well managed.  
Chapter II then considers when individuals collectively decide to ban shale 
development outright. Numerous cities and towns across the United States have started to 
prohibit all natural gas extraction activities, and such local bans could hinder a national 
energy policy that relies on continued increases in natural gas production. This chapter 
investigates the circumstances under which local governments are likely to ban shale 
development by analyzing New York town decisions. Since July 2008, New York has 
had a moratorium on fracking activities to allow the state to research appropriate 
regulations. In the meantime, more than fifty towns have adopted bans and more than one 
hundred and twenty towns have adopted additional moratoria on fracking activities. In 
this chapter, I assess the relative importance of risk perceptions and economic and 
political factors in these decisions. In particular, I find that greater reliance on private 
wells for human and animal consumption is associated with a higher probability of 
adopting a ban. The decision to adopt a moratorium, which is largely symbolic in light of 
New York’s statewide moratorium, appears to be driven by environmental preferences. 
Again, my results suggest that perceived risks to water sources play an important role 
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when individuals assess the relative costs and benefits of allowing shale development in 
their communities. 
In Chapter III, I discuss how governments could better manage the water-
contamination risks of shale development. Key to this management is creating a system 
that ensures the quick discovery of any possible contamination, incentivizes net-
beneficial risk management, and guarantees the availability of funds to remediate 
environmental harms. I first divide risks into four categories based on the nature of the 
pollution releases and the manifestation of harm, and I suggest that governments should 
manage these risk categories differently. The resulting comprehensive system would use 
combinations of regulations, tort liability, and insurance mandates to ensure that 
operators are liable for all environmental risks, thus stimulating an efficient level of 
shale-development activity, and would guarantee a process for the remediation of any 
residual environmental harms, alleviating some of the water-contamination concerns 
identified in Chapters I and II. 
Overall, this dissertation makes the following contributions to law and economics: 
it employs empirical analysis to examine the perceived risks of shale development as 
revealed through property transactions in a Pennsylvania county and through legislative 
decisions by New York towns. In general, I find that risks to water feature prominently in 
both contexts. I then consider legal and regulatory interventions that could better manage 
risks to water, thereby possibly preventing property-value losses and outright bans. I hope 
that this dissertation will provide timely, fact-driven, and useful information to 
policymakers and citizens evaluating the future of shale development.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
PROPERTY VALUES AND RISKS: EVIDENCE FROM SHALE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
The profitability of extracting oil and gas trapped within the nation’s extensive 
shale formations has generated a boom in the oil-and-gas industry.1 Operators are 
pushing to drill close to populations and sensitive resources, and many states are 
facilitating such extensive drilling with laws that preempt local control. Shale production, 
however, is not without local risks. The unprecedented scope and scale of development 
exposes more areas to ordinary perils associated with drilling activities, including air 
pollution and spills, accidents, and blowouts, the cumulative effects of which could be 
significant. In addition, shale drilling techniques, namely horizontal drilling and high-
volume hydraulic fracturing (fracking),2 come with their own set of hazards, such as 
possible groundwater and surface water contamination from fracking fluid or wastewater, 
water-supply shortages due to the sizeable water requirements associated with fracking, 
and earthquakes induced through the injection of wastewater into disposal wells. Some of 
these risks are speculative, and the magnitudes of the risks are uncertain. 
Nonetheless, people across the United States must decide whether to lease their 
mineral rights to drilling operators. A rational homeowner in this position would weigh 
                                                
1 These formations are also referred to as unconventional formations. 
2 Shale wells require high-volume hydraulic fracturing or horizontal drilling techniques to stimulate well 
production. Most vertical (and usually conventional) wells are also hydraulically fractured, but the volume 
of fluid typically required for well stimulation is much lower. 
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the expected rental and royalty payments received from oil-and-gas companies against 
the expected costs of adverse drilling events, gleaned from currently available risk 
information from neighbors, the scientific community, the media, state regulators, and the 
companies themselves. Over time, a rational homeowner would update his perception of 
the benefits and costs of the arrangement based on any new information that he obtains. If 
he no longer perceives the benefits to outweigh the costs (enough to justify the costs of 
moving), then the homeowner would move to another location, one that is farther from 
the risks of drilling. A rational homebuyer would also weigh expected benefits and costs 
when deciding whether to purchase a property near such drilling, just as he weighs the 
benefits and costs of any other property or neighborhood characteristic in his decision. 
The fact that the property comes with an oil-and-gas lease that accrues rental and royalty 
payments could be a plus, but any perceived risks from drilling would diminish the 
advantages of such a lease. In this way, final sales prices for homes would reflect 
perceptions of the average net benefits or net costs of shale drilling as thousands of 
homeowners and homebuyers weigh their options. 
In this chapter, I analyze property sales data from Washington County, 
Pennsylvania between January 2004 and May 2013 to explore individuals’ willingness to 
pay to live near shale development as compared to conventional development under 
different circumstances. I focus on Pennsylvania for a number of reasons. For one, 
Pennsylvania is an important player in the shale boom. By 2012, the state became the 
third-largest gas-producing state, and preliminary estimates suggest that it could have 
become the second-largest producer in 2013—mostly due to the huge growth in 
Marcellus shale production (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013). 
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Pennsylvania also has the second-highest number of households served by private water 
wells, making Pennsylvania homeowners particularly vulnerable to possible groundwater 
contamination from shale development.3 In addition, Pennsylvania has been active in 
passing various laws and regulations regarding shale development. Most controversial 
was the legislature’s February 2012 law, known as Act 13, that imposed additional 
requirements on shale well operators and gave all operators the right to drill anywhere 
notwithstanding local zoning that might prohibit drilling in sensitive areas, such as 
residential areas.4 A study on how drilling affects property values could shed light on the 
value of regulating shale wells more stringently and prohibiting local regulation. Finally, 
Pennsylvania has a wealth of publicly available data on well locations and violations.  
I focus on Washington County in particular because it is the highest shale-
producing Pennsylvania county for which I have property sales data.5 Washington 
County also has a history of conventional development, making it ideal for an analysis of 
possible diverse property-value effects of conventional versus unconventional 
production.6 Finally, two other studies analyze property-value impacts in Washington 
County using different empirical strategies (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014; 
Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2012), allowing for comparisons of results and 
providing a complete picture of the local impacts in one county.7 
                                                
3 “Groundwater Supply and Use,” http://wellowner.org/groundwater/groundwater-supply-use/. 
4 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2013), which amends the Oil and Gas Act (Title 58). In December 
2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the part of Act 13 that bars local zoning 
restrictions. Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Com., 2013 WL 6687290 (Pa. Dec. 19, 2013).  
5 Laura Legere and Katie Colaneri. 2014. “Pennsylvania Shale Production Continued to Grow in 2013.” 
StateImpact, February 19. DataQuick did not provide sales data for the counties with higher shale 
production. 
6 Michael Jacobson and Timothy W. Kelsey. 2011. “Impacts of Marcellus Shale Development on 
Municipal Governments in Susquehanna and Washington Counties, 2010.” Marcellus Education Fact 
Sheet, Pennsylvania State University. 
7 In Appendix A, I discuss the potential generalizability of results to other counties in Pennsylvania. 
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This chapter is the first to distinguish the property-value effects of nearby vertical 
and horizontal wells and to identify property-value effects based on the number of recent 
environmental well violations. Horizontal and vertical well pads look different, and they 
may generate different average benefits and costs to nearby property owners. For 
example, because horizontal wells have a longer reach, properties located a certain 
distance from a horizontal well’s wellbore are more likely to receive royalty and rental 
payments than are properties located the same distance away from a vertical well’s 
wellbore. On the other hand, horizontal wells require high-volume fracking, and the risks 
that stem from the application of horizontal drilling and high-volume fracking are those 
that are uncertain. In particular, owners may be concerned about water contamination, 
especially if their properties are vulnerable to such contamination, such as properties that 
rely on private wells for drinking water. Finally, individuals might look to recent 
information on well violations to update their risk preferences, but again, their desire for 
risk information might also vary by well type. Individuals may be more interested in 
violations that occur at horizontal wells given the risk uncertainty, and only properties 
with nearby wells might suffer negative effects from a high number of recent well 
violations. My results are consistent with such effects. 
I find that an additional horizontal well within a mile of a property increases the 
property’s value, likely due to the receipt of rental and royalty payments. I do not find 
any statistically significant property-value effects of the number of vertical wells within a 
mile. In addition, properties that rely on private wells for drinking water face a property-
value loss from each additional nearby horizontal well, but the property-value loss does 
not fully offset the benefit of an additional well on average. Finally, properties with 
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nearby horizontal wells face losses in value as the number of relevant well violations in 
the county six months prior to each property’s sale increase. These results suggest that 
individuals perceive groundwater risks from nearby shale development. County-level 
violations inform individuals’ perceptions of these and other risks, but property-value 
effects are largely limited to properties with nearby horizontal wells.  
 
The Homeowner’s Decision and Property Values 
 
In Pennsylvania, most property owners possess both “surface rights” and “mineral 
rights,” meaning that an oil-and-gas operator seeking to drill a well spanning several 
property tracts would need to receive permission from all of the relevant property 
owners.8 Landowners typically accept rental and royalty payments from oil-and-gas 
companies in exchange for leasing mineral rights to operators. Before production begins, 
most landowners receive annual rental payments, varying from a few dollars to hundreds 
of dollars per acre, that usually end once production-tied royalty payments begin. In 
Pennsylvania, a recent state law requires the production-tied royalty payments to be at 
least 12.5 percent of the value of the produced oil or gas, and landowners can negotiate 
higher royalty payments.9 In this way, landowners may receive payments from nearby 
testing and exploration activities for a few years before any drilling commences, and 
                                                
8 In Pennsylvania, the Oil and Gas Conservation Law prevents waste of mineral resources by allowing 
operators to apply to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to force pooling of landowners into a 
drilling unit. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 401–19 (2013). Compulsory pooling prevents a landowner from holding 
up oil-and-gas extraction by refusing to enter into a lease, and it prevents an operator from draining mineral 
resources from neighboring properties without paying rental and royalty payments. Compulsory pooling, 
however, does not apply to production from the Marcellus shale.  
9 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 33.3 (2013), codifying the 2013 Oil and Gas Lease Act. 
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these payments have the potential to greatly increase and continue for a number of years 
once drilling commences. 
In deciding whether to lease mineral rights, a landowner that lives on her 
property—in other words, a homeowner—must weigh these rental and royalty payments 
against the potential adverse environmental, health, and safety effects of nearby drilling. 
In particular, the media often focuses on the potential water contamination that could 
result from fracking fluids, which can contain hazardous substances, fracking wastewater, 
and methane gas.10 In fact, leaks and spills often occur at drilling sites, as evident from 
information on well violations. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (PADEP), the agency that oversees oil and gas activities in the state, strives to 
frequently monitor and inspect producing wells.11 PADEP schedules inspections of 
producing wells, paying particular attention to wells that are about to be fracked, and 
responds to citizen or operator reports of spills and other harms. The agency then posts 
information on any resulting violations on its website, information that is often reported 
on by various media outlets. Using this information, researchers have identified almost 
one hundred and fifty violations for minor spills (spilling less than four hundred gallons) 
and nine violations for major spills in Pennsylvania between January 2008 and August 
2011 (Considine et al. 2013). 
After weighing the benefits and costs, homeowners decide whether to enter into 
an oil-and-gas lease. If they later decide to sell their homes, they may face property-value 
                                                
10 Appendix C provides a detailed overview of some of these risks. 
11 This discussion of PADEP’s regulatory policy is based on conversations with the agency’s oil and gas 
office in October 2013 as well as on information from numerous reviews done by the State Review of Oil 
and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations, Inc. (STRONGER) (STRONGER 2010; STRONGER 2013). 
STRONGER is a nonprofit, multi-stakeholder organization that provides voluntary reviews of state oil and 
gas laws and regulations, and Pennsylvania’s program has undergone five reviews.  
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gains or losses based on their decision to lease, as homebuyers will assess a property 
based on its characteristics, which include both the benefits and costs of nearby wells. 
Properties with nearby wells that do not receive rental or royalty payments would face 
only the costs of drilling activities, likely facing property-value losses unless potential 
buyers expect future drilling activity on their property with resulting rental and royalty 
payments. On the other hand, properties that rely on private water wells, whether 
receiving rental and royalty payments or not, may be more vulnerable to water-
contamination risks, which may decrease property values.  
A hedonic housing price model provides a tool for studying how individuals value 
nearby environmental amenities and disamenities. Hedonic housing price models are 
based on the theory that, in equilibrium, the price homebuyers pay for a house is related 
to the characteristics of the house, which include the structural attributes of the house as 
well as neighborhood attributes such as environmental quality (Rosen 1974). 
Homebuyers make tradeoffs between the property price and combinations of these 
characteristics, revealing their preferences through their purchases. When researchers 
analyze a collection of purchases of different bundles, they can estimate the implicit 
marginal price of one of the characteristics by examining how the total price changes 
when this characteristic changes, holding other relevant characteristics constant. Hedonic 
housing price models have been used to analyze valuations of locally undesirable land 
uses, such as power plants (Davis 2011), hog operations (Palmquist, Roka, and Vukina 
1997), underground storage tanks (Guignet 2013), facilities that report to the Toxic 
Release Inventory (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008), and contaminated sites (Gayer, Hamilton, 
and Viscusi 2000; Kiel and Williams 2007; Greenstone and Gallagher 2008). 
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Two previous studies examined property-value effects of additional oil-and-gas 
wells in Washington County, Pennsylvania using a hedonic housing price model.12 
Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) analyzed property sales data from 2008 to 2010 to 
estimate the impact of an additional recently permitted horizontal well on nearby 
properties. The authors found that all properties face value losses with each additional 
new well, and properties that rely on private wells for drinking water have larger losses. 
The authors found the largest losses, however, accruing to properties surrounded by 
agricultural lands, suggesting a concern with future nearby development. The authors did 
not include the number of nearby vertical (or older horizontal) wells in their regressions 
and did not control for any tract-level neighborhood characteristics. Muehlenbachs, 
Spiller, and Timmins (2012) analyzed property sales data from 2004 to 2009 to find that 
an additional drilled well pad (of any type) generally increases nearby property values, 
but again, properties that rely on private water wells face property-value losses.13 When 
the authors limited their sample to properties located just inside and outside the public 
water service boundary and employed property fixed effects, they found especially large 
and statistically significant value losses of an additional drilled well pad for properties 
that rely on private water wells. This chapter extends these analyses by distinguishing the 
effects of nearby vertical and horizontal wells and examining the effect of information on 
well violations on property sales over a longer time frame, while controlling for property, 
neighborhood, and other characteristics in cross-sectional regressions and employing a 
nearest-neighbor matching estimation strategy as an additional check.  
                                                
12 Another study has considered property-value effects in a larger region of Pennsylvania and New York 
(Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2014). 
13 The authors consider all wellbores that are within one acre of another wellbore to be on the same well 
pad.  
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Hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, I use a hedonic housing price model to capture the willingness to 
pay associated with different features of nearby wells. I expect individuals to care about 
nearby wells for a number of reasons, namely because wells may increase income 
through royalty or rental payments; wells may be visually, audibly, or otherwise 
displeasing; and wells may increase the risk of poor water quality and other bad outcomes 
associated with drilling. In this section, I discuss my specific hypotheses. 
One component of the direct marginal price effect of an additional well within a 
mile of the property is the expected rental or royalty payments minus any visual, audible, 
or environmental (or, for simplicity, environmental) disamenities associated with the 
presence of the well. If the average rental and royalty payments are large enough, then 
the direct effect on nearby properties may still be positive; otherwise, these two forces 
may offset each other. If some environmental disamenities such as environmental risks 
are considered separately, however, then the effect of an additional nearby well on nearby 
property values may become positive because of the rental and royalty payments that 
accrue to some of these properties.  
Hypothesis 1. After controlling for environmental disamenities, an additional well 
should increase nearby property values.  
 
Importantly, I expect these effects to be different for nearby vertical and 
horizontal wells. First, horizontal wells will pay rental and royalty payments to more 
nearby property owners on average, increasing the direct positive effects. Operators of 
horizontal wells can drill under properties located up to two miles away from the 
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wellbore, which means that these operators tend to pay rental and royalty payments to 
more surface owners than do operators of a typical vertical well. Second, property owners 
without oil-and-gas leases may be more aware of, and more concerned about, nearby 
horizontal drilling activities. Property owners are more likely to be aware of nearby shale 
wells partly because recent surface-owner notification requirements vary in Pennsylvania 
depending on well type. An applicant for a permit to drill a conventional well must only 
notify surface owners within 1,000 feet, or about 0.2 miles, of the wellbore, while an 
applicant for a permit to drill a shale well must notify surface owners within 3,000 feet, 
or about 0.6 miles, of the wellbore.14 But even residents aware of both vertical and 
horizontal drilling could have different concerns about the two types of drilling 
operations. Vertical and horizontal well pads are visibly different in nature and size. A 
typical Marcellus well pad involves multiple horizontal wells and covers about five acres 
(U.S. Department of Energy 2013), while vertical wells are spaced at least twenty to forty 
acres apart in order to maximize production. In addition, the high-volume fracking 
process necessary to stimulate horizontal well production requires multiple trucks to 
transport gallons of water, sand, and chemicals to the fracking site each day and may 
present different risks of spills and leaks. These differences suggest that residents, 
especially residents of a county with prior experience with conventional drilling, are 
likely to know whether nearby wells are vertical or horizontal and may associate vertical 
and horizontal wells with different risks. Property values may manifest any such 
differences in individuals’ subjective risk perceptions of these two types of wells. Hence, 
each of my hypotheses is associated with an additional hypothesis based on well type. 
                                                
14 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3211(b) (2013). 
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Hypothesis 1A. An additional horizontal well affects nearby property values more 
than does an additional vertical well. I expect both positive effects from royalty 
payments and negative effects from risks to water to be larger in magnitude for 
nearby horizontal wells.  
 
Pennsylvania residents vulnerable to groundwater contamination may be 
particularly concerned about drilling-related risks. More than a million Pennsylvania 
households rely on private water wells. Unlike for the public water system, Pennsylvania 
has no statewide regulations governing the location, testing, and treatment of private 
water wells, making it up to the individual homeowner to ensure that his water supply is 
safe for consumption. Properties that rely on private water wells, therefore, would be 
expected to have a higher probability of realizing poor water quality if a nearby well 
damages water sources.15  
Hypothesis 2. An additional well will decrease the value of nearby properties that 
rely on private water wells. 
 
Because horizontal well drilling employs high-volume fracking and because the 
extensive reach of horizontal wells exposes more areas to risks, individuals may perceive 
a higher probability of poor water quality from nearby horizontal wells.  
Hypothesis 2A. An additional horizontal well will have a greater negative effect 
on the value of nearby properties that rely on private water wells than will an 
additional vertical well. 
 
Finally, when individuals make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, it is 
important to consider the information that they use to form their subjective risk 
perceptions (Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1987; Smith and Johnson 1988; Maani and Kask 
                                                
15 Anecdotally, a Pennsylvania realtor has said about one property, “If [the property] had public water 
today, I could probably sell it for $120,000. . . . Right now with no water, we got it listed at $87,900. It’s 
not gonna sell because other houses in the area without water are selling for between $15,000 and 
$30,000.” Susan Phillips. 2012. “Residents Fed Up with Bad Water Flee Shale Drilling Areas.” StateImpact 
Pennsylvania, April 30. The realtor also stated that houses with publicly supplied water are rising in value 
because residents want a secure water source. 
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1991). In this case, because homeowners and homebuyers do not have perfect 
information on risks, they may seek out and respond to additional information, such as 
information on environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) well violations. This 
information can provide residents with a better sense of common types of violations 
during drilling activities. Unlike other risk information in this context, information on 
well violations is readily available as violations are posted on the PADEP website and 
may be reported on by local newspapers. People can view well violations by visiting the 
state agency website, examining media sources, or receiving information directly from 
PADEP. In addition, the diffusion of information within the local real estate market can 
influence the perceptions of individuals who do not personally view this information 
(Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000). When people obtain new information that clarifies 
uncertain risks, property values may update to reflect this new understanding.16 I expect 
information on the number of well violations to increase individuals’ subjective 
probabilities of adverse events because individuals likely place high weight on violations 
information.17 Such behavior would be consistent with a Bayesian learning process 
(Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000). 
Hypothesis 3. An additional environmental, health, and safety well violation in the 
county will reduce the value of properties with nearby wells. 
 
                                                
16 For example, Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) found that the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s release of site-specific risk information generally lowered individuals’ perceptions of a 
Superfund site’s risk, a result that suggests that the initial reactions to site risks were too high. 
17 In addition, increases in subjective risk perceptions could be aided by various biases and heuristics that 
individuals use to process risk information, even if actual frequencies of adverse events implied by the rate 
of violations are low. Previous researchers have found that individuals are susceptible to an availability 
bias, meaning that they often judge the probability of events based in part on the ease with which examples 
of these events come to their mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). This concept has been tested 
empirically (e.g., Lichtenstein et al. 1978; Bin and Landry 2013). Experiences might also matter. As the 
number of violations increase, the number of people who personally experienced an adverse well event 
increases. People might view experienced events as more likely or informative, and this might also drive 
increasing subjective risk perceptions. 
 16 
Because individuals have experience with nearby vertical wells, they might not 
seek out additional information on vertical well risks; they might only seek out 
information on the new risks of horizontal wells in order to reduce the risk uncertainty 
associated with horizontal wells that are fracked. As shale wells are likely to be 
horizontal wells that employ fracking, individuals would look to the most informative 
information available: information on EH&S violations at shale wells. Well-violation 
information would then decrease property values through its influence in increasing the 
subjective risk probability associated with having a nearby horizontal well.  
Hypothesis 3A. Higher numbers of recent well violations will reduce the value of 
properties with a nearby horizontal well more than properties with a nearby 
vertical well. 
 
Data Description 
 
To test my hypotheses, I use property sales data from DataQuick, a national real-
estate data company. My dataset includes all sales between January 2004 and May 2013 
for Washington County, Pennsylvania. DataQuick provides information on each 
property’s structural characteristics as well as information on all sales of the property. I 
limited my analysis to single-family residential properties. The property structural 
variables include the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the size of the lot in 
square feet, the age of the property, and the presence of a garage, among other things. I 
removed properties that do not have a sale price, have a zero sale price, are indicated to 
be non-arms length transactions, or have zero square footage. In order to obtain latitude 
and longitude coordinates for each property, I used Geographic Information System 
(GIS) technology to geocode each property and kept only properties that were located 
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with building-level accuracy. Finally, I used the Consumer Price Index to express all 
property sales prices in constant 2012 dollars. I present summary statistics in Table 1. 
The average sale price is $161,344. Properties on average contain three bedrooms and 
two bathrooms and are about fifty years old.18  
In addition to property sales data, I obtained information on the exact locations of 
drilled wells within each county using data from the PADEP. I calculated distances from 
each property to the nearest 350 wells. I then merged each well identifier with relevant 
well characteristics, ultimately using this information to calculate the number of wells 
satisfying various criteria within a set distance from each property. For example, in my 
main analysis, I use the numbers of vertical and horizontal wells within a mile of each 
property that have been drilled prior to the property’s sale date. In robustness checks, I 
vary the distance around each property and the immediacy of drilling relative to the date 
of sale. Properties in Washington County have, on average, 0.17 horizontal wells within 
one mile.  
I also obtained information on well violations from PADEP. I generated variables 
capturing the number of EH&S violations that accrued to wells within the county in the 
six months prior to the property’s sale. EH&S violations include discharging industrial 
waste and other pollution to Pennsylvania waters without a permit and failing to mitigate 
spill impacts, and these violations can accrue to operators of conventional or shale wells. 
I chose six months prior to each property’s sale as a reasonable time window during 
which individuals may seek and process information on well violations. After a violation 
is discovered, it must be posted on the PADEP website. In addition, individuals need time 
                                                
18 Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2014) and Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins (2012) also used data from 
DataQuick in their analyses of Washington County, Pennsylvania. As expected, our summary statistics are 
similar, although our analyses focus on different time periods. 
 18 
to view and process the information. The information is also salient for at least a few 
months because homebuyers take time to search for a new home.  
 To identify properties that rely on private water wells, I used data on Public Water 
Supplier’s Service Areas in Pennsylvania from the Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access 
(PASDA). Owners of properties that lie outside of the public water service area are likely 
to rely on private wells for drinking water because it is expensive to extend piped water 
outside of the service area. Therefore, I used GIS technology to identify those properties 
that fell outside of the public water service areas and treated those as properties that rely 
on private water wells. In Washington County, about eight percent of properties rely on 
private water wells. 
In addition, I controlled for neighborhood characteristics by matching each 
property to census tract-level characteristics from the American Community Survey using 
GIS technology. These characteristics include the median household income; the percent 
of the population under nineteen years old; the percent of the population that is Black; 
and the percent of the population, twenty-five years old or older, that graduated high 
school for the year 2008, which is approximately the midpoint of my 2004 to 2013 
sample. I also used data from PASDA to match each property to its school district in 
order to include school district fixed effects in my regressions. 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
To test my hypotheses, I regress the natural logarithm of the sale price for 
property i at time t (ln𝑃!") on the number of nearby wells drilled prior to the property’s 
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sale; a vector of the property’s structural characteristics (𝑋); a vector of the property’s 
neighborhood characteristics (𝑁); and city, school district, and year fixed effects (𝐶!, 𝑆!, 
and 𝑌!). My main variables of interest are 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙!", which indicates the number of 
horizontal wells within a mile drilled prior to the property’s sale; and the interactions of 
the variable 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙!" with the variable 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒!, which indicates whether the 
property is located outside the public water system and therefore likely relies on private 
well water for drinking water, and the variable 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!, which indicates the number 
of shale well violations in the county over the six-month period prior to each property’s 
sale. Hence, I estimate the semilogarithmic form of the hedonic price function, expressed 
as follows: ln𝑃!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!+ 𝜃! 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙!"  ×  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒!+ 𝜃! 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙!"  ×  𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! + 𝑋′!𝛿! + 𝑁′!𝛿!+ 𝐶! + 𝑆! + 𝑌! ++𝜀!"  . 
(1) 
The coefficient on the first interaction term, 𝜃!, measures the price discount 
associated with an additional horizontal well for a property that relies on private water. I 
hypothesize that 𝜃! will be negative. The coefficient on the second interaction term, 𝜃!, 
estimates the effect of additional information on well violations for a property with a 
nearby horizontal well. I also hypothesize that 𝜃! will be negative. In addition, I include a 
variable for the number of vertical wells within a mile of each property and estimate any 
interaction effects with vertical wells in all specifications. In robustness checks, I test 
various assumptions of this specification and offer an alternative nearest-neighbor 
matching estimation strategy. 
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Empirical Results 
 
Estimates of the Cross-Sectional Hedonic Model 
Table 2 summarizes my main results on the effect of an additional horizontal or 
vertical well that is drilled within a mile of the property prior to the property’s sale. In 
equation 1, I do not control for any environmental disamenities, and I find that an 
additional well has no statistically significant effect on property values. In equations 2 
and 3, I separately control for properties affected by two categories of risks: groundwater 
risks for properties that rely on private water wells (equation 2) and violations 
information (equation 3), and I find negative property-value effects for relevant 
properties with nearby horizontal wells. The separate inclusion of these variables also 
increases the coefficient on horizontal wells, which becomes statistically significant in 
equation 3, without affecting the estimated coefficients on other variables.  
After controlling for both risks to water and violations information in equation 4, I 
find that an additional horizontal well within one mile increases a property’s value by 
about 2 percent. Given the average price of homes in Washington County, this result 
suggests a price increase of a little more than $3,200 per additional well. I do not find any 
statistically significant effects on property values of an additional vertical well within one 
mile. The gains for additional horizontal wells represent the average effect of rental or 
royalty payments that accrue to some properties located within a mile of the well. In 
reality, properties that receive rental or royalty payments may have higher property-value 
increases while properties that do not receive rental or royalty payments might have no 
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property-value increases or may face some losses.19 While operators of vertical wells also 
pay royalty and rental payments to nearby property owners, the reach of vertical wells is 
not nearly as far, and fewer properties within a mile of these wells accrue payments.  
Although an additional horizontal well increases a property’s value by 2 percent, I 
find that a property that relies on private water wells loses on average 1.4 percent of its 
value with each additional horizontal well. Thus, properties that rely on private water 
wells only obtain a 0.6 percent average increase in property values per additional 
horizontal well. This result is consistent with the idea that individuals worry about water 
security for properties that rely on private water wells. Unlike Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and 
Timmins (2012), who also analyzed differential effects of nearby wells on piped versus 
well-water properties, I do not find that losses due to perceived water risks offset the 
property-value gains of an additional well on average. As before, I only find statistically 
significant effects for horizontal wells, suggesting that individuals are not as concerned 
about water risks from nearby vertical wells. 
Finally, I find that properties with horizontal wells also lose value as the number 
of recent county-level shale well violations increase in the six months prior to each 
property’s sale.20 Specifically, for properties within one mile of a horizontal well, each 
additional EH&S shale well violation in the six-month period prior to the property’s sale 
decreases the property’s value by about 0.04 percent. Although this effect seems small, it 
can become substantial when considering the number of violations and the number of 
properties affected. Calculated at the average number of EH&S shale violations, each 
                                                
19 In future work, I hope to differentiate between properties that receive rental or royalty payments and 
properties that do not. No one has done this to date. 
20 In Appendix A, I limit the violations time period to the three months prior to each property’s sale; the 
qualitative results do not change. 
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additional horizontal well is associated with a 0.5 percent decrease in property values, 
decreasing the net effect of an additional horizontal well to about 1.5 percent. If the 
property also relies on private well water, then almost all of the gains of an additional 
well are offset by individuals’ subjective risk perceptions.21 
Table 3 presents results for information on all EH&S violations (equation 1) and 
then divides these violations into EH&S violations at shale wells versus those at 
conventional wells (equation 2). These results demonstrate that EH&S violations only 
have statistically significant effects on property values for properties with nearby 
horizontal wells, which is consistent with the idea that individuals seek out violations 
information when faced with the uncertain risks of a nearby horizontal well. Equation 2 
also demonstrates that this result is driven by EH&S violations at shale wells—that is, 
individuals with nearby horizontal wells with uncertain risks seem to seek out 
information on EH&S violations that accrue to those types of wells in particular. 
Information on EH&S violations on conventional, typically vertical, wells has no 
property-value effect for properties with nearby wells, horizontal or vertical. Thus, these 
results suggest that individuals only update their subjective probabilities of the risks of 
horizontal wells using information on violations at shale wells—not information on 
violations at other wells.22  
                                                
21 In these main specifications, I present results for the effect of wells located within a mile of each 
property, but in robustness checks, I show that the coefficients to be largest in magnitude when I use well 
counts within 0.75 miles of each property and especially for wells drilled within the year prior to the 
property’s sale. This suggests that closer and more recent activity matters more for property values. These 
and other robustness checks are summarized in Appendix A.  
22 In Appendix A, I also consider the effect of well investigations, which should not provide much risk 
information to residents. I find that well investigations have no statistically significant effects on properties 
with nearby wells. In future work, I hope to provide a closer match between nearby wells and specific 
violations. 
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Overall, the estimated effects seem modest but may become large in some 
circumstances, especially considering the number of potentially affected properties. Table 
4 provides a summary of estimated effects. For simplicity, the value of a property that has 
its water piped from the public water supplier is standardized at $100,000. Because I 
estimate properties with private water wells to be worth more on average after I control 
for various property and neighborhood characteristics, those properties begin with a value 
of $113,430.23 Already, at the average number of EH&S violations, all the benefits of a 
nearby horizontal well are offset for properties that rely on private water, while properties 
with piped water retain modest net benefits. As the number of violations increase toward 
the maximum observed in my sample, all properties face net losses from an additional 
nearby horizontal well. Of course, properties that receive royalty payments from well 
operators may still see net benefits, but those that do not almost certainly face greater 
losses. 
 
Nearest-Neighbor Matching Estimation 
Another concern when estimating the effects of nearby wells is possible 
endogeneity or reverse causality because well placements are not random; operators 
choose where to drill and, in particular, may choose to drill where property values (and 
therefore leases) are cheaper. Then, instead of finding the effect of nearby wells on 
property values, I might pick up how property values influence an operator’s decision to 
                                                
23 I report the correct interpretation of the coefficient on the private-well indicator variable in the 
discussion. In a semi-log econometric specification, the correct interpretation of the coefficient is calculated 
using the following equation: 𝑒! − 1 ∗ 100 percent, where 𝛽 is the coefficient on an indicator variable, 
as pointed out in the literature (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; Kennedy 1981). 
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drill.24 In this chapter, I find a positive and statistically significant effect of nearby 
horizontal wells on property values after I control for variables that are affected by risk 
perceptions. Although operators are not likely to have chosen to drill in locations where 
property values are higher, there is the possibility that the operators’ strategic choices 
lead me to underestimate the positive effects of nearby wells.25 In this section, I try to 
account for this possibility by employing an alternative estimation strategy: nearest-
neighbor matching. 
The goal of the nearest-neighbor matching strategy is to identify untreated 
properties that are similar to treated properties and thereby construct a control group. The 
effect of the treatment is then found by averaging across the price differences for matched 
pairs. This estimation strategy requires the use of an indicator variable that denotes the 
treatment, so I test the effect of at least one horizontal well within a mile for different 
types of properties or the effect of a risk-relevant feature for properties with and without 
at least one nearby horizontal well. The nearest-neighbor matching estimator allows me 
to require exact matches on certain dimensions, so I require that the matched untreated 
properties are located in the same school district. I then match on the sale year, the 
number of nearby vertical wells, and various property characteristics. I also take 
advantage of a bias-correction procedure that adjusts the difference within matches for 
                                                
24 In Appendix A, I present results of a falsification test that suggest that my control variables mitigate this 
concern. 
25 There are other ways in which I might be underestimating the positive property-value effects of nearby 
wells. I don’t know which properties actually receive royalty payments, so my coefficients represent the 
average effects for all nearby properties—those that receive rental and royalty payments as well as those 
that do not. In addition, the “control” properties that do not have nearby wells may soon have nearby wells 
and may already be receiving rental payments that raise their property value. Previous studies have also 
been unable to control for these effects (Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2012; Gopalakrishnan and 
Klaiber 2014). 
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observed differences in my matching variables as well as tract characteristics for matched 
properties. I require three matches for each treated property. 
In Table 5 and Table 6, I present these results. In Table 5, I find that having at 
least one nearby horizontal well increases property values by about 8 to 10 percent, 
which is similar to my ordinary least squares regression results when I use a well 
indicator variable.26 These gains, however, only accrue to properties connected to the 
public water system. Properties that rely on private water wells have no statistically 
significant gain or loss from having at least one horizontal well; in other words, these 
properties lose the 8 to 10 percent gain in property values that other properties tend to 
accrue with at least one nearby horizontal well but do not necessarily face further losses 
on average. I also flip the treatment by examining the property value effects associated 
with reliance on private water wells when matched to similar properties with and without 
at least one nearby horizontal well. Whereas reliance on a private water well is not 
associated with any statistically significant difference in property values for similar 
properties without a nearby horizontal well, reliance on private water wells is associated 
with a 38 percent decrease in property values for similar properties with at least one 
nearby well. 
In Table 6, I use the matching estimator to validate my results on the effect of 
EH&S shale violations. This is difficult because I rely on the continuous nature of the 
violations variable, which captures the number of relevant well violations in the six 
months prior to each property’s sale. I employ two treatments: having at least one nearby 
                                                
26 In my dataset, properties that have at least one horizontal well have, on average, five such wells. Because 
of this, the indicator variables tend to show larger effects because they are not just showing the effect of an 
additional horizontal well—but rather, the effect of five horizontal wells. Multiplying my finding of a 2 
percent increase for each additional horizontal well by five generates similar results. Results using indicator 
variables are presented in Appendix A. 
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horizontal well and having an above-average number of recent EH&S shale violations (as 
compared to the county’s average level of such violations in my sample), and I split the 
properties into groups. I find two statistically significant results: all properties following 
an above-average number of recent EH&S shale violations sold for about 9 percent less, 
but those properties with at least one nearby horizontal well sold for about 17 percent 
less. The results using nearest-neighbor matching are consistent with my main results and 
suggest that site endogeneity is not a concern. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the property-value effects of nearby shale development 
in Washington County, Pennsylvania using a hedonic pricing model. Specifically, I 
analyze whether property sales data reveal evidence that buyers and sellers are 
responding to perceived risks of shale development. I find that most effects are driven by 
nearby horizontal wells, not by nearby vertical wells. After controlling for risks to water 
and information on violations, an additional horizontal well within a mile of a property 
increases the property’s value by about 2 percent. Properties that receive water from a 
private water well, however, face property-value losses from nearby horizontal wells, but 
I find that, on average, these losses tend not to outweigh the value of an additional nearby 
well. In addition, I find evidence that individuals consider the number of recent EH&S 
violations on shale wells when assessing the risk of nearby horizontal wells. In particular, 
my main specification suggests that each violation decreases the value of a property with 
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at least one horizontal well within a mile by about 0.04 percent. A nearest-neighbor 
matching estimation strategy supports my main results.  
In general, my results suggest that individuals are aware of horizontal well risks. 
Individuals pay a premium to own a property that is connected to the public water 
system, and they pay less for properties with nearby horizontal wells when there have 
been a lot of recent well violations. The well-violation results are consistent with a model 
in which individuals rationally update their subjective risk probabilities of shale 
development using the information contained in well violations. Increased notifications 
about these violations could lead to even larger effects on property values, possibly 
outweighing the financial benefits.27  
To put the risk results into perspective, I estimate the fatality risk probability 
implied by my risk coefficients. For example, I estimate that individuals are willing to 
pay 1.4 percent of a property’s value, or $2,260 at the average house price, in order to 
avoid the risk of an additional nearby horizontal well when the property relies on a 
private well water. If the value of a statistical life is measured at $9 million,28 then the 
implied risk would be equivalent to a fatality risk of 2.5 out of 10,000. Similarly, the 
implied fatality risk per recent EH&S well violation would be about 7.3 in 1,000,000 and 
the implied fatality risk at the average number of well violations would be about 1.3 in 
10,000. Under the Superfund program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
generally acts to clean up a hazardous site when the cumulative lifetime excess cancer 
risk exceeds 1 in 10,000, and it has discretion to act when the cancer risk is measured to 
                                                
27 Already, many Pennsylvania residents complain that they do not receive adequate information about the 
violations incurred by operators drilling near their properties. Erica Fink. 2012. “Reporting of Fracking and 
Drilling Violations Weak.” CNN Money, May 1. 
28 This is a reasonable estimate based on the latest research using accurate fatality data (Viscusi 2013). 
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be between 1 in 1,000,000 and 1 in 10,000 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
1991). By this metric, individuals’ implied risk perceptions for private well-water risks 
and general adverse well-event risks are roughly equivalent to the actual cancer risk 
associated with a high-priority Superfund site.  
In Pennsylvania, Act 13 distinguishes between conventional and shale wells, 
applying more stringent statutory requirements for shale wells in order to manage their 
specific risks. Operators of shale wells may be subject to presumptive liability for water 
contamination, may be assessed impact fees by local governments, and must comply with 
larger setback rules and more extensive reporting and notification requirements. My 
results support Pennsylvania Act 13’s application of more stringent requirements on 
operators of shale wells, although these additional requirements have not eliminated 
residents’ concerns. Environmental groups have previously reported that PADEP’s 
inspection and enforcement practices still leave much to be desired (Earthworks 2012). 
Along those lines, my results underscore the need to develop comprehensive risk-
management schemes and provide relevant, science-based information on risks to 
communities facing shale development. In Chapter III of this dissertation, I propose 
regulatory interventions to help manage water-contamination risks of nearby drilling, 
such as insurance mandates to ensure funds for compensation and remediation and 
additional tort and regulatory clarifications. Together, these interventions would create a 
risk-management scheme that could alleviate water-contamination property-value losses. 
Otherwise, as I demonstrate in Chapter II, local governments may turn to extreme 
solutions such as outright bans on natural gas extraction to bluntly prevent environmental 
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damage and resulting property-value losses in their communities, thereby limiting access 
to potentially valuable natural resources.   
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Tables  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics – Washington County, Pennsylvania. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Property Characteristics   
Sale Price (in year 2012 dollars) 161,344 145,144 
Bedrooms (number) 3.08 0.89 
Bathrooms (number) 2.05 1.01 
Building Age 49.40 40.77 
Total Living Area (1,000 square feet) 1.83 0.83 
Lot Size (100,000 square feet) 0.28 1.19 
Building Sold in Year Built 0.13 0.34 
Stories (number) 1.82 0.75 
Garage (0/1) 0.75 0.44 
Fireplace (0/1) 0.29 0.45 
Pool (0/1) 0.03 0.16 
Private Well Water 0.08 0.27 
Distance to Pittsburgh (miles) 18.93 7.74 
   
Census Tract Characteristics   
Median Household Income 58,868 22,995 
Mean Household Income 70,941 26,225 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree 37.95 12.25 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor's Degree 18.33 8.50 
% Unemployed 6.95 3.30 
% Poverty 9.66 7.92 
% Over 65 Years Old 17.24 4.54 
% Under 19 Years Old 24.33 4.72 
% Black 4.32 7.32 
% Latino 1.11 1.21 
   
Shale Well Proximity   
Distance to closest well (miles) 0.63 0.87 
Number of wells within 1 mile 4.93 5.81 
Distance to closest horizontal well 2.06 2.51 
Number of horizontal wells within 1 mile 0.17 1.18 
   
Shale Well Compliance   
Well investigations in county, 6 months before sale 298.04 286.29 
Violations in county, 6 months before sale 31.26 31.54 
Environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) violations in 
county, 6 months before sale 
18.88 21.41 
EH&S shale violations in county, 6 months before sale 11.43 13.50 
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Table 2. Main Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Washington County. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vertical wells w/in 1 mile 
(Vertical wells) 
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells w/in 1 mile 
(Horizontal wells) 
0.005 0.010 0.015* 0.020** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Vertical wells x Private well 
water 
 -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
Horizontal wells x Private well 
water 
 -0.014*  -0.014* 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
EH&S shale violations    0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S shale 
violations 
  -2.7e-5 -2.4e-5 
  (5.3e-5) (5.3e-5) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S shale 
violations 
  -4.3e-4*** -4.3e-4** 
  (1.5e-4) (1.7e-4) 
Private well water 0.089* 0.126** 0.090* 0.126** 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.047) (0.055) 
Building Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (4.7e-4) (4.7e-4) (4.7e-4) (4.7e-4) 
Total Living Area (1,000 sqft) 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Bedrooms (number) 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Bathrooms (number) 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Building Sold in Year Built -0.381*** -0.382*** -0.381*** -0.382*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Lot Size (100,000 sqft) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Garage (0/1) 0.377*** 0.377*** 0.377*** 0.377*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Fireplace (0/1) 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Distance to Pittsburgh (miles) -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Median Household Income 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Black 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School 
Degree 
-0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% Unemployed -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% Under 19 Years Old -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School District Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 11.187*** 11.231*** 11.681*** 11.692*** 
 (0.250) (0.254) (0.383) (0.372) 
     
Observations 21,987 21,987 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.613 0.613 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicators for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Shale Versus Conventional Environmental, Health, and Safety Violations. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Vertical wells 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells 0.020** 0.019* 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Vertical wells x Private well water -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells x Private well water -0.014* -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
EH&S violations 0.001  
 (0.001)  
Vertical wells x EH&S violations -8.0e-6  
 (5.3e-5)  
Horizontal wells x EH&S violations -4.1e-4**  
 (1.7e-4)  
EH&S shale violations  -1.8e-4 
  (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S shale violations  2.7e-5 
  (8.0e-5) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S shale violations  -4.0e-4* 
  (2.0e-4) 
EH&S conventional violations  0.002* 
  (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S conventional violations  1.2e-5 
  (7.7e-5) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S conventional violations  3.2e-5 
  (0.001) 
Private well water 0.126** 0.126** 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
   
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes Yes 
   
Constant 11.710*** 11.721*** 
 (0.372) (0.370) 
   
Observations 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicators for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4. Summary of Main Estimated Effects, Washington County. 
  
Property with Piped 
Water 
Property with a 
Private Well 
Additional horizontal well 102,000 114,030 
Well plus average EH&S shale violations 101,510 113,540 
Well plus max EH&S shale violations 99,940 111,960 
Well plus average EH&S violations 101,230 113,260 
Well plus max EH&S violations 98,390 110,420 
Notes. For simplicity, the value of a piped property is standardized at $100,000.  
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Table 5. Matching Estimator, Water-Contamination Risk of Horizontal Wells.  
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Sample Well Treatment Water Treatment 
All Properties (n=22,002)   
 Well treatment: 96.99 percent exact matches 0.098**  
 (0.040)  
 Water treatment: 92.83 percent exact matches  0.027 
  (0.043) 
   
Properties with piped, public water 0.082**  
 (n=20,306; 97.73 percent exact matches) (0.044)  
Properties with private water wells -0.013  
 (n=1,696; 99.9 percent exact matches) (0.077)  
   
Properties without a nearby horizontal well   0.070 
 (n=21,283; 92.14 percent exact matches)  (0.046) 
Properties with at least one nearby horizontal well  -0.329*** 
 (n=719; 92.92 percent exact matches)  (0.113) 
Exact Matching Variable: School district Yes Yes 
Other Matching Variables   
 Number of vertical wells within a mile Yes Yes 
 Property characteristics Yes Yes 
 Sale year Yes Yes 
   
Bias Adjustment Variables   
 Matching variables Yes Yes 
 Tract characteristics Yes Yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors. Each treated property is matched with three properties in 
the control sample. Well Treatment refers to having at least one horizontal well within a 
mile. Water Treatment refers to relying on a private water well. Exact match required on 
school district. Matching is also based on and the number of vertical wells within a mile, 
the sale year, and property characteristics that include building age, total living area, the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the lot size, and the distance to Pittsburgh. Bias 
adjustment contains the property characteristics and tract characteristics that include the 
median household income, percent Black, percent age twenty-five with a high school 
degree, percent unemployed, and percent under nineteen years old. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6. Matching Estimator, Information on Violations. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Sample Well Treatment Violations 
Treatment 
All Properties (n=22,002)   
 Well treatment: 96.99 percent exact matches 0.098**  
 (0.040)  
 Violations treatment: 98.02 percent exact 
matches 
 -0.086*** 
  (0.017) 
   
Properties sold when low EH&S shale violations  0.016  
 (n=13,512; 88.08 percent exact matches) (0.072)  
Properties sold when high EH&S shale violations  0.057  
 (n=8,490; 96.86 percent exact matches) (0.051)  
   
Properties without a nearby horizontal well   -0.091*** 
 (n=21,283; 97.84 percent exact matches)  (0.019) 
Properties with at least one nearby horizontal well  -0.157** 
 (n=719; 95.74 percent exact matches)  (0.062) 
Exact Matching Variable: School district Yes Yes 
Other Matching Variables   
 Number of vertical wells within a mile Yes Yes 
 Number of recent well investigations Yes Yes 
 Property characteristics Yes Yes 
 Sale year Yes Yes 
   
Bias Adjustment Variables   
 Matching variables Yes Yes 
 Tract characteristics Yes Yes 
Notes. Each treated property is matched with three properties in the control sample. Well 
Treatment refers to having at least one horizontal well within a mile. Violations 
Treatment refers to having above-average EH&S shale violations in the prior six months. 
Exact match required on school district. Matching is also based on the number of vertical 
wells within a mile, the number of well investigations in the six months prior to the sale, 
the sale year, and property characteristics that include building age, total living area, the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the lot size, and the distance to Pittsburgh. Bias 
adjustment contains the matching variables and tract characteristics that include the 
median household income, percent Black, percent age twenty-five with a high school 
degree, percent unemployed, and percent under nineteen years old. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOCAL DECISION TO PROHIBIT 
SHALE DEVELOPMENT  
 
Introduction 
 
In 2012, the International Energy Agency (IEA) warned firms to support 
regulations that deal convincingly with environmental risks of high-volume hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling, which would raise production costs by about 
seven percent, or else face widespread bans and other limits that would ultimately prove 
more expensive. Already, numerous cities and towns across the United States have 
started to prohibit all natural gas extraction activities, hindering a national energy policy 
that relies on continued increases in natural gas production (Cheren 2014). The IEA’s 
statement, however, assumes that banning behavior would decrease in light of more 
stringent regulations—or at the very least, it assumes that banning behavior is motivated 
by the perceived environmental costs of shale development. Yet, no one has studied this 
question. In this chapter, I empirically investigate why some towns in New York chose to 
prohibit fracking either permanently (a ban) or for a specified term (a moratorium). 
Although shale development provides economic benefits to communities, the 
extensive fracking associated with shale development also generates negative 
externalities that can range in severity from increased traffic and noise to potential 
groundwater contamination and other environmental damage.29 These perceived costs 
                                                
29 Appendix C provides a more detailed overview of some of these risks.  
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have made fracking highly controversial, especially in the state of New York. Since July 
2008, New York has had a moratorium on high-volume fracking in order to allow the 
state to study the environmental effects of these drilling techniques and to develop 
appropriate regulations. In the meantime, more than fifty towns have passed fracking 
bans, and more than one hundred and twenty towns have passed moratoria on fracking 
activities. Thus, the events in New York provide an opportunity to analyze the 
fundamental drivers of these local decisions.  
In this chapter, I develop a model wherein town board members decide whether to 
adopt a ban or a moratorium on fracking. Town board members take into account resident 
voter preferences, which are based on the net benefits of fracking, among other things. 
Previous work has found that voter preferences are important determinants of state-level 
smoking restrictions (Hersch, Del Rossi, and Viscusi 2004). In this study, I model how 
residents are likely to form their preferences and use insights from the model to inform 
my empirical specification. I then combine various sources of town-level and county-
level data to analyze and explain the town’s decision to ban or delay fracking.  
Overall, I find evidence that water-risk concerns play an important role in the 
decision to adopt a ban. Towns with a higher reliance on private water wells and those 
with higher livestock water use are associated with a higher probability of adopting a ban. 
In addition, towns with more Black residents and with a greater reliance on private water 
wells are particularly likely to ban shale development, possibly due to African 
Americans’ higher likelihood of living in areas with poor water quality (U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 2011). Demographic characteristics, environmental 
preferences, and political interests also predict whether a town will adopt a ban.  
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Moratoria adoption, on the other hand, is different. Towns with higher water risks 
and with greater drilling experience are less likely to adopt a moratorium. The largest 
driver of moratoria adoption is the county recycling rate, possibly because moratoria are 
mostly symbolic gestures given the state moratorium on fracking activities. As symbolic 
gestures, it is not surprising that moratoria are adopted where residents have strong 
environmental preferences but are not adopted where residents might have real concerns 
about water risks. Finally, industry presence and previous experience with drilling tend to 
decrease the probability that a town adopts any anti-fracking measure. 
 
Literature 
 
 This research draws on public choice models of policymaking by state and local 
governments. In these models, the preferences of voters are important because they affect 
the incentives of policymakers to support various laws and regulations. These models are 
often augmented with nonvoter factors, such as political pressures from interest groups. 
My analysis most closely resembles the work of Hersch, Del Rossi, and Viscusi 
(2004), who analyzed how voter preferences influence the probability that a state has a 
smoking restriction.30 Their model was based on the median voter theory of government 
action (Black 1948; Downs 1957). Essentially, when there are two political candidates 
vying for a position, the median voter theory posits that a majority-rule voting system 
will select the candidate most preferred by the median voter, and political candidates will 
maximize their support when they gravitate toward the median voter’s position (subject 
                                                
30 Hersch, Del Rossi, and Viscusi’s (2004) examination of determinants of state smoking restrictions has 
already been extended to local smoking restrictions using methodology similar to that used in this chapter 
(Phelps 2012). 
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to a number of simplifying assumptions). At its core, the model predicts which voter 
preferences are important to candidates or incumbents seeking to maintain their office. 
The model says nothing about how voters form their preferences but does assume that 
voters behave rationally and consistently based on their ordered preferences. Thus, 
economists and political scientists have invoked the median voter model as a way to use 
the individual utility maximizing model applied to the median income family to analyze 
government behavior.  
The median voter model, however, rests on a special set of assumptions about 
group preferences that may not be satisfied in practice (Stearns and Zywicki 2009). In 
most elections, for example, there are more than two candidates; policy preferences rarely 
align along a single-dimensional scale; and the voting population is divided into electoral 
districts. In those cases, it is still possible for self-interested political candidates to 
converge on the median voter’s position, but other outcomes are also possible, often 
depending on the voting scheme. In New York, the town board serves as the governing 
board of each town and is typically made up of five elected officials—the supervisor 
(two-year term) and four councilpersons (four-year terms). Most towns employ at-large 
majority voting to elect the single supervisor every two years, but use at-large single-
nontransferable voting to elect two councilpersons every two years (a plurality voting 
system).31 Theoretically speaking, the outcome from a plurality-voting system need not 
coincide with the median voter outcome (Stearns and Zywicki 2009), meaning that the 
councilpersons need not converge on the median voter’s preferences to get elected.  
                                                
31 Thirteen towns, however, employ a ward election system instead of an at-large election system. 
Appendix B presents the main results with the inclusion of a control for these towns. The qualitative results 
remain the same.  
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Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that the median voter model has 
motivational relevance in this context as a way to summarize voter preferences. First, the 
elected official has an obligation to represent resident preferences in New York. 
According to the New York town manual, whenever a town councilperson votes on a 
proposal before a town board, “he or she is representing, through that vote, the views of 
all of the residents of the town.”32 Even for self-interested local politicians, voter 
preferences on shale development are important because the politicians may fear 
retaliation from voters in the next election, retaliation that is more likely on a local scale 
where the anti-fracking action may be one of few town board actions. Resident 
homeowners pay particular attention to decisions that affect the use of their land, and 
those local decisions are especially likely to be majoritarian (Serkin 2006). Local 
politicians are also likely to know resident preferences in this context, usually having 
held town resident meetings in advance of any anti-fracking action. In short, local 
officials fulfill their duties and often maximize their support when they estimate and 
follow resident preferences when making a decision on a proposal. 
In this work, I explore the determinants of residents’ preferences that can affect a 
politician’s perception of the median voter’s position in his community. I assume that 
residents are rational and that they choose the position on a proposed action that 
maximizes their expected utility based on their perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
the proposed action. Of course, the public choice literature is also concerned with how 
citizens translate preferences into voting behavior—and why they vote at all.33 In my 
                                                
32 Association of Towns of the State of New York, Town Law Manual for Town Supervisors and Town 
Boards, http://townverona.org/content/Laws/View/7:field=documents;/content/Documents/File/35.pdf. 
33 Because any one person’s vote is unlikely to drive the outcome of an election, the act of casting a vote is 
considered to be not worth the effort in most cases. 
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model, politicians assume that residents get additional benefits from expressing their 
preferred outcome in the form of voting. Politicians are also aware of the various 
demographic factors that could lead some residents to be more or less likely to express 
their preferences or engage in collective action.34  
When forming preferences, I assume that residents weigh the benefits and costs of 
fracking activities in their town. For bans, which are mostly enacted through local zoning 
amendments, this assumption is reasonable as zoning has been long thought to be a way 
for local governments to manage various industry externalities and protect property 
values. As I show in Chapter I, perceived water-contamination risks can lower some 
property values; residents vulnerable to water contamination in New York towns may 
fear these risks and property-value losses. Moratoria are often enacted as local 
ordinances, and the moratoria are unlikely to have much effect given the state’s 
longstanding moratorium on fracking activities and the short adopted duration of most 
town moratoria. Residents considering temporary moratoria may not weigh the costs and 
benefits of fracking in the same way as are residents considering bans. Hence, the drivers 
of these two anti-fracking actions are likely to be different. 
Scholars have analyzed mechanisms aside from the median-voter model that 
influence the legislative preferences of politicians. One prominent alternative theory is 
the interest group theory (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983), which posits that 
rational legislators are likely to confer regulatory benefits on interest-seeking industry 
groups. Although I do not explicitly rely on this model, I use insights from it, such as the 
idea that the presence of an industry in an area could translate to political influence. In 
                                                
34 My assumptions about how politicians estimate resident preferences are similar to those in Hamilton’s 
(1995) analysis of how firms estimate the intensity of resident preferences in their decisions to locate in 
different neighborhoods.34 
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general, studies have found that both median voter models and interest group models are 
useful in explaining local and state spending (e.g., Congleton and Bennett 1995; Ahmed 
and Greene 2000; Walden and Eryuruk 2012).  
 
New York Anti-Fracking Actions and Preferences 
 
In New York, the Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) 
regulates oil-and-gas permitting and drilling activities.35 Since July 2008, New York has 
had a moratorium on high-volume fracking in order to allow the NYDEC to study the 
environmental effects of the drilling techniques associated with fracking and to develop 
appropriate regulations. In furtherance of this goal, the NYDEC released a draft 
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (draft SGEIS) in September 
2009 and a revised draft SGEIS in September 2011.36 Currently, the NYDEC is waiting 
on a review of the potential impacts of shale drilling on public health before it finalizes 
the SGEIS. Once completed, the final SGEIS will apply statewide, except in areas that 
the NYDEC determines will be off-limits to fracking, and the NYDEC will use its SGEIS 
findings to develop criteria and conditions for permit approvals.  
Despite the regulatory uncertainty, oil-and-gas operators have shown interest in 
New York. Landowners in Chemung and Tioga counties in New York, for example, have 
already been receiving rental payments of about $500 per acre (Marcellus Drilling News 
                                                
35 The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) has power to oversee drilling in its area of jurisdiction, 
which includes parts of New York in the watershed area of the Delaware River. To date, the DRBC has 
indicated an interest in reviewing New York’s drilling regulations before proposing any regulations. 
36 2011. “Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program.” 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html. 
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2012).37 The NYDEC has also received applications for permits to drill horizontal wells 
while it works to finalize the new drilling rules.  
Although the statewide moratorium has suspended fracking activities for the time 
being, both proponents and opponents of fracking have begun to think about the future of 
fracking in their communities. Below, I provide information on the anti-fracking town 
actions analyzed in this study and describe the results of recent polls on New York 
preferences on fracking. 
 
New York Town Anti-Fracking Actions 
Many New York town residents have voiced their concerns about fracking to their 
local town boards. New York has 932 towns, and each town is governed by a town board 
that may adopt local laws pursuant to the home rule powers granted by Article 9 of the 
State Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law. In many cases, these town boards 
have adopted fracking-related measures. Some town boards have adopted resolutions 
stating that the town will wait until the NYDEC issues regulations before making any 
decisions on fracking within the town’s borders, a neutral action considered to be 
supportive of fracking. Other towns, however, have voted to prohibit fracking either 
permanently (a ban) or for a specified term, usually between six months and two years (a 
moratorium). This study analyzes the anti-fracking actions of these towns. Table 7 
                                                
37 These payments are much lower than those in other states such as Pennsylvania and Ohio given the 
uncertainty surrounding eventual drilling authority in New York. 
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provides a list of the towns that adopted an anti-fracking measure between 2010 and 2013 
that are included in this analysis.38  
Most fracking bans have been amendments to (or new versions of) local zoning 
laws, adopted under the towns’ home-rule authority. Typically, the towns enact language 
to clarify or reiterate that horizontal drilling and fracking in particular (e.g., Camillus) or 
all natural gas activities generally (e.g., Lumberland) are incompatible land uses in all 
zoning districts. In some cases, the town also lists reasons for its actions. For example, 
the town of Tusten explicitly writes that the law “is intended to protect drinking water 
supplies.” One exception is the town of Wales, which enacted its ban as a rights-based 
ordinance instead of a zoning local law, asserting the right of the community to protect its 
environment from harmful activities. Specifically, the town cites “the inherent right of the 
residents of the Town of Wales to govern and protect their own community” as the 
authority for its ban and notes that the town “relies exclusively on the existence and 
usage of natural well water as its sole source of water.” In Table 8, I provide detail on 
some of the language used by towns that banned fracking in 2010 or 2011. Towns that 
banned fracking in 2012 or 2013 used similar language. 
I define anti-fracking moratoria as temporary bans on natural gas exploration, 
extraction, and production activities that range in duration from three months (Onondaga) 
to until proven safe (Westmoreland), although the most common duration is one year.39 
These moratoria are often extended or renewed, though some town boards have allowed 
moratoria to expire. The towns often explicitly note that the moratoria address matters of 
                                                
38 In addition, there were six towns that adopted an anti-fracking measure during the sample period that 
were excluded from this analysis because the towns do not lie on a shale formation. Appendix B provides a 
list of these towns and also lists some cities and villages that adopted bans or moratoria. 
39 The adopted duration of 72 percent of moratoria was twelve months. 
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local concern and were enacted pursuant to the towns’ home-rule authority. Many towns 
also cite environmental and, in particular, water concerns as reasons for adopting 
moratoria. For example, the town of Avon notes, that “[m]any residents are dependent 
upon aquifers and wells for life sustaining water [and] maintaining the quality of water 
resources within the Town is critical to protecting the natural environment of the Town, 
the general health and welfare of Town residents, and the local economy.”40 Twenty-
seven towns that adopted a ban on fracking activities between 2010 and 2013 had 
previously adopted a moratorium on fracking. 
Already, two towns, Dryden and Middlefield, are involved in litigation 
surrounding their actions banning fracking outright through zoning laws.41 The town of 
Dryden was initially sued by the Anschutz Exploration Corporation, a privately held 
drilling company, while the town of Middlefield was sued by a landowner who had 
signed two oil and gas leases in 2007 with Elexco Land Services, Inc. The towns won 
their lawsuits at the lower-court level, with courts upholding the actions under the home-
rule authority of the towns to engage in zoning. On appeal, Norse Energy, a Norway-
based drilling company (whose U.S. unit filed for bankruptcy protection in December 
2012) replaced Anschutz Exploration in the Dryden case. The New York Appellate Court 
upheld the lower-court decisions in May 2013.42 In August 2013, New York’s highest 
court, the Court of Appeals, agreed to hear the cases, which are being tried together. The 
Court’s decision is pending. Meanwhile, town bans are not the only anti-fracking actions 
                                                
40 “Moratorium on and Prohibition of Gas and Petroleum Exploration and Extraction Activities 
Underground Storage of Natural Gas and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum Extraction Exploration and 
Production Wastes,” Town of Avon Local Law No. T-A-5-2012. 
41 The initial lawsuits were Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 474 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2012); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2012).  
42 Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Cooperstown 
Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
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being attacked in New York courts. A lower court in New York has also upheld against 
challenge the authority of a town to enact a moratorium.43  
These decisions on the ability of towns to enact bans or moratoria on natural gas 
activities are likely to have a significant effect on shale development in New York. If the 
town actions are upheld, then operators will evaluate whether to invest in drilling in New 
York in light of the local regulatory uncertainty—that is, in light of the fact that a town 
board can ban drilling at any time.44 In addition, it is unclear whether a future New York 
state law could strip towns of this authority, as Pennsylvania legislators recently 
discovered. In 2012, Pennsylvania’s legislature passed a law known as Act 13 that, 
among other reforms, gave drilling operators the right to drill anywhere notwithstanding 
local zoning that might prohibit drilling in sensitive areas, such as residential areas.45 The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania’s highest court, found that part of Act 13 
unconstitutional under Pennsylvania’s Constitution.46 Because local control could play an 
important role in the regulation of shale development in many states, it is important to 
understand what predicts banning behavior. 
 
New York Opinions on Fracking 
 Although there is no poll that provides town-level preferences on fracking, there 
have been a few state-level polls on fracking views in New York. These polls tend to 
show New Yorkers divided on the issue, with typically a slight majority opposing the 
practice. One detailed 2011 poll of 941 adults found that statewide, 38 percent of adults 
                                                
43 Lenape Resources, Inc. v. Town of Avon, Index No. 1060-2012 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Mar. 15, 2013). This was 
the first court to successfully affirm a moratorium.   
44 The ability of towns to ban fracking could also be seen as a bargaining chip (Rose 2013). 
45 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301-3504 (2013), which amends the Oil and Gas Act (Title 58). 
46 Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Com., 2013 WL 6687290 (Pa. Dec. 19, 2013). 
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supported fracking, 41 percent opposed it, and 21 percent were unsure.47 Of those adults 
living in upstate New York, 37 percent supported fracking, 47 percent opposed it, and 16 
percent were unsure. Overall, Democrats were most likely to oppose fracking, with about 
47 percent opposing the practice. Republicans were most likely to support fracking, with 
about 49 percent supporting it. The relationship between fracking opposition and income 
was counterintuitive, with New Yorkers who made less than $50,000 being most likely to 
oppose fracking (at 43 percent, compared to 33 percent that support it), while those who 
made between $50,000 and $100,000 and those who made more than $100,000 were 
relatively split on the issue (with 44 and 42 percent, respectively, supporting it compared 
to 40 percent opposing it). Finally, men were more likely to support fracking (at 48 
percent supporting it compared to 41 percent opposing it), while women and nonwhite 
respondents were more likely to oppose fracking (at 42 and 45 percent, respectively, 
opposing it compared to 29 and 34 percent, respectively, supporting it). 
 When the tradeoffs associated with shale development were made explicit, New 
Yorkers were similarly divided. When asked which was more important, “making us 
more independent from foreign oil” or “preserving water supplies and the environment,” 
51 percent of New Yorkers living in upstate New York chose the environment, 45 
percent chose energy independence, and 4 percent were unsure.48 Similarly, when asked 
which is more important, “creating jobs” or “preserving water supplies and the 
                                                
47 NY1/YNN-Marist Poll, May 17, 2011, Marist College Institute for Public Opinion. The question was 
worded as follows: “Hydraulic fracturing, often referred to as hydrofracking, is a process of splitting rocks 
underground to remove natural gas. From what you have read or heard, do you generally support or oppose 
hydrofracking?” The survey was conducted between April 25 and April 29, 2011, and participants were 
contacted by land line and through random dialing of cell phones. 
48 Specifically, the question was worded as follows: “Those who support this process say it makes us more 
independent from foreign oil and creates jobs. Those who oppose this process say it contaminates 
community water supplies and the environment. What do you think is more important: Making us more 
independent from foreign oil or preserving water supplies and the environment?” 
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environment,” 52 percent of New Yorkers chose preserving the environment, 41 percent 
chose creating jobs, and 6 percent were unsure.49 Though these data do not provide 
information on how resident preferences form and how they vary among towns, the data 
highlight which demographic characteristics might be relevant. The survey questions also 
emphasize the tradeoffs that are relevant for residents when they make their decisions: 
water supplies, the environment, energy independence, and jobs. Below, I present a 
theoretical framework that formalizes some of these tradeoffs.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
My analysis is framed by the following model of the relationship between a town 
board’s decision to adopt a ban and my variables of interest. Let 𝐵! be a binary indicator 
of whether the town board in town 𝑖 adopts a fracking ban. The probability that town 𝑖 
has a fracking ban depends on 𝑏!, a measure of preferences for a fracking ban by town 
residents, a vector 𝑋! of demographic variables that capture additional preferences that 
might not be reflected by 𝑏!, and a vector 𝑍! that represents the influence of interest 
groups and other political variables, summarized by the following equation: Pr 𝐵! = 1 = 𝜌(  𝛼!𝑏! + 𝑋!!𝛼! + 𝑍!!𝛼!). (2) 
In this model, I assume that the town board’s decision to adopt a ban is responsive 
to resident preferences, 𝑏!. Resident preferences are salient to local elected officials. 
Town boards typically adopt bans after receiving significant input from residents through 
                                                
49 Specifically, the question was worded as follows: “Those who support this process say it makes us more 
independent from foreign oil and creates jobs. Those who oppose this process say it contaminates 
community water supplies and the environment. What do you think is more important: Creating jobs or 
preserving water supplies and the environment?” The preference breakdown for upstate residents was 
similar to the statewide preference breakdown on this question. 
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scheduled town hall meetings on the proposed actions. Resident preferences are also 
relevant because those town board members that do not adhere to resident preferences 
risk being voted out of office during the next local election.  
So far, this model resembles the theoretical framework for Hersch, Del Rossi, and 
Viscusi’s (2004) analysis of state smoking restrictions with the key exception that I do 
not have data on town voter preferences to directly estimate 𝑏!. In my model, town board 
members estimate resident preferences by calculating the net benefits of a ban to the 
median voter. Hence, the probability of adopting a ban increases as resident preferences 
for a ban increase, and resident preferences for a ban increase as the expected 
environmental damages increase, the consumption value of voting for a ban increases, 
and the costs associated with organizing support for a ban decrease. Formally, resident 
support for a ban, 𝑏!, is determined in the following way: b! =   𝛿! 𝑒! − 𝑟 + 𝛿!𝑠! + 𝛿!𝑐! + 𝜀, (3) 
where 𝑒! is the expected value of environmental and health damages,   𝑟 is the expected 
rental or royalty payments, 𝑠! is the satisfaction that the median voter derives from the 
ban, 𝑐! is the transaction cost associated with supporting political action in the town, and 𝜀 is random error. An assortment of variables will be used to proxy for these dimensions 
that are broadly discussed in this model.  
In particular, the expected value of environmental and health damages, 𝑒!, depend 
on the perceived probability and extent of damages and on the value that residents place 
on such damages. Therefore, I expect 𝑒! to depend, among other things, on the value of 
the town’s water resources, which may become polluted; the proportion of residents who 
rely on private wells for consumption or for livestock, making residents and livestock 
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more vulnerable to negative health effects of contamination;50 the importance of 
agriculture to the local economy, an industry that might be affected by extensive drilling; 
and the proportion of environmentalists in the town. For simplicity, I model expected 
rental and royalty payments, 𝑟, to be a priori the same for each town. Rental and royalty 
payments offset some of the expected damages of fracking. This means that residents 
tend to support bans in towns where the perceived expected damages are higher than 
expected rental and royalty payments. 
 In addition, I expect town preferences to be a function of the satisfaction that 
town residents are likely to derive from the ban (𝑠!). Political scientists puzzled by the 
persistence of voting despite the low probability that any one person’s vote matters have 
hypothesized that the consumption value of voting may be the most important driver of 
voting behavior. I hypothesize that towns with a high proportion of environmentalists, for 
example, are likely to have residents with a high consumption value of banning fracking.  
Finally, board members are also likely to pay attention to 𝑐!, or the cost associated 
with supporting political action in the town. As the cost of collective political action 
increases, then residents are less likely to actively support a ban—and less likely to vote 
councilpersons out of office for their actions. Residents who actively participate in 
political parties likely face lower costs of political action, while residents in towns with a 
large population face higher costs to collective action.  
For the decision to enact a moratorium, town board members would also look to 
resident preferences. However, residents may be less likely to form their preferences for a 
moratorium by considering the benefits and costs of fracking activities simply because a 
                                                
50 At least one study links cases of illness and death among farm animals and other wildlife to 
contamination from nearby shale development (Bamberger and Oswald 2012). 
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temporary moratorium is likely to expire before fracking becomes a possibility in New 
York given the state moratorium. Preferences for a moratorium may depend more on the 
environmental preferences of residents. 
 
Data Description 
 
To examine the motivations behind town anti-fracking actions, I constructed 
relevant variables from various state and local sources. These variables are summarized 
in Table 9. First, I only considered towns that likely lie upon the Utica or the Marcellus 
shale formations in order to focus on the towns with residents who would reasonably 
balance the competing costs and benefits of shale development because the probability of 
fracking is nonzero.51 Because there is some uncertainty regarding the exact contours of 
the shale formations, I applied a simple decision rule: if a shale formation is known to 
underlie a part of a county, then I include all the towns in the county in my analysis.52 
This limited my analysis to 688 towns out of the 932 towns in New York.  
Second, I created variables that indicated whether a town adopted a ban or a 
moratorium between 2010 and 2013. I used town websites, news articles, and pro-
fracking/anti-fracking group websites to generate a list of all towns that adopted bans or 
moratoria through 2013; the year in which they first adopted the anti-fracking measure; 
and the adopted duration of any moratoria. The FracTracker Alliance, for example, 
                                                
51 Towns that do not lie on a shale basin may still adopt fracking bans or moratoria, but the motivations for 
these actions are likely to be different, driven more by the consumption value of the action than by the 
expected costs and benefits of the action, for example. Appendix B provides a list of these towns. 
52 This decision rule excluded towns in the following counties: Clinton, Columbia, Dutchess, Essex, 
Franklin, Fulton, Hamilton, Nassau, Putnam, Rensselaer, Richmond, Rockland, Saratoga, St. Lawrence, 
Suffolk, Warren, Washington, Westchester, and New York City counties (Bronx, Kings, New York, and 
Queens). 
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provided an excellent starting point for much of my research.53 I supplemented their lists 
of anti-fracking actions with original documents from the Food & Water Watch website54 
and town websites. Table 10 summarizes the types of actions that I identified per year. 
For my analysis, I created separate variables for bans and moratoria because these 
actions were vastly different in scope and effect, especially in light of the state’s 
moratorium on fracking. As discussed previously, the bans were mostly enacted through 
zoning amendments that would be difficult to repeal. The moratoria, in contrast, were 
temporary, and some were allowed to expire without renewal. The moratoria also varied 
greatly in duration. I include the first adoption of a moratorium in my study (regardless of 
whether the moratorium was renewed). According to Table 10, the number of towns 
adopting moratoria peaked in 2012 and declined in 2013. In addition, twenty-seven towns 
that adopted moratoria switched to a ban.55  
Next, I generated variables to capture the value of clean water to each town’s 
residents. As discussed previously and in Chapter I, the potential for water contamination 
is a high-priority issue in public fracking discussions. Water risks are especially 
important in both Pennsylvania and New York because so many residents rely on private 
well water.56 To construct these variables, I collected county-level data from the U.S. 
Geological Survey on water use for the year 2005. These data contain estimates of the 
total population served by the public water supply in each county, and I used this 
                                                
53 Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing Drilling Bans and Moratoria in NY State, 
http://www.fractracker.org/map/ny-moratoria/. My research has led me to make a few changes to the initial 
categorizations of the FracTracker Alliance. 
54 Local Actions Against Fracking, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-
center/local-action-documents/. 
55 In robustness checks contained in Appendix B, I separate bans and moratoria by adoption year and 
moratoria by duration. 
56 Pennsylvania has the second-highest number of households served by private water wells, and New York 
has the fourth-highest number of households served by private water wells. “Groundwater Supply and 
Use,” http://wellowner.org/groundwater/groundwater-supply-use/.  
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information to construct a measure of the proportion of the population that relies on 
private water wells in each county. I also constructed estimates of the million gallons of 
water privately withdrawn from groundwater and surface water sources each day for 
livestock and crop irrigation use from these data.  
I also created variables based on the number of domestic drinking water wells and 
agricultural wells drilled in each town since April 2000. I obtained these data from 
NYDEC, after submitting a FOIL (New York’s Freedom of Information Law) request. I 
treated all wells categorized as iterations of “Domestic,” “Drinking,” or “Potable” as 
domestic water wells and summed these wells for each town. I treated all wells 
categorized as iterations of “Agricultural,” “Farm,” or “Irrigation” as agricultural or 
irrigation wells and summed these wells for each town. Although these data are not 
complete, they were the only town-level data on water-well reliance that I could find. I 
have no reason to suspect that the missing pre-2000 data would systematically affect 
town well totals in a way that is correlated with adopting fracking actions, but 
unfortunately the data contain many zero entries for towns. Nonetheless, I use the 
variables constructed from these data in robustness checks in conjunction with the 
county-level water-use data. 
In addition, I generated variables that measure the history of drilling in each town 
using data from the NYDEC. I calculated the number of vertical, horizontal, oil, and gas 
wells in each town that had a drilling, completion, permit-application, or permit-issue 
date that was before January 1, 2010. Alternatively, these variables could approximate 
the presence and influence of industry groups in those towns.  
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I also approximated the proportion of active party members in each town’s 
population using county-level voter registration data for November 2008 from the New 
York Board of Elections. A higher proportion of residents actively engaged in politics 
suggests an organized community that is more likely to engage in collective action. I 
separated active membership by the main political parties—Democratic and 
Republican—because preferences about fracking tend to vary by political party, as 
demonstrated in the previously discussed polling results. In particular, active Democrats 
are more likely to be attentive to environmental concerns associated with fracking. I 
combined the proportion of active Greens with the proportion of active Independents for 
each county. Although fracking preferences may vary for these two groups, the 
proportions even on the county level are too small to be meaningful.  
In addition, I include an estimate of county-level recycling rates, as measured by a 
representative national survey administered by Knowledge Networks.57 This variable 
would capture both environmental preferences and, because recycling rates are 
influenced by various state and local programs, the successful adoption of other 
environmentally favorable policies. 
Finally, I match each town to various demographic characteristics from the 
American Community Survey (ACS). These characteristics include the median household 
income, the total population, the percent of the population under nineteen years old, the 
percent of the population that is Black, the percent of owner-occupied homes, the percent 
of the population twenty-five years and older that only completed high school, and the 
percent of the population twenty-five years and older that have more than a high school 
                                                
57 The Knowledge Networks panel is based on probability sampling of both online and offline populations, 
providing the necessary hardware and Internet access if a respondent does not have access to a computer or 
the Internet. These data were purchased by Vanderbilt Law School. 
 59 
degree. These data come from the ACS’s five-year average estimates for 2006 to 2010, 
which provide town-level demographic characteristics before the adoption of the bans 
and moratoria in this study. 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
 To test whether my empirical model predicts the adoption of a ban or a 
moratorium, I estimate the following cross-sectional equation based on observable data: Pr 𝐵! = 1 = 𝜌 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟!,!! 𝛼! + 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!!𝛼! + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙!!𝛼! +𝛼!𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔! + 𝑋!!𝛼! + 𝜀 ,  (4) 
where the probability that town 𝑖 in county 𝑗 adopts a ban or a moratorium (Pr 𝐵! = 1 ) 
depends on a vector of measures of the town’s vulnerability to risks to water (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟!,!), 
a vector of variables representing the town’s experience with oil-and-gas drilling and 
expectations for future drilling (𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!), a vector of the proportion of the county’s 
residents who are active members of relevant political parties (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙!), the county 
recycling rate (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!), and a vector of town-level demographic characteristics (𝑋!).  
Specifically, 𝐵! is a binary variable equal to 1 if town 𝑖 adopted a ban or, in other 
specifications, a moratorium. I use probit estimation and report marginal effects. I regress 𝐵! on variables that proxy the relevant features of the town decision, based on my 
theoretical framework. The vector 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟!,! includes variables that proxy the expected 
environmental and health costs of an adverse well event, particularly water-
contamination risks, measured on either the county or the town level. This includes the 
proportion of county residents who rely on private water wells, the daily millions of 
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gallons of water used in the county for livestock or crop irrigation, and the number of 
private water wells and agricultural or irrigation wells drilled in the town since April 
2000. I expect the coefficients on these variables to be positive, denoting an increased 
probability of adopting a ban or a moratorium.  
The next vector, 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!, includes town-level variables such as the number of 
oil-and-gas wells drilled in the town prior to 2010 and the number of horizontal well 
applications on file with NYDEC prior to 2010. These variables show the history of oil-
and-gas drilling in each town, and previous experience with oil-and-gas drilling could be 
related to residents’ perceptions of the risks of shale development. In addition, the 
variables could approximate the presence and influence of industry groups in the area, 
directly contributing to 𝑍! in the model or indirectly affecting residents’ risk perceptions 
and, therefore, their preferences. If so, then I expect the coefficients, summarized in 
vector 𝛼! to be negative—indicating a lower likelihood of adopting a ban.  
Next, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙! is a vector of county-level variables that indicate the proportion 
of the county’s residents who are active members of the Democratic, Republican, and 
other parties. These variables reflect both preferences and the ease of collective action. I 
expect the coefficient on the proportion of active Republicans to be negative while the 
coefficient on the proportion of active Democrats to be positive.  
Finally, I include a vector of town-level demographic characteristics 𝑋!, 
specifically the median household income, the town population, the percent of the 
population twenty-five years and older that graduated only high school, the percent 
twenty-five years and older that graduated with more than a high school degree, the 
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percent under nineteen years old, and the percent that is Black, as well as the percent of 
owner-occupied homes in the town. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
In Table 11, I summarize the main results for the adoption of a ban. I find that 
expected water risks play a robust role in predicting the adoption of bans. In the decision 
to adopt a ban on fracking, towns in counties with a higher proportion of their population 
relying on private water wells and those in counties that use more water for livestock are 
associated with a statistically significant higher probability of adopting a ban. In equation 
2, a higher number of private water wells and a higher number of agricultural wells in the 
town are also associated with a higher probability of adopting a ban. These results 
suggest that residents in these towns are more likely to perceive net costs of fracking. 
Meanwhile, towns with previous oil-and-gas development and towns that 
anticipate operator interest in horizontal development are associated with a statistically 
significant lower probability of adopting a ban. These results suggest the role of 
experience in diminishing perceptions of expected environmental damages or the pro-
fracking influence of industry in these towns. 
In addition, organized preferences matter. Towns in counties with a higher 
proportion of Democrats are associated with a statistically significant higher probability 
of adopting a ban, while Republicans are associated with a statistically significant lower 
probability of adopting a ban. Towns in counties with high recycling rates are also more 
likely to ban fracking.  
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Finally, I find that demographic characteristics also predict ban enactment. In 
both equations 1 and 2, I find that towns with a higher percent of residents with only a 
high school degree are associated with a statistically significant lower probability of 
banning fracking, while towns with a higher percent of residents with more than a high 
school degree are associated with a statistically significant higher probability of adopting 
a ban. I also find that towns with a higher percent of young residents are also associated 
with a statistically lower probability of banning fracking. These results are likely driven 
by the relative attractiveness of oil-and-gas jobs to those who have only a high school 
degree. Most oil-and-gas jobs only require a high school degree (or equivalent), provide 
on-the-job training, and pay well.58 There is already concern that high school graduates in 
shale-rich areas will forego college for lucrative oil-and-gas jobs.59 Those with more 
education and those who are older, on the other hand, tend to have other employment 
options.  
In addition, towns with a higher percent of owner-occupied homes are associated 
with a statistically significant higher probability of adopting a ban. Property owners may 
collect rental and royalty payments from oil-and-gas operators. When owners live 
elsewhere, they could reap the rewards of fracking activities without facing these costs. 
Those who also live on their properties, however, would have to tolerate the costs of 
shale development. In equation 2, I also find statistically significant and negative 
associations between median income and town population and the probability of adopting 
a ban. My results are consistent with New York polling data that indicates that support 
for fracking is higher among higher income groups. And, as the size of the town’s 
                                                
58 Sid Pranke. 2012. “Bakken Oilfield Jobs: Do You Have What It Takes?” Bakken Today, August 30. 
59 News Source. 2013. “Drilling or a College Diploma.” Shale Stuff, May 14. 
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population increases, the ease of organizing against fracking decreases, making towns 
with large populations less likely to ban fracking. 
Interestingly, I also find that towns with a higher percent of Black residents are 
associated with a statistically significant higher probability of adopting a ban. African 
Americans are more likely to be exposed to poor water quality (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 2011), and they may have stronger concerns about the 
water-contamination risks of fracking activities. The New York polling data also revealed 
that nonwhite respondents were more likely to oppose fracking, and this opposition could 
be related to fears about further deterioration in water quality. For example, Viscusi, 
Huber, and Bell (2014) have previously documented that Black individuals are more 
likely than others to drink bottled water because they perceive bottled water to be safer.  
To test whether the opposition of Black residents may be related to water-risk 
vulnerability, I interacted the percent Black variable with the number of private water 
wells in each town. These results are summarized in Table 12. I find that the coefficient 
on this interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Specifically, towns with a 
higher percent of Black residents and a higher number of private water wells are 
associated with a higher probability of banning fracking. After taking into account the 
increased vulnerability to risks to water faced by Black residents, the coefficient on the 
percent Black is now statistically insignificant. This result suggests that Black opposition 
to fracking activities may be related to their awareness of their communities’ greater 
exposure to low-quality water. 
Next, I present the results for the adoption of moratoria in Table 13. As before, 
towns in counties that use more water for livestock and towns in counties that have a 
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higher recycling rate are associated with a statistically significant higher probability of 
adopting a moratorium, while towns with a greater history of drilling and towns with a 
higher percent of residents with only a high school degree are associated with a 
statistically significant lower probability of adopting a moratorium. Otherwise, the 
estimated coefficients for moratoria adoption are different from the coefficients for ban 
adoption in statistical significance, magnitude, and direction. In Appendix B, I explore 
the results for moratoria in more detail, differentiating the moratoria in various ways. 
Overall, I find that results for shorter moratoria are more similar to the results for bans 
because shorter moratoria are associated with subsequent ban adoption. Otherwise, the 
adoption of a moratorium continues to be inversely proportional to a town’s vulnerability 
to water risks, confirming that an alternative theoretical framework—and not one based 
on resident analysis of benefits and costs—better explains moratoria adoption. 
In terms of effect, a moratorium would only implicate the benefits and costs of 
shale development if the state were to lift its moratorium on shale development during the 
lifetime of the town moratorium. The probability of an effect is thus very small. This 
makes it less likely that these actions are adopted with the net costs of fracking activities 
in mind. It is more likely that the moratoria are symbolic gestures of support or 
opposition. If so, it is not surprising that some of the strongest predictors of moratoria 
adoption are the variables indicating previous drilling experience, which may proxy for 
industry influence, and the county recycling rate, which may proxy for environmental 
preferences.  
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Conclusion 
 
Towns in New York and other states are deciding whether or not to allow fracking 
within their borders. In this chapter, I empirically investigate what predicts these local 
decisions. Overall, I find that vulnerability to risks to water plays a robust role in the 
decision to adopt a ban on fracking activities. Towns with more residents with greater 
reliance on private wells for drinking water or with greater reliance on healthy livestock 
are associated with a statistically significant higher probability of adopting a ban. In 
addition, industry presence and previous experience with drilling tend to decrease the 
probability that a town adopts a ban. Finally, environmental preferences, demographic 
characteristics, and organized political interests also predict whether a town will adopt a 
ban. In general, the results suggest that New Yorkers in towns where shale development 
is viable decide whether or not to adopt a ban on fracking based at least partially on 
perceived benefits and costs of shale development to their communities. In contrast, my 
results suggest that the adoption of a town moratorium, especially in light of the state’s 
moratorium on fracking activities, may be mostly a symbolic gesture.   
In Chapter I, I demonstrate that properties that rely on private water wells may 
face overall value losses due to nearby shale drilling when well violations are high. The 
preservation of property values has long been acknowledged as an important and 
acceptable reason for zoning classifications. It may be the case that New York residents 
oppose drilling and enact zoning regulation to preserve property-value losses from risk 
perceptions, too. 
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If bans are adopted to protect vulnerable water sources from actual or perceived 
water-contamination risks of drilling that may lead to property-value losses, then the IEA 
may be correct in thinking that more stringent regulations would decrease such bans. 
Without knowing the final form that the NYDEC regulations will take, towns in New 
York are banning fracking. The town actions suggest that residents are not convinced that 
the proposed NYDEC regulations protect their water sources sufficiently and, in the case 
of water contamination, provide adequate assurances of compensation and remediation.  
In Chapter III, I discuss how state regulators could better manage the risks to 
water from fracking activities by strengthening regulatory safeguards, clarifying tort 
responsibility, and using insurance to ensure compensation and remediation. Such 
strategies would act to mitigate actual risks, alleviating some of the concerns of property-
value losses. The availability of insurance to cover damages will further provide peace of 
mind to residents. Together, these strategies could make residents more tolerant of 
fracking activities in their areas and decrease the number of total bans on fracking 
activities. 
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Tables 
 
Table 7. Towns Adopting Bans or Moratoria in Counties on Shale Formations, 2010 to 
2013. 
Bans Moratoria 
Andes 
Augusta 
Bethel 
Brighton 
Butternuts 
Camillus 
Caroline 
Cherry Valley 
Danby 
DeWitt 
Dryden 
Elbridge 
Enfield 
Forestburgh 
Fulton 
Geneva 
Guilderland 
Highland 
Ithaca 
Jerusalem 
LaFayette 
Lumberland 
Marbletown 
Marcellus 
Marshall 
Mendon 
Meredith 
Middlefield 
 
Milford 
Moravia 
New Hartford 
New Lisbon 
New Paltz 
Niles  
Olive 
Onondaga 
Otisco 
Otsego 
Paris 
Perinton 
Plainfield 
Pompey 
Rochester 
Roseboom 
Rosendale 
Rush 
Skaneateles 
Spafford 
Springfield 
Summerhill 
Tusten 
Ulysses 
Wales 
Warwick 
Wawarsing 
Woodstock 
Alfred 
Andes 
Annsville 
Augusta 
Ava 
Avon 
Barrington 
Benton 
Berne 
Blenheim 
Boonville 
Brighton 
Bristol 
Brookfield 
Burns 
Butternuts 
Caledonia 
Camden 
Canandaigua 
Caroline 
Chester 
Colden 
Conesus 
Cortlandville 
Danube 
DeWitt 
Deerfield 
Eaton 
Elbridge 
Enfield 
Fabius 
Florence 
Floyd 
Forestport 
Fulton 
Geneseo 
Genoa 
Gorham 
Hartwick 
Highland 
Hopewell 
Huron 
Italy 
Jerusalem 
Kirkland 
LaFayette 
Lansing 
Ledyard 
Lenox 
Lima 
Lincoln 
Little Falls 
Livonia 
Locke 
Manchester 
Manheim 
Marbletown 
Marcellus 
Marshall 
Mendon 
Middleburgh 
Middlesex 
Milo 
Minden 
Moravia 
Mount Morris 
Naples 
New Hartford 
Newfield 
Newport 
Niles 
Niskayuna 
North Dansville 
Nunda 
Olive 
Oneonta 
Onondaga 
Otego 
Otisco 
Owasco 
Palatine  
Paris 
Penfield 
Portage 
Preble 
Remsen 
Rensselaerville 
Richmond 
Richmondville 
Rush 
Sangerfield 
Schoharie 
Scipio 
Sennett 
Seward 
Sidney 
Skaneateles 
South Bristol 
Spafford 
Sparta 
Springwater 
St. Johnsville 
Stafford 
Starkey 
Torrey 
Trenton 
Tully 
Vernon 
Verona 
Vienna 
Wales 
Waterloo 
Wayne 
West Bloomfield 
West Sparta 
Westerlo 
Westmoreland 
Whitestown 
Yorkshire 
Notes. This list does not include towns in counties without known shale reserves.   
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Table 8. Sample Detail on Town Bans. 
Town Type Prohibition 
Camillus Zoning “The exploration of land for natural gas by horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing” is a prohibited use in all districts. 
Cherry 
Valley 
Zoning “Heavy industry” is prohibited in all districts, and the 
definition of heavy industry includes “exploration for natural 
gas; extraction of natural gas; natural gas processing facilities.” 
Danby Zoning Added a section on the “prohibition against the exploration for 
or extraction of natural gas and/or petroleum.” 
Dryden Zoning Clarifying that oil and gas development activities, including 
fracking, were prohibited uses of land within the town. 
Ithaca Zoning Clarifying that natural gas exploration, extraction, and related 
operations could not interpreted as allowable uses in the “light 
industrial zone.” 
Lumberland Zoning Natural gas exploration, extraction, and related operations are 
listed as explicitly prohibited uses in all districts. 
Middlefield Zoning Heavy industry and all oil, gas, or solution mining and drilling 
are prohibited uses in all districts. 
New Lisbon Zoning Unlawful for any person to conduct “heavy industry” within 
the town, with the definition of heavy industry including 
exploration for natural gas; extraction of natural gas; natural 
gas processing facilities, among other things. 
Plainfield Zoning “Heavy industry” is prohibited in all districts, with the 
definition of heavy industry including exploration for natural 
gas; extraction of natural gas; natural gas processing facilities, 
among other things. 
Springfield Zoning Unlawful for any person to conduct “heavy industry” within 
the town, with the definition of heavy industry including 
exploration for natural gas; extraction of natural gas; natural 
gas processing facilities, among other things. 
Tusten Zoning Activities expressly and explicitly prohibited in any zoning 
district include natural gas exploration, extraction, or 
production activities. 
Ulysses Zoning Natural gas exploration, extraction, and support activities are 
not permitted in any zoning district. 
Wales Rights-
Based 
Ban 
“It shall be unlawful for any individual or corporation to 
engage in the extraction of natural gas or oil utilizing in whole 
or in part the process commonly known as and herein defined 
as hydraulic fracturing within the Town of Wales .” 
Notes. The assorted bans detailed above were adopted in 2010 or 2011. Later bans tended 
to use similar language.  
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Table 9. Summary Statistics – New York Towns, in Counties on Shale Formations. 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Legislative Actions    
Adopted a ban on fracking activities, 2010-2013 (0/1) 688 0.081 0.274 
Adopted a moratorium on fracking activities, 2010-2013 (0/1) 688 0.173 0.378 
Adopted a ban or moratorium on hydraulic fracturing activities, 
2010-2013 (0/1) 
688 0.215 0.411 
Adopted duration of moratoria, in months* 116 11.250 3.501 
    
Water Variables    
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county 688 0.326 0.183 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, Million Gallons per Day, by 
county  
688 0.672 0.398 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, Million Gallons per Day, 
by county 
688 0.323 0.376 
Domestic Water Wells, by town (count) 688 65.201 71.944 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells, by town (count) 688 0.443 3.217 
NYC, Syracuse, or Croton watershed area (0/1) 688 0.041 0.198 
Intersects Any Aquifer (Principal, Primary, Sole-Source) (0/1) 688 0.257 0.437 
    
Drilling Variables    
Vertical Well Development, before 2010 (count) 688 46.190 216.700 
Horizontal Well Development, before 2010 (count) 688 0.544 2.880 
Gas Well Development, before 2010 (count) 688 13.330 40.370 
Oil Well Development, before 2010 (count) 688 16.010 139.800 
    
Political Variables (county level)    
Proportion Active Democrats, Nov. 2008 688 0.243 0.093 
Proportion Active Republicans, Nov. 2008 688 0.296 0.055 
Proportion Active Independents, Nov. 2008 688 0.032 0.008 
Proportion Active Green Party, 2008 688 0.002 0.001 
Strong Democratic Party Affiliation, by county 688 0.124 0.086 
Strong Republican Party Affiliation, by county 688 0.149 0.082 
    
Recycling Variable (county level)    
Recycling Rate, by county 688 0.761 0.102 
    
American Community Survey (5-year, 2006-2010)    
Median Household Income 688 52,028 11,517 
Total Population Estimate 688 6,180 10,920 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree 688 37.740 8.477 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor's Degree 688 12.090 5.547 
% Age 25 w/ More than a High School Degree 688 49.935 11.455 
% Unemployed 688 6.903 3.028 
% Black 688 2.360 4.114 
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Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
% Under 19 Years Old 688 25.740 4.861 
% Owner-Occupied Housing 688 80.604 8.735 
Notes. This list excludes towns in counties without known shale reserves. * Excludes 
moratoria that do not specify a duration. In regressions, these moratoria were coded as 36 
months, which is the largest duration otherwise specified (for Niskayuna).  
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Table 10. Anti-Fracking Actions Adopted per Year. 
 Bans Moratoria 
2010 2 8 
2011 13 33 
2012 21 75 
2013 21 7 
Total 57 123 
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Table 11. Main Results for Bans in New York Towns, Cross-Sectional Probit (reporting 
marginal effects). 
Variables (1) (2) 
Water Variables   
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county 0.020*** 0.014** 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by county -0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000  0.014* 
  (0.008) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000  0.182** 
  (0.080) 
   
Drilling Variables   
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -0.074** -0.064** 
 (0.036) (0.029) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -2.998*** -2.767*** 
 (0.942) (0.940) 
   
Political Variables   
Prop. Active Democrats, by county 0.042* 0.040** 
 (0.026) (0.019) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -0.170*** -0.125*** 
 (0.032) (0.025) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by county -0.581** -0.471** 
(0.288) (0.233) 
   
Recycling Variable   
Recycling Rate, by county 0.044*** 0.038*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
   
Demographic Variables   
Logarithm of Median Income -0.010 -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Logarithm of Town Population -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -0.410* -0.341* 
 (0.218) (0.178) 
% Age 25 w/ More than a High School Degree/1,000 0.341** 0.300** 
 (0.166) (0.138) 
% Unemployed/1,000 -0.024 -0.047 
 (0.280) (0.226) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -0.471*** -0.392*** 
 (0.164) (0.137) 
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Variables (1) (2) 
% Black/1,000 0.312* 0.269* 
 (0.185) (0.150) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 0.235** 0.208*** 
 (0.096) (0.080) 
   
Observations 688 688 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 12. Results for Bans with Race-Risk Interaction, Cross-Sectional Probit. 
Variables (1) 
Water Variables  
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county 0.014** 
(0.006) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by county -0.001 
(0.002) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000 0.010 
 (0.009) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000 0.213** 
 (0.099) 
  
Drilling Variables  
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -0.067** 
 (0.031) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -2.955*** 
 (1.001) 
  
Political Variables  
Prop. Active Democrats, by county 0.039* 
 (0.021) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -0.134*** 
 (0.028) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by county -0.520** 
(0.252) 
  
Recycling Variable  
Recycling Rate, by county 0.042*** 
 (0.013) 
  
Demographic Variables  
Logarithm of Median Income -0.011** 
 (0.005) 
Logarithm of Town Population -0.001 
 (0.001) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -0.347* 
 (0.202) 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor’s Degree/1,000 0.336** 
 (0.156) 
% Unemployed/1,000 -0.042 
 (0.245) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -0.426*** 
 (0.152) 
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Variables (1) 
% Black/1,000 0.008 
 (0.225) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 0.205** 
 (0.087) 
Interaction Domestic Water Wells x % Black  0.014** 
 (0.007) 
  
Observations 688 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 13. Main Results for Moratoria in New York Towns, Cross-Sectional Probit. 
Variables (1) (2) 
Water Variables   
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county -0.290*** -0.257*** 
(0.097) (0.094) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.099*** 0.091*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by county -0.035 -0.027 
(0.043) (0.042) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000  -0.053 
  (0.169) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000  -40.218* 
  (20.980) 
   
Drilling Variables   
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -0.761*** -0.722*** 
 (0.282) (0.270) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -7.643* -7.040 
 (4.595) (4.365) 
   
Political Variables   
Prop. Active Democrats, by county -0.503 -0.459 
 (0.417) (0.411) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -0.644 -0.687* 
 (0.397) (0.393) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by county -1.922 -2.200 
(3.998) (3.847) 
   
Recycling Variable   
Recycling Rate, by county 0.644*** 0.615*** 
 (0.169) (0.161) 
   
Demographic Variables   
Logarithm of Median Income -0.081 -0.049 
 (0.094) (0.091) 
Logarithm of Town Population -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -11.773*** -11.527*** 
 (3.793) (3.642) 
% Age 25 w/ More than a High School Degree/1,000 -3.379 -3.601 
 (3.056) (2.906) 
% Unemployed/1,000 -3.727 -3.326 
 (4.272) (4.086) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -4.510 -4.247 
 (2.869) (2.719) 
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Variables (1) (2) 
% Black/1,000 -7.226* -6.946* 
 (4.338) (4.082) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 1.348 1.143 
 (1.711) (1.622) 
   
Observations 688 688 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a moratorium. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FRACTURED SYSTEMS: HOW TO MANAGE RISKS TO WATER FROM SHALE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Advances in drilling techniques, namely horizontal drilling and high-volume 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), have allowed operators to profit from oil and gas 
extracted from the extensive shale (unconventional) formations found in the United 
States. These technological advances combined with the high price of natural gas in the 
mid-2000s have resulted in a drilling boom that exposes more areas, including heavily 
populated and environmentally sensitive areas, to the ordinary as well as the 
extraordinary perils associated with drilling activities. In Chapters I and II, I empirically 
examined how perceived or actual risks of shale development affect property sales in a 
Pennsylvania county and legislative decisions by New York towns. In general, I find that 
risks to water feature prominently in both contexts—that is, these risks are particularly 
salient for individuals deciding whether to live near shale development or whether to 
allow it in their communities at all.  
Specifically, in Chapter I, I find that properties that rely on private water wells in 
Washington County, Pennsylvania may face property-value losses due to actual or 
perceived risks of nearby shale development, especially when the properties do not 
receive offsetting royalty payments from nearby operators. In addition, the values of all 
properties with a nearby horizontal well decrease when state regulators find and reveal 
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high numbers of environmental, health, and safety violations at shale wells. Overall, my 
results show that the average losses due to risk perceptions are not large. My findings 
also suggest that shale development could pass a local benefit-cost test—wherein winners 
could more than compensate losers60—if drilling risks are well managed. Property-value 
losses may even be prevented completely if vulnerable properties are appropriately 
protected from risks and if compensation for damages is readily available.  
Despite the possibility of local net benefits on average, concerns about significant 
drilling externalities and resulting losses to some property values may lead communities 
across the United States to prohibit shale development outright. In Chapter II, I find that 
shale-rich New York towns with a higher proportion of residents who rely on private 
water wells are more likely to prohibit shale development in their jurisdictions. This 
finding is robust to different definitions of reliance on private water wells, and the effects 
are distinct from other relevant determinants of banning behavior, such as environmental 
preferences, political affiliations, and demographic characteristics.  
States have primary authority to regulate most externalities associated with shale 
development and onshore drilling in general (Richardson et al. 2013). Typically, when a 
socially beneficial activity generates externalities, governments can engage three tools to 
manage these externalities: regulations, tort liability, and liability insurance mandates. 
Governments can promulgate all kinds of regulations, but under an economic framework, 
regulations are only justified if they generate net benefits to society. Tort litigation, on the 
other hand, is initiated by private parties seeking compensation for harms allegedly 
caused by other parties. But, governments can decide how broadly to define tort liability, 
                                                
60 This is a condition of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which underlies benefit-cost analysis (Adler and Posner 
2006). A full benefit-cost analysis is outside the scope of this study. Other studies suggest that shale 
development provides benefits that are likely to exceed costs (Considine, Watson, and Considine 2011). 
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and the extent of tort liability can regulate private behaviors. Finally, liability insurance is 
a market tool available to companies to manage risks from their activities. Governments 
can mandate liability insurance coverage, ensuring that only companies that are able to 
pay for expected damages engage in an activity. When deployed effectively, these three 
tools—regulation, tort, and insurance—make up a risk-management system that creates 
incentives for optimal activity levels, acceptable risk-taking, and adequate environmental 
protection.  
In this chapter, I examine some of the features of such a system. First, I discuss 
the risks to water from shale development, dividing resulting harms up into four 
categories broadly based on the timing of pollution discharges and the manifestation of 
harms. Next, I discuss how regulations can help incentivize appropriate risk-taking by 
operators. Essentially, regulators should require risk-mitigation expenditures that pass a 
benefit-cost test, taking into account all immediate environmental and other costs of 
adverse well events. Regulators should use alternative regulatory interventions, however, 
to manage uncertain risks. I then discuss how tort incentives would ensure that operators 
comply with these regulations while providing compensation to victims for immediate 
harms notwithstanding regulatory compliance. Finally, I discuss how and when insurance 
mandates could work with comprehensive regulatory and tort regimes to ensure that a 
pool of money is available to compensate victims and remediate the environment. 
Overall, governments could use these tools to provide responsible protection against all 
categories of harms to water from shale development.  
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Risk Categories 
 
Ordinary risks of drilling include risks of contamination from blowouts, improper 
waste disposal, and inadequately sealed abandoned wells, the cumulative environmental 
effects of which could be significant. Shale drilling techniques also come with uncertain 
risks of groundwater and surface water contamination from fracking fluid, fracking 
wastewater, or methane gas that could pass through underground fracture pathways into 
drinking-water aquifers or that could get spilled on the surface and seep into the water 
supply.61 In Table 14, I divide the risks to water from extensive onshore drilling into 
categories based on whether harms are caused by sudden releases versus gradual releases 
and on whether the adverse effects on health, property, or the environment are 
immediately manifested versus manifested long after the initial release of 
contamination.62 Although it is useful to consider the risks that arise from different 
contaminants or during different stages of the drilling process when devising regulations, 
it is often the timing of harms that is relevant for implementing ideal combinations of 
regulatory, liability, and insurance tools. I refer to these categories in my discussions. 
The examples of risk pathways and harms that fall into each category in Table 14 
are meant to be illustrative, not comprehensive. Category I and II risks to water are 
characterized by immediate detection of harms. These pollution releases can be contained 
quickly, and the damage will often involve property and environmental damage, with few 
adverse health effects. Although the extent of immediate damages can be high, the 
                                                
61 Appendix C provides a detailed overview of contaminants and contamination pathways. 
62 Dana and Wiseman (2014) present a different categorization of risks by activity and the nature of risk. 
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probability that these damages would reach catastrophic scales is small.63 Category I risks 
stem from sudden releases, such as accidental spills, discharges, or blowouts that can 
contaminate nearby soil or water. Category II risks stem from gradual releases, such as 
slowly leaking on-site wastewater storage pits that can contaminate nearby soil or water. 
It might be more difficult to quickly detect a gradual release and link it to immediate 
harms, but incentives should be in place for operators to do so. 
Category III and IV risks are characterized by latent manifestation—and therefore 
delayed detection—of harms. A large proportion of these risks include the uncertain risks 
of shale development, such as the risk of pollutants moving through fracture systems over 
the course of years to enter a water source (Category III) or the risk that individuals may 
develop cancers as a result of previous exposures to pollution (Category III or IV). Some 
future harms relate to well completion and abandonment procedures or to wastewater 
disposal. If adequate procedures are not in place to seal wells, then these wells may 
develop leaks and gradually discharge pollution over time into the surrounding soil or 
water (Category IV). Resulting harms are likely to involve property and environmental 
damage but may also include allegations of adverse health effects, such as cancers caused 
by long-ago contamination events. 
 
Regulation’s Role 
 
 Economists, and most people, would agree that government regulation should 
produce more benefits than no regulation at all—that is, the social benefits of the 
regulation should be higher than the social costs of implementing and complying with the 
                                                
63 Later, I discuss strategies for dealing with low-probability catastrophic damages. 
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regulation. This concept is often easier for people to support in the abstract than in 
particular circumstances, especially when it comes to protecting people from 
environmental risks; valuations of nonmarket entities may vary widely across people, and 
people often distrust the ability of the government to acknowledge all the benefits of 
regulation. Hence, when it comes to environmental protection, some call for maximum 
risk reduction. In reality, however, it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate all risks 
from an activity. The time and money invested into reducing small risks may be time and 
money that could have been spent more efficiently in other contexts. Governments must 
be able to prioritize risks and do more good than harm with their policy interventions. 
Such a goal would be accomplished when governments require only those drilling risk-
mitigation expenditures that pass a benefit-cost test or, in other words, generate net 
benefits to society.64 
Roughly speaking, benefit-cost analysis forces regulators to explicitly list, 
quantify, and when possible, monetize the expected benefits and costs of a proposed 
regulation, taking into account alternatives that might achieve similar goals at lower cost 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2011). Regulators then pick the regulatory 
alternative that maximizes net benefits, subject to statutory constraints. Benefit-cost 
analysis is already a feature of most major federal rulemaking. Executive Order No. 
12,866 requires federal agencies to engage in benefit-cost analysis (referred to as 
regulatory impact analysis) before promulgating major regulations (Clinton 1993). 
Studies suggest that regulatory impact analysis has improved the quality of many federal 
                                                
64 Preferably, among net beneficial regulations, regulators would also choose the risk-control option that 
maximizes net benefits or, in other words, minimizes the sum of the costs of losses and the costs of 
avoiding losses. 
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regulations (e.g., Morgenstern 1997), and the procedure, though still controversial, forms 
the foundation of federal regulatory policy (Sunstein 2002).  
Currently, shale development is regulated by states, and state regulation is not 
explicitly constrained in any way. Some scholars and commentators are calling for states 
to implement shale regulations based on “best practices.”65 Already, the American 
Petroleum Institute has developed a set of industry “best practices,”66 and one 
organization offers certification to Appalachian Basin operators for compliance with a set 
of water and air performance standards based on “leading industry practices.”67 But, the 
definition of “best practices” is rarely provided. 
One exception is Merrill and Schizer (2013) who roughly define best-practice 
regulations as rules based on best-available technologies. Specifically, the authors state 
that these practices “reflect the ‘state of the art,’ meaning something more stringent than 
common practice that is still technologically and economically feasible,” and that the 
resulting regulations “are usually defined by the state of existing technology instead of a 
rigorous assessment of costs and benefits” (Merrill and Schizer 2013). 
In this chapter, I urge regulators to engage in a rigorous assessment of costs and 
benefits and adopt only those best-practices regulations that generate net benefits to 
society. Qualifying regulations can take many forms—such as command-and-control 
rules that specify operating practices or flexible performance standards that require a 
level of environmental protection—as long as the likely benefits are shown to outweigh 
                                                
65 For example, Peter Behr. 2013. “Insurance Issues Loom Over Shale Gas Development.” E&E 
EnergyWire, August 1. 
66 American Petroleum Institute. 2012. “Overview of Industry Guidance/Best Practices on Hydraulic 
Fracturing (HF).” http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/exploration/hydraulic_fracturing_infosheet.ashx. 
67 Center for Sustainable Shale Development. 2014. “Certification.” 
https://www.sustainableshale.org/certification/. 
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the costs. An example of this type of constraint on regulation can be found in the current 
federal regulations in place for oil-and-gas operations conducted on the Outer Continental 
Shelf, which call for “the use of the best available and safest technologies . . . except 
where the Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to 
justify the incremental costs of utilizing such technologies.”68 In many cases, benefit-cost 
analysis will point toward rules or incentives that are based on best-available 
technologies, but the analysis will generate transparency and will help shed light on 
uncertainties that require further research.  
In practice, the analyses should account for all the costs and benefits of shale 
development in an area, including national, state, and local impacts. Under the “matching 
principle” wherein the lowest level of government that geographically encompasses the 
costs and benefits of an activity is made responsible for regulating the activity (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962), then, the federal government would regulate shale development and 
condition site-specific permits on compliance with cost-effective regulations perhaps 
tailored to local conditions. A national shale development regulatory scheme would also 
allow the government to take advantage of greater resources and potential benefits 
overlap when generating site-specific benefit-cost analyses. The current political 
atmosphere, however, suggests that transferring authority over regulation and permitting 
of drilling on nonfederal lands from states to the federal government is unlikely.69 That 
                                                
68 43 U.S.C. § 1347 (2014). One of the motivating principles behind the requirement of “best available and 
safest technologies” was ensuring that operators use “technologies that allow for the safest and most 
reliable operations, which are cost-effective” (Khorsandi 2011). 
69 It may be more likely that the federal government could gain control of particular aspects of shale-
development regulation in which the benefits of uniformity and concentrated expertise outweigh the 
benefits of tailoring. One such area may be the disclosure of fracking chemicals. Fourteen states require 
disclosure (Richardson et al. 2013), but most states have exemptions that provide for varying levels of trade 
secret protection. But, drilling companies often operate in multiple states. If the companies use similar 
chemicals in their fracking fluid across different states, then their secrets are only protected as far as in the 
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said, Spence (2013) argues that most impacts are subsumed within state boundaries, 
suggesting that state regulation may be sufficient.70 In addition, state-specific analyses 
would allow for baseline risk-mitigation requirements that are tailored to state-specific 
conditions. For example, the potential benefits of risk mitigation will be higher in states 
with more people who rely on private water wells for drinking water, which would tend 
to justify greater expenditure on risk mitigation in those states.71 
The question then arises whether local governments should be more involved in 
regulating shale development within their jurisdictions. Spence (2014) argues that, 
because the majority of impacts are local and because locals are likely to have the most 
intense preferences, local decisionmaking can in some circumstances better maximize 
welfare. But, as he acknowledges, local regulation is only likely to consider local benefits 
and costs, and local benefits and costs do not reflect full benefits and costs that occur on a 
state, regional, and sometimes national level. Because my proposal relies on an analysis 
of all benefits and costs, local regulation alone would not suffice. In practice, it would 
also be difficult if not impossible for local governments to satisfy a requirement of 
engaging in comprehensive benefit-cost analysis before requiring risk-mitigation 
practices or banning shale development outright. Meanwhile, a state that employs 
benefit-cost analysis would take into account local impacts when choosing appropriate 
                                                                                                                                            
state requiring the most disclosure. If so, then a federal disclosure standard that weighs the costs of 
revealing trade secrets against the benefits of quickly identifying potential environmental hazards in the 
event of accidental pollution releases would be an improvement. 
70 In a response to Spence (2013), Burger (2013) argues that state regulation is unlikely to take into account 
some interstate and national impacts of shale development. Other scholars have also weighed in on the 
question of whether federal, state, or local regulation is best (e.g., Nolon and Polidoro 2012; B. Warner and 
Shapiro 2013; Craig 2013; Burleson 2013). 
71 So far, however, researchers have not found many statistically significant associations between observed 
regulatory heterogeneity and environmental and demographic variables (Richardson et al. 2013), 
suggesting room for improvement. 
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regulation and could incorporate consideration of the intensity of relevant preferences 
into its analysis.72 
What may be more effective, then, is a state regulatory scheme with baseline cost-
effective regulations that then conditions site-specific permits on additional risk-
mitigation practices tailored to local conditions. Such a strategy would require significant 
input from local governments. It is possible that New York’s Supplemental Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS) regulations, when finalized, will reflect such a 
system. The current revised draft SGEIS would preempt local government regulation of 
oil-and-gas development73 but would require site-specific environmental review, would 
notify relevant local governments before approving any shale development permits in 
their jurisdiction, and would ensure consultation with local governments if a proposed 
permit application would be inconsistent with local laws, regulations, or policies.74 In this 
way, the state would consider all possible costs of shale development as local 
governments would have a systematic way to inform the state of any significant adverse 
environmental impacts that might not have been addressed in the state review.75 
Besides ensuring that shale regulations are net beneficial, a benefit-cost 
requirement would increase the transparency of risks, promote public understanding of 
risks, and help identify cost-effective alternatives in some contexts. In Chapter I, I find 
evidence that individuals look to information on environmental, health, and safety 
                                                
72 For example, analysts might consider certain resources to be more valuable, justifying greater protection 
measures. 
73 The question of what New York local governments could do notwithstanding state regulation is currently 
being litigated. In August 2013, New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, agreed to hear two cases 
challenging town bans, and its decision is pending. Chapter II provides details on these cases. 
74 2011. “Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program.” 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html. 
75 Local governments might still wish to mitigate some of the truly local impacts of shale development 
using tools at their disposal to the extent allowable by law (Nolon and Polidoro 2012). 
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violations to update their beliefs about the riskiness of nearby shale wells. Violations, 
however, do not provide clear risk information. Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) 
previously found that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s release of risk 
information about nearby Superfund sites76 generally lowered individuals’ perceptions of 
site risks, a result that suggests that the initial reactions to site risks were too high. 
Similarly, accurate risk information contained in benefit-cost analyses may reduce public 
concern by potentially demonstrating that many risks to water are small, eliminating the 
violations-related property-value effects. 
In addition, in Chapter I, I find that properties that rely on private well water are 
most vulnerable to value losses from nearby shale development, and in Chapter II, I find 
that concern for such properties may also drive banning behavior. It is possible that 
extending public water to properties that now rely on private well water may be found to 
be a cost-effective solution to some of the ordinary risks of shale development that 
otherwise fall on these properties. Or, states may find it worthwhile to provide support to 
private water well owners for water-quality testing and maintenance. A careful 
accounting of benefits and costs could reveal such alternative risk-mitigation strategies. 
To keep the calculations tractable, the benefits of regulation should focus on 
avoiding immediate environmental harms—in other words, those caused by Category I 
and II risks to water. These risks are known and quantifiable to a large extent based on 
data from the last decade or so of shale development, as well as decades of conventional 
onshore oil-and-gas drilling. In addition, there are resources available to states to help 
                                                
76 Superfund sites are sites contaminated with hazardous substances that are managed under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2014). 
 91 
ensure that their regulations cover most sources of immediate risks.77 State regulators 
could also solicit information from industry experts to help calculate costs.78 Finally, state 
regulators could further decrease administrative costs by relying more on flexible 
performance standards to achieve regulatory goals, though the regulators would still have 
to justify the regulatory goals from a benefit-cost perspective. 
Some Category IV risks are also amenable to cost-effective regulation. 
Specifically, for Category IV risks such as future leaks in disposal wells or improperly 
plugged abandoned wells,79 regulators should require companies to post assurance bonds 
at well completion (Dana and Wiseman 2014). Once the operator proves that it has 
implemented cost-effective features to ensure that the wells are unlikely to leak, the 
operator may retrieve the bond that it posted. The bond would thus counteract the 
incentive for companies to simply abandon or improperly seal wells once drilling or 
disposal is complete. 
But, generally speaking, it would be difficult for regulators to assess the benefits 
and costs of risk-mitigation strategies to manage Category III risks and some Category IV 
risks, specifically those that manifest in the future through highly uncertain pathways. 
Because harms are yet to manifest (if they manifest at all), the calculation of benefits of 
specialized risk-mitigation strategies would be a speculative venture. Command-and-
                                                
77 The State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations, Inc. (STRONGER), a nonprofit, 
multi-stakeholder organization with expertise in oil-and-gas regulations, offers a voluntary review of state 
oil-and-gas laws and regulations, including fracking-specific regulations, but so far, only six states have 
availed themselves of the fracking-specific regulatory review. STRONGER, Past Reviews, 
http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews. 
78 Concern about regulatory capture that might lead to less-stringent regulations would be mitigated if 
regulation is supplemented with tort liability that would hold operators responsible for all damages from 
drilling activities. As I discuss in the next section, comprehensive tort liability will provide incentives that 
push regulators to adapt cost-effective operating practices. 
79 These harms do not manifest later, but rather they may actually occur later if proper precautions are not 
taken in advance. 
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control regulations, the most common form of state regulations,80 are particularly 
unlikely to provide the flexibility necessary for regulators to adapt to new information on 
these risks and the magnitude of harms. In this context, information-generating 
regulations about risks or pathways may be most valuable. The government could 
incentivize research (or conduct research itself) to obtain more information about the 
risks and respond appropriately as soon as information is available. These tasks would be 
most efficiently accomplished at the federal level to avoid repetition and to take 
advantage of considerable resources, but if an enhanced federal role is unlikely at this 
time, then states could take up this research role. 
As the government awaits the results of long-term studies, regulators generally 
have two options: err on the side of caution and prohibit or significantly reduce the extent 
of shale development with stringent regulation or regulate lightly now and learn about 
these risks as development unfolds. The first option is embodied in the precautionary 
principle, which states that those wanting to take an action bear the burden of proving 
that the action does not create a risk of harm to the public or the environment. This 
principle is often thought to be too strong, prohibiting many net beneficial actions. There 
are circumstances, however, where caution is ideal. For example, Arrow and Fisher 
(1974) find that it might be optimal to err of the side of underdevelopment of a resource 
if development of the resource would cause irreversible environmental harm or if 
preservation of the resource is likely to have a high value in the future. In the case of 
contamination risks to water from shale development, current evidence does not suggest 
                                                
80 Currently, more than eighty percent of state regulations are command-and-control regulations and about 
one percent are flexible performance standards (Richardson et al. 2013). The rest rely on case-by-case 
permitting and other methods. 
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that contamination would be irreversible, though it may be costly to clean up 
contaminated water sources.81 If so, the second option may be preferable. 
The second option is only reasonable, however, if researchers actively investigate 
the uncertain Category III and IV risks to water. Unfortunately, operators might not have 
adequate incentives to investigate the nature of uncertain pathways and latent harms. By 
definition, any harms manifest later, so operators would have to anticipate future tort 
liability to invest in this research now.82 Tort litigation could help though—as cases enter 
the system, large judgments against operators may mobilize research (Hersch 2002). In 
the short term, however, the government would have to either incentivize research or 
conduct its own research into latent harms and uncertain pathways. For example, the 
government could require operators to invest a certain amount into research conducted by 
neutral scientific or research bodies. The government could also use taxes on the oil-and-
gas industry to pay for the costs of conducting this research itself. Research could range 
from passive health monitoring of specific populations exposed to a major pollution event 
to active testing of uncertain risk pathways. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy 
injected fracking fluid with tracer chemicals into a drilling site in order to monitor the 
process of the fluid over several years.83 Similar projects could occur at different shale 
formations and provide useful information to regulators, the public, and courts. When 
given the appropriate weight, the information could help set future regulatory standards 
and verify causation in tort. 
                                                
81 I note, however, that there may be other risks of shale development that are irreversible and require a 
cautionary regulatory approach.  
82 Some tort plaintiffs alleging immediate harms from adverse well events are also calling for medical 
monitoring costs and may later hold operators responsible for latent health harms. For example, see 
Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., 2013 WL 3427901 (Colo. App. July 3, 2013). 
83 Kevin Begos. 2013. “DOE Study: Fracking Chemicals Didn’t Taint Water.” USA Today, July 19. 
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Tightening Tort 
 
 Government regulation, even net beneficial regulation, may not sufficiently deter 
undesirable behaviors if the probability of detection and the resulting fines are low.84 But 
compliance with net beneficial operating practices can be achieved through other 
mechanisms that force operators to pay for the externalities that they generate. For 
example, tort law, the body of law that deals with harms that occur outside of contractual 
relationships, can supplement the deterrence objectives of regulatory schemes by 
deciding when injurers are liable for their externalities and must thus compensate their 
victims. In this way, the tort system ensures that potential defendants only take those 
actions in which the benefits exceed the costs, exactly the incentives imposed by a 
rational regulatory system. 
 As of now, there is opportunity for states to increase the effectiveness of the tort 
system to manage the risks of shale development because key cases have yet to be 
decided in many states new to drilling. For example, states could expand the definition of 
liability, inform the selection of a liability standard for drilling-related harms, and 
decrease some of the difficulties plaintiffs face in establishing causation.  
In order to establish a defendant’s liability, the tort plaintiff must present prima 
facie evidence showing, at the minimum, that (1) the plaintiff suffered harm and (2) the 
defendant’s activity caused the harm. Courts typically apply one of two liability 
standards: negligence (the default in many contexts) or strict liability. Under a negligence 
                                                
84 Earthworks, for example, has argued that many states do not have the enforcement capacity to keep up 
with rapid shale development (e.g., Earthworks 2012). Fines do not seem high enough to make up for the 
low probability of detection. 
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rule, the plaintiff would additionally need to show that the defendant owed and violated a 
duty to the plaintiff to take reasonable care when engaging in the activity in order for 
courts to impose liability on the defendant. Increasingly, however, defendants that engage 
in dangerous activities are held to a strict liability standard, which imposes liability on 
defendants for all the harms their actions cause regardless of whether the defendants are 
negligent. Theoretically, either form of liability can result in defendants taking the 
socially optimal level of care, defined as the level of care that minimizes total social costs 
after taking into account the costs of exercising care and the reduction in accident risks 
(Shavell 2004). But, under a negligence rule, courts would have to determine the 
defendant’s level of care and calculate the socially optimal level of care.  
Just as tort litigation can support the objectives of a net beneficial regulatory 
regime, such a regulatory regime can increase the efficiency of tort litigation. If courts 
apply a negligence rule to drilling operators, a set of net beneficial regulations would ease 
the court’s decisionmaking task; the court would only need to determine whether the 
defendant violated relevant regulations to determine whether the defendant’s actions fell 
below the standard of care. In fact, Merrill and Schizer (2013) propose such a regulation-
and-tort integrated system for managing the risks of shale development, except that they 
urge regulations to adopt best practices based on best-available technologies. In their 
scheme, compliance with best-practices regulations would create a presumption that the 
defendant exercised reasonable care, subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff. If the best-
practices regulations are not those that maximize net benefits, however, then the standard 
of care may not coincide with the socially optimal standard of care. For example, if the 
best-practices regulations minimize expected accident losses without considering costs, 
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then they would in effect require the highest level of care and not the socially optimal 
level of care. Under an economic framework, the regulations would balance the costs and 
benefits of risk-mitigation strategies (as discussed in the previous section) and would not 
necessarily be based on best-available technologies, thereby keeping the resulting level of 
care at the socially optimal level of care. 
 Alternatively, courts can hold the operator strictly liable for resulting harms. Strict 
liability would also ease the court’s decisionmaking task by removing the comparison of 
the defendant’s level of care to the socially optimal level of care. It may also make sense 
to hold operators strictly liable for harms as operators may have easier access to 
insurance to pay for environmental harms that occur even when operators take reasonable 
care. Homeowner policies tend not to cover contamination risks of nearby shale 
development, but insurers can purchase specialized coverage to cover third-party harms, 
as discussed in the next section. Finally, strict liability has the added benefit of 
discouraging excessive activity levels (Shavell 2004). Because operators do not pay for 
resulting harms when they take due care under a negligence rule, they increase their 
activity levels so long as the benefits of additional activity outweigh their costs of taking 
due care. Under a strict liability rule, however, operators choose an activity level where 
their net utility (benefits minus costs of care) is higher than total expected harms, which 
is the socially optimal level of activity. If a state applies strict liability to operators, 
compliance with net beneficial regulatory standards should prevent the assessment of 
punitive damages against the operator even if compliance does not absolve the operator 
from liability for harms. 
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Beyond setting a liability standard, legislatures could create a liability regime for 
contamination by onshore drilling operators. This could be similar to what the federal 
government currently does for sites contaminated with hazardous substances (referred to 
as Superfund sites) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA). Specifically, CERCLA imposes strict liability for 
contamination by hazardous substances not only on current operators or owners of sites, 
but also on past operators or owners, transporters of hazardous substances, and disposal 
arrangers. In fact, some fracking-related spills may already trigger CERCLA liability. 
Fracking fluid contains about a half to two percent of chemical additives, some of which 
could be considered hazardous substances (U.S. House of Representatives 2011). And, if 
so, a sizeable spill of the fluid on the surface might trigger emergency response action 
under CERCLA, even though the purposeful injection of fracking fluids for well 
stimulation is not federally regulated.85 To the extent not preempted by CERCLA, states 
could create similar liability systems for shale operators, where any spill of fracking fluid 
or wastewater could trigger cleanup responsibility.86 In addition, the expansion of 
cleanup liability for such spills to parties besides operators may produce incentives for 
other involved parties to monitor the activities of those with whom they choose to work. 
Although the tort system has the potential to efficiently regulate shale 
development, it has certain disadvantages, some of which can be mitigated with 
additional regulation. First, there is the problem of judgment-proof injurers (Shavell 
                                                
85 In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress amended the definition of “underground injection” under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act to exclude the injection of fracking fluid in the fracking operation itself, unless 
the fracking fluid contains diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 300h.  
86 Notably, however, CERCLA exempts oil and natural gas from the definition of a hazardous substance, 
meaning that spills of oil and gas do not trigger these reporting and liability requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(14). In the case of shale development, it does not seem reasonable to require cleanup of natural gas, 
however, because the gas may be naturally present. In the case of alleged contamination by methane 
migration, then, it might be better for states to directly address causation hurdles, as I discuss next. 
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2004). These injurers face diminished incentives to mitigate risks because, even if 
disaster ensues, they will not be able to pay for damages. Victims can sue these injurers 
in tort, but there will be no funds available to compensate the victims and remediate 
harms. Regulatory interventions, however, could prohibit judgment-proof drilling 
operators. Specifically, regulators could require operators to purchase liability insurance 
that would cover expected immediate harms, as discussed in the next section.  
 Second, tort litigation is characterized by high transaction costs. Using insurer 
data, Hersch and Viscusi (2007) find that on average the total transaction costs for each 
dollar received by claimants are $0.75 for all claims and $0.83 for litigated claims. In 
addition, Hersch and Viscusi find that the main factors that influence litigation and 
defense costs for insurers were the scale and the complexity of the case—and 
environmental litigation, especially with causation often disputed, likely falls into the 
category of high complexity. It is possible that states could reduce transaction costs by 
clarifying liability standards to promote settlement of claims.  
Finally, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove causation and assign guilt in tort for 
water contamination from drilling activities (Jordan 2011; Hall 2013). A plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant’s actions caused the harm in order to prevail in a tort claim. 
Sudden or gradual pollution spills at drilling sites, for example, can cause contamination 
of nearby water sources, but contamination can also be naturally present or be due to 
other human activities, such as the use of pesticides in agriculture. Even if drilling 
activities cause contamination, multiple operators can contribute to the contamination, 
making it difficult to hold any one company at fault.  
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Clear rules may provide some relief by creating default liability under certain 
conditions. For example, states could require operators to provide baseline test results if 
they want to allege that contamination in a water source was preexisting. This is 
essentially the liability rule in Pennsylvania, promoting baseline testing of nearby water 
wells without explicitly requiring baseline testing. As of now, only eight states require 
operators to test nearby water wells prior to drilling (Richardson et al. 2013). Texas and 
Oklahoma, states with significant shale development, have no such requirements. 
Noncompliance with testing requirements could factor into tort liability as it does in 
Pennsylvania—that is, operators that fail to test wells prior to drilling could be 
presumptively liable for any contamination—thereby decreasing some of the difficulties 
plaintiffs have in proving causation. 
 Although such strategies may reduce some causation burdens, they are unlikely to 
help plaintiffs that seek to establish causation between latent harms and shale 
development (Category III and IV risks). Courts may be hesitant to hold operators 
responsible for contamination or contamination-related harms that arise long after drilling 
has ceased. The amount of time that has elapsed also increases the likelihood that other 
factors contributed to the harm. Proactive research into these risk pathways would also 
work to support causation for true latent harms that might feature in future tort litigation.  
And, if states fail to support such research, tort litigation could still play a useful, 
albeit costly, role in mobilizing research into latent harms. This could arise if future juries 
award large damages to plaintiffs regardless of whether the plaintiffs prove causation 
when there is little scientific evidence to dispute causation.87 Hersch (2002) found that 
                                                
87 Such occurrences have been documented in previous tort litigation. For example, after a prominent tort 
case in which the plaintiff alleged latent harms from her silicone breast implants, two jurors indicated after 
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litigation on breast-implant safety prodded the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) into action. When breast implants first became available on the market, the FDA 
had not required implant manufacturers to provide any information on the long-term 
safety of implants and did not initiate any such studies until after numerous plaintiffs had 
won multimillion dollar awards through tort litigation. Of course, it is preferable for 
regulators to require safety information or invest in research before large-scale tort 
litigation as potential plaintiffs will not have the necessary resources to support scientific 
research, and judges and juries will not have the expertise to evaluate the research. But, 
litigation could still act as an important backstop, ensuring that regulators do not ignore 
the difficult-to-understand latent harms from shale development.  
 
Insurance Mandates 
 
Finally, insurance mandates should play a role in comprehensive management of 
risks to water from shale development (Dana and Wiseman 2014). Insurance requires 
companies to pay premiums before any harms occur, thus forcing companies to “save” 
money in advance to pay for future harms. When clear regulatory standards are in place 
and when tort liability is well defined, a liability insurance regime can successfully 
mitigate environmental risk and ensure that funds are available to compensate victims 
and remediate the environment. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the decision that while they did not think that silicone caused the plaintiff’s disease, they awarded her $5.2 
million in compensation because she was sick and needed the money and because there was no evidence 
that silicone was safe (Hersch 2002). 
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Benefits of Insurance 
At first glance, the risk-mitigation benefits of insurance are counterintuitive. 
Liability insurance is actually a solution to the problem of risk-averse potential injurers 
either exercising too much care to avoid liability or avoiding the activity altogether when 
they face strict liability for harms. Both excessive care and suboptimal activity levels 
reduce social welfare. Therefore, the usual benefit of liability insurance is that injurers 
could be risk neutral instead of risk averse and generate an optimal (i.e., higher) level of 
risk. In addition, the purchase of insurance itself could diminish the insured’s incentives 
for risk reduction, a phenomenon referred to as moral hazard. Essentially, a party (the 
insured) may take on more risks when another party (the insurer) becomes the one 
responsible for paying for the consequences of the risks.  
Hence, the role of insurance in risk mitigation is not a foregone conclusion. The 
key conditions for insurers to function as pseudo risk regulators is their ability to 
condition favorable premiums on the use of sound operating practices and to monitor 
policyholders to ensure compliance. Scholars disagree about whether insurers monitor,88 
but arguably, if claim payment is conditional on complying with the premium conditions 
and if tort litigation generally reveals the actions taken by the operator prior to an 
accidental release of pollution, then policyholders would have incentives to adhere to 
insurance conditions. But, even then, the insurer must condition premiums on compliance 
with some set of operating practices.  
                                                
88 Some scholars point to examples where such monitoring occurs and improves outcomes (Ben-Shahar and 
Logue 2012), while others argue that insurers’ monitoring capacity and history have been overstated 
(Abraham 2011). At least one energy insurance provider, Energi, Inc., has revealed to media that its 
underwriting process does include a compliance audit of a client's operations to ensure that safety and loss-
prevention standards are followed. Peter Behr. 2013. “Insurance Issues Loom Over Shale Gas 
Development.” E&E EnergyWire, August 1. 
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Once again, a rational regulatory system could enhance the beneficial properties 
of insurance. Specifically, premiums could be conditioned on the net-beneficial 
regulations discussed previously.89 This would ensure that the resulting standard of care 
would continue to be the socially optimal standard of care. This system, however, would 
generally not work well for Category III and IV risks to water because state regulations 
would not specifically cover those risks. But, as I discuss later in this section, this gap is 
not relevant in this context as insurance should not be required to cover latent harms.  
Finally, an insurance mandate can improve compensation outcomes by barring 
judgment-proof operators from engaging in drilling.90 The insurance requirement would 
need to be set at an optimal coverage amount equal to the expected value of tort harms; 
otherwise, it might deter too many firms from entering the market. 
 
Availability of Insurance 
There are several types of insurance plans available today that can be used to 
control some of the water-contamination risks of fracking and drilling in general. First, 
there are traditional commercial general liability (CGL) policies. These policies were first 
offered in 1940 and provided protection for liability for damages from accidental events 
(including pollution discharges) that occurred during the policy period (“occurrence-
based” coverage).91 Largely due to expanded environmental liability exposure and broad 
interpretations of the term “accident,” CGL policies became stingier over time with their 
                                                
89 Again, if monitoring is an issue, insurers could also condition favorable premiums on maintaining a low 
record of violations of state regulations, which would achieve similar compliance objectives. 
90 Some scholars have argued that the availability of insurance may also improve compensation outcomes 
by making courts more comfortable with holding companies responsible for the environmental harms 
caused by their activities (Abraham 2008), making injured parties more likely to sue (Dana and Wiseman 
2014), and transfering payment to victims more efficiently (Freeman and Kunreuther 1997). 
91 Abraham (2008) more thoroughly describes the emergence and evolution of CGL policies. 
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coverage of environmental liability. Basically, environmental liability can attach to 
injuries or damages that do not manifest until years after the liability-producing 
accidental pollution release (such as Category III and IV risks to water). The emergence 
of a “long tail” on claims made it difficult for insurers to predict overall liability 
(Abraham 2008). CGL policies began to contain a “pollution exclusion” that precludes 
liability coverage for damages caused by the discharge of pollution unless the discharge 
was “sudden and accidental.” But because courts have allowed unexpected gradual 
discharge of pollutants to count as “sudden and accidental” discharges, some CGL 
policies now contain an “absolute pollution exclusion,” which removes the “sudden and 
accidental” exception in total.92  
 Instead of standard-form occurrence-based liability coverage for accidental 
pollution discharges, operators can purchase specialized policies that cover liability and 
cleanup costs associated with pollution discharges. These policies are generally referred 
to as environmental impairment liability (EIL) insurance policies, and there are oil-and-
gas specific EIL policies. These specialized policies cover bodily injury, property 
damage, and remediation expenses, but they often only provide coverage on a “claims-
made” basis, meaning that the policies only cover damages from qualifying pollution 
events that are claimed during the policy period. For example, a specialized EIL policy 
would cover damages from the contamination of a private water well by fracking 
wastewater that leaked from a storage container located on a well site—if the claim for 
the loss was made and reported during the policy period. The claims-based coverage cut 
                                                
92 The stingiest CGL policies include a “total pollution exclusion.” IRMI.com, an insurance resource, 
provides more detailed information about these policies and exclusions, http://www.irmi.com. 
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off the difficult-to-insure long tail, providing no coverage for later liability for long-
latency harms from a pollution release that occurred during the policy period. 
 These policy coverage descriptions suggest that traditional CGL policies are 
likely to cover Category I and III risks as long as the policies do not contain an absolute 
pollution exclusion.93 Once the CGL contains an absolute pollution exclusion, however, 
the policy might not cover any water-contamination risks. Specialized EIL policies, in 
contrast, are likely to cover Category I and II risks, but they are unlikely to cover any 
risks with latent harms94 and any risks that involve the possibility of delayed detection. 
Table 15 summarizes the possible coverage. 
 Broadly speaking, insurance is available to cover some water-contamination risks 
of drilling and, especially, fracking. Most drilling operators carry CGL policies, but not 
many purchase additional EIL insurance and those who do purchase such coverage may 
not purchase enough coverage.95 Of course, an operator can choose not to purchase 
insurance and self-insure against all environmental risks. When an operator is large 
enough, self-insurance is a viable strategy. Self-insurance, however, is unlikely to be a 
viable strategy for small- to medium-sized operators given that damages from water-
contamination events are in the millions. And, reports suggest that smaller operators are, 
on average, more likely to incur violations during drilling.96  
 
                                                
93 It is possible, however, that some policies are written to exclude some of the risks of fracking, such as 
damages stemming from contamination by fracking fluid. 
94 Unless insurers are made liable for medical monitoring expenses for potential future manifestations of 
disease or illness when the claim is made at the time of the accident. 
95 One insurer estimates that only about thirty to forty percent of oil-and-gas companies buy EIL policies. 
Douglas McLeod. 2013. “Insurance Coverage Options for Fracking Risks are Limited.” Business 
Insurance, February 24. 
96 Daniel Gilbert and Russell Gold. 2013. “As Big Drillers Move In, Safety Goes Up.” Wall Street Journal, 
April 1. 
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Mandating Insurance 
Before mandating any form of liability insurance, state regulators should examine 
why operators are not purchasing insurance in their area. It could be that operators are not 
being held liable for immediate environmental harms in tort, which could suggest 
problems in the state’s tort liability regime that should be separately addressed. As 
discussed previously, causation hurdles in tort make it challenging for plaintiffs to prove 
their cases—that drilling activities caused their damages. Operators will not choose to 
pay premiums for coverage that they do not think that they will use. 
It could also be that operators are not willing to purchase insurance because 
premiums are too high relative to expected damages. Freeman and Kunreuther (1997) 
document that the ambiguity of risks plays a role when insurers decide what premium to 
charge; more ambiguous risks lead to higher premiums. One source of risk ambiguity 
could be outstanding liability uncertainty.97 The liability uncertainty may be highest in 
the Marcellus shale area because the case law is particularly undeveloped and the extent 
of damages may be high as the area is heavily populated and many people rely on private 
water wells for drinking water.98 There are a few fracking-related water-contamination 
cases making their way through the courts, but none have been decided yet. If this is the 
source of high premiums, state legislators could reduce premiums by reducing some of 
the tort liability uncertainty through tort reforms that clarify causation and outline 
compensable damages.  
                                                
97 Another source of ambiguity is the scientific uncertainty surrounding some risk pathways. This 
uncertainty is most prevalent for Category III and IV risks, and I do not advocate that operators be required 
to purchase insurance to cover corresponding harms of these risks. 
98 This may be why only one insurer is known to provide EIL coverage in the Marcellus shale area 
(Ironshore), and based on my conversations with insurers, its premiums are expensive. 
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In addition, the lack of a set of operating practices that maximize the net benefits 
of shale development could contribute to ambiguity. For example, the senior vice 
president of one energy insurance provider, Energi, Inc., has called for a “more 
consistent, visible and effective set of best operating practices” and, in particular, 
“common agreement among states on a [set of] best practices” to improve insurance 
availability.99 Again, here, the development of net beneficial regulations could reduce 
these concerns. 
Finally, the insurance market might not function well on its own due to concerns 
about adverse selection. Adverse selection would occur when insurers could not 
distinguish between operators that present a high risk of loss and those who present a low 
risk of loss, offering both groups insurance coverage at the same price. The riskier 
operators would be more likely to purchase the insurance, which might cause the insurer 
to raise the price, thus further reducing the probability that less risky firms would 
purchase insurance. This could lead to a situation where premiums are high, and many 
operators do not purchase insurance. 
Once it is clear that the regulatory and tort systems are able to support the 
provision and purchase of insurance, states should consider mandating EIL insurance 
coverage for operators that drill within their jurisdictions. Insurance mandates have two 
direct benefits: they eliminate adverse selection, and they block judgment-proof injurers 
from engaging in the activity. Once all firms are required to purchase insurance, the 
insurer will no longer have to worry about less risky operators opting out. And, if states 
require the purchase of sufficient coverage, then only operators able to afford to pay out 
expected damages will remain.  
                                                
99 Peter Behr. 2013. “Insurance Issues Loom Over Shale Gas Development.” E&E EnergyWire, August 1. 
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So far, not many jurisdictions require insurance for oil-and-gas operators.100 And, 
when they do, state and local governments also vary in the amount of coverage that they 
mandate and typically only mandate CGL insurance, which could have several pollution 
exceptions. Operators are required to purchase EIL coverage in only one state, Maryland, 
which does not yet allow fracking.101 Maryland requires coverage of at least $1 million to 
cover bodily injury, property damage, and natural resource damage, which includes the 
costs of cleanup and remediation caused by the discharge of pollutants. The state also 
mandates that the insurance be maintained for five years after the well has been sealed 
and plugged and the site has been reclaimed. 
Under an economic framework, variations in the amount of coverage may be 
desirable as different areas may have different expected damages from accidental 
pollution discharges. But, all states should mandate EIL insurance coverage that covers 
immediate injury, property, and cleanup costs from both accidental sudden and gradual 
releases of pollution—that is, Category I and II risks to water. Policies should continue to 
only cover claims made during the policy period, perhaps within some time window of 
the incident responsible for the pollution release. Policies would then incentivize 
operators to immediately report spills or leaks to ensure that any resulting damages are 
covered by their insurance. Early discovery of pollution releases would mitigate 
environmental damages and minimize remedial costs. 
                                                
100 Municipalities such Arlington and Fort Worth, Texas, and some states, including Colorado, Idaho, 
Maryland, New jersey, Ohio, and Oregon, require insurance coverage. Dana and Wiseman (2014) provide a 
more comprehensive overview of local and state efforts. 
101 Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 14-111(7) (2013).  
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Operators should not be required to purchase insurance coverage that would cover 
Category III and IV harms.102 Few insurers would be willing to underwrite such 
comprehensive policies given the uncertainty associated with latent harms, and the 
inclusion of these harms in coverage would drive up premiums. Dana and Wiseman 
(2014) argue that “insurance markets have consistently produced adequate insurance 
capacity once a mandate was enacted” despite risk uncertainty and predictions to the 
contrary. To support their claims, they refer to the $1.5 billion in insurance capacity 
generated in response to a de facto insurance mandate on offshore oil shippers and 
drilling operators.  
But, previous cases where insurers supplied enough insurance capacity to satisfy 
demand despite uncertain environmental liability were characterized by significant tort 
and regulatory reforms. Referring to Dana and Wiseman’s example, the federal 
government does require offshore oil shippers and drilling operators to prove financial 
responsibility for removal costs from oil spills,103 which operators can satisfy by 
demonstrating sufficient insurance coverage (Abraham 2011). But, the federal liability 
scheme104 for offshore operators imposes a maximum liability cap that depends on the 
facility, typically removal costs plus $75 million,105 and requires operators to prove 
financial responsibility sufficient to meet maximum liability.106 These caps make it easier 
                                                
102 An exception to this is the previously discussed requirement for operators to post assurance bonds to 
ensure proper well abandonment (Dana and Wiseman 2014). Once the operator proves that it has properly 
plugged and sealed the well, the operator may retrieve the bond that it posted. 
103 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61. 
104 Offshore drilling is subject to liability and regulatory provisions under the Clean Water Act § 311, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321, and the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61. 
105 This is the liability cap for an offshore facility except a deepwater port. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). 
106 Id. § 2716. Of course, as the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrated, these insurance limits 
can be far too low to compensate victims and remediate the environment in the case of large spills. I 
discuss the possibility of catastrophic damages next. 
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for insurers to price premiums for uncertain risk pathways.107 Unless state legislatures set 
a liability cap for damages from accidental pollution releases, then it is not likely that 
many insurers will offer to insure operators against liability for later-manifested harms. 
Thus far, however, the analysis in this chapter has not considered the possibility 
of catastrophic damages from shale development. This is partly because the findings in 
Chapter I suggest that average impacts are small. The focus of this chapter was then to 
develop a comprehensive regulatory system that responds to all risk pathways. But, if a 
low-probability risk of catastrophic damages manifests, the injurer is unlikely to have the 
financial resources to pay for damages even in a regulatory system that requires operators 
to carry insurance that would cover expected damages.  
States concerned about low-probability catastrophic damages of shale 
development could look to the proposals for creating a system to cover catastrophic 
damages from offshore drilling accidents; many of these proposals were generated in the 
wake of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster that highlighted the inadequacy of the 
regulatory regime for offshore drilling in dealing with spills of that magnitude. Insights 
from these proposals could be applied to onshore shale development.108 For example, 
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2011) recommend a “two-tier” liability system that includes 
regulatory, tort, and insurance interventions. Specifically, they recommend combining a 
high individual tort liability cap for operators that would cover damages from a large spill 
with an ex ante tax on all operators. The taxes would be paid into a fund that would be 
                                                
107 In addition, the federal government has mandated insurance for owners of nuclear plants, but the 
insurance requirements were also passed with limits on the extent of private liability. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Fact Sheet, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html. 
108 Note that worst-case scenario damages would be different than those for offshore drilling, and these 
damages could vary by shale formation. 
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used to cover damages that are in excess of the individual liability cap.109 Operators 
would also need to prove financial responsibility by obtaining liability insurance 
sufficient to cover damages up to the individual liability cap.110 Hence, if shale 
development is characterized by the possibility of catastrophic damages, then state 
regulators may similarly consider setting much higher insurance coverage requirements 
than otherwise suggested by average damage estimates and augmenting available funds 
with an ex ante tax.111 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapters I and II, I find that perceived risks to water from drilling activities can 
lower property values for vulnerable properties and lead to outright bans on shale 
development. To help manage the externalities associated with shale development, 
governments can deploy three tools—regulation, liability rules, and insurance mandates. 
In this chapter, I have discussed how these systems interact with each other, suggesting 
that different combinations of these tools can be used to manage harms from different 
risk categories. I conclude by explicitly outlining the tools that regulators could prioritize 
for each risk category. These priorities are summarized in Table 16. 
                                                
109 Financing part of the fund with a percentage of fines collected each year could also add a fault element 
to fund payment. Those responsible for the worst violations would contribute more money to the fund. 
110 Similarly, Cohen et al. (2011) propose setting a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social 
costs of a spill and requiring insurance up to the cap, though Abraham (2011) points out that third-party 
insurers may be unable to provide that much coverage. 
111 Alternatively, states could require all operators to maintain separate, additional insurance coverage that 
would be activated should any operator cause catastrophic damages above the individual liability cap. For 
example, claims resulting from nuclear accidents are covered under the Price-Anderson Act, which both 
mandates an individual “first tier” level of insurance for owners of nuclear power plants and generates a 
plan for obtaining additional funds from insurers in the case of severe accidents. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Fact Sheet, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html. 
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Category I and II risks manifest in immediate harms to water sources. These risks 
are not very different from the risks to water presented by all onshore drilling activities, 
not just shale development. Regulators should require operators to adopt all risk-
mitigating operating practices that generate net benefits. Strict liability for drilling harms 
will also motivate operators to adopt these practices, especially if legislative and 
regulatory interventions facilitate recovery for actual drilling-related harms. Mandatory 
insurance coverage for Category I and II risks will then guarantee that only operators that 
are able to pay for expected immediate harms (reasonable care notwithstanding) engage 
in drilling activities. Net beneficial regulations, an adequate enforcement system, and 
robust tort litigation will ensure that operators continue to adopt all net-beneficial risk 
mitigation operating practices.   
States should recognize that this regulatory strategy, however, is unlikely to 
address those Category III and IV risks that are characterized by uncertain pathways and 
latent harms. Regulators should implement research strategies now to learn more about 
these risks. By being proactive, regulators can amass scientific data and update 
regulations in a timely manner and in an appropriate way given the information. Tort 
litigation can still function as a backstop motivating force. If governments are concerned 
about having money available to address these latent harms in the future, then 
governments could apply a portion of regulatory fines to form a fund. This fund could be 
used in the future to remediate the environment when those responsible for latent-
manifesting contamination are unable to pay.112 Financing the fund with a percentage of 
fines collected each year would also add a fault element; those responsible for the worst 
violations would contribute a larger amount of money to the fund. 
                                                
112 Ideally, health insurance would pay for any latent health risks to individuals. 
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Both Pennsylvania and New York have been proactive in developing new 
regulatory schemes to accommodate shale development while addressing environmental 
risks. In February 2012, Pennsylvania passed Act 13,113 a law that strengthened many 
environmental protections for water sources by increasing setback requirements and 
establishing the presumption of liability for water contamination for operators of 
unconventional wells. Meanwhile, New York has prohibited shale development since 
2008 to allow the state to develop comprehensive shale regulations. If the final SGEIS 
resembles the revised draft SGEIS published in September 2011, then New York will 
have the most comprehensive shale regulations in the country (Richardson et al. 2013). 
Pennsylvania’s regulatory changes may mitigate property-value losses going forward, 
and once finalized, New York’s regulations may lower the incidence of local bans.  
But, gaps still remain. Neither state requires insurance coverage, and neither state 
makes provisions for research into uncertain risk pathways. It is also not evident whether 
the current set of regulations in either state is net beneficial. By applying insights from 
this chapter, states such as Pennsylvania and New York could ensure that all types of 
risks to water are managed through regulation, litigation, and insurance. When deployed 
effectively, these three tools will responsibly facilitate shale development by creating 
incentives for optimal activity levels, acceptable risk-taking, and comprehensive 
environmental protection.  
 
  
                                                
113 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2301–3504 (2013). 
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Tables 
 
Table 14. A Typology of Water-Contamination Harms from Shale Development 
Incident Type 
Harm Discovery  
Sudden Gradual 
Immediate Category I: A spill, 
discharge, or blowout event 
that contaminates nearby 
soil or water 
 
Pathways: Some fracturing 
process (improper well 
casing); blowouts; some 
storage/transport; some 
wastewater disposal 
Category II: A slowly 
leaking on-site waste 
storage pit that 
contaminates nearby soil or 
water 
 
Pathways: some fracturing; 
storage; some disposal 
Delayed (latent harms) Category III: Any spill, 
discharge, or blowout found 
to generate latent harms 
 
Pathways: Fracking fluid 
flowing into natural fault 
lines in the local geology; 
any blowouts, spills or leaks 
linked to latent health harms 
Category IV: Leaking pits, 
disposal wells, or 
abandoned wells that 
generate later harms 
 
Pathways: Unplugged 
abandoned wells with later 
leaks; later leaking disposal 
wells; improper wastewater 
disposal linked to latent 
health harms; gas seeping 
into natural fault lines in the 
local geology 
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Table 15. Insurance Coverage for Risk Categories by Insurance Plan 
 Category I Category II Category III Category IV 
CGL YES MAYBE YES MAYBE 
CGL with pollution 
exclusion 
YES NO YES NO 
CGL with absolute 
pollution exclusion 
NO NO NO NO 
EIL YES YES NO NO 
Notes. CGL refers to commercial general liability insurance plans. EIL refers to 
environmental impairment liability insurance plans. A “pollution exclusion” precludes 
liability coverage for damages caused by the discharge of pollution unless the discharge 
was “sudden and accidental.” An “absolute pollution exclusion” removes the “sudden and 
accidental” exception in total. 
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Table 16. Prioritizing Regulatory Tools By Risk Category 
 Category I Category II Category III Category IV 
Net-Beneficial 
Regulation 
YES YES NO Some: YES 
Research Investments NO NO YES YES 
Tort Liability Standards YES YES YES YES 
Insurance Mandates 
(EIL) 
YES YES NO NO 
Assurance Bonds NO NO YES YES 
Notes. EIL refers to environmental impairment liability insurance plans. See text for 
details. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
 
 In this Appendix, I provide the results of a series of robustness checks. In general, 
my qualitative results do not change when I alter the spatial and temporal definitions of 
my variables of interest, use indicator variables, analyze only recent environmental health 
and safety (EH&S) violations, include well investigations, and limit my analysis to gas 
wells. I also present limited evidence that the results for Washington County, 
Pennsylvania may be generalizable to other similar areas facing extensive shale 
development. 
 
Spatial and Temporal Robustness Checks 
 
First, I analyze the sensitivity of my results by varying the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of the nearby-well variables. Specifically, I allow the distance buffer around 
properties to vary between 0.75 and 2 miles, and I look at all nearby wells drilled prior to 
the property’s sale, only wells drilled within the two years before the sale, and only wells 
drilled within one year before the sale. Table 17 summarizes the coefficients of interest 
for these regressions. The coefficients are similar and often statistically significant, 
especially the coefficient on the interaction term between violations and wells. To help 
demonstrate overall patterns, I graph these coefficients in Figure 1. The coefficients tend 
to be largest in magnitude when I use well counts within 0.75 miles of each property and 
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especially for wells drilled within the year prior to the property’s sale. These results 
suggest that closer and more recently drilled horizontal wells have the greatest effects on 
a property’s value. 
 
Indicator Variables of Interest 
 
In Table 18 through Table 20, I modify my coefficients of interest by generating 
indicator variables. First, I generate indicator well variables. For example, my horizontal 
well dummy variable is equal to one if there is at least one horizontal well within a mile 
of the property and zero otherwise. Next, I generate indicator violations variables. For 
example, I create an indicator variable equal to one if the property sold after above-
average numbers of well violations in the previous six months and zero otherwise (using 
the county’s own well-violations sample average). I also generate interactions between 
these variables and other variables of interests.  
Table 18 presents the main results using well indicator variables. I find that 
having at least one horizontal well within a mile raises property values by between 10 
and 20 percent. This estimated effect is much higher than the effect I estimated using well 
count variables, likely because most properties, if they have any nearby horizontal well, 
have multiple nearby horizontal wells. Specifically, properties with at least one horizontal 
well within a mile have on average five horizontal wells within a mile. I also find that, at 
the average number of county-level environmental violations, having a horizontal well 
within a mile decreases a property’s value by about 6 percent.  
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In Table 19, I summarize the results when recent violations in the county are 
compared to the county’s own well-violations average. In this way, I test for whether 
noticing violations above the expected number of violations drives the results. In the case 
of above average numbers of EH&S violations leading up to the sale, a property loses 
about 1.4 percent of its value for each additional horizontal well within a mile. This effect 
reduces the direct benefit of an additional nearby horizontal well to about a 0.5 percent 
increase in property value.  
Finally, in Table 20, I use the violations indicator variables together with the well 
indicator variables. Again, the effects are the same in sign, but much larger in magnitude. 
Above-average EH&S violations at the county level reduce the benefit of having a nearby 
horizontal well by about half.  
I also run regressions that approximate the nearest-neighbor matching runs. 
Because the matching estimator requires a binary treatment variable, the results should be 
compared to my results when I use the horizontal wells indicator variable. In Table 21, I 
demonstrate that my results are similar to the results generated using the matching 
estimator.  
 
Recent Environmental, Health, and Safety Violations 
 
 In my model, individuals pay attention to information on recent well violations. 
At first blush, however, it is not obvious how recent these violations should be. After a 
violation is discovered, it must be posted on the PADEP website. In addition, 
homeowners and homebuyers need time to view and process the information. Because 
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most homebuyers take a few months to search for a new home, I use the number of 
violations in the six months prior to each property’s sale as a reasonable time window 
during which homebuyers may view information on well violations. 
In this robustness test, I generate variables equal to the number of violations that 
occurred in the three months prior to each property’s sale. Table 22 summarizes these 
results. The pattern is similar to the pattern summarized in Table 3 in the main text. As 
before, the results demonstrate that EH&S shale violations have the strongest effects on 
property values for properties with nearby horizontal wells. This result is consistent with 
the idea that individuals derive more risk-relevant informational content from these 
violations than from EH&S violations at conventional wells. The coefficients on other 
variables do not change.  
 
Well Investigations 
 
As an additional robustness check, I control for the number of county-level well 
investigations in the six months prior to each property’s sale in Table 23. This test serves 
to rule out potential omitted variable bias of the following form: the number of well 
violations is correlated with the number of wells in the county, and the volume of drilling 
activity might affect property values. Well investigations are a good control because, 
while they are correlated with county well activity (even more so than are well 
violations), well investigations tend not to offer much risk information. Most well 
investigations are scheduled or surprise visits.114 Controlling for the number of well 
                                                
114 Some investigations, however, are initiated in response to reported spills and other possible violations. If 
anything, this suggests that total investigations may provide some, albeit small, risk information. 
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investigations has little effect on the size and statistical significance of the coefficient on 
the interaction between horizontal wells and shale well violations, suggesting that county-
level well activity does not drive the estimated effect. The coefficients on other variables 
of interest do not change much, but they lose statistical significance. The coefficient on 
investigations is small, positive, and statistically significant, suggesting that some of the 
positive effect of nearby horizontal wells is due to positive economic effects on the 
county level from drilling activity. 
 
Effect of Gas Wells 
 
Because most shale development involves natural gas extraction, I test whether 
my effects are driven by horizontal gas wells. Table 24 summarizes these results. As 
expected, I find that my results are driven by nearby horizontal gas wells. I do not limit to 
gas wells in my main specification, however, because I hesitate to assume that 
homeowners and homebuyers are aware whether a nearby well is a gas, oil, or other well. 
In contrast, there are many reasons to suspect that residents can distinguish between 
nearby vertical and horizontal wells (I summarize these reasons in my main discussion). 
 
Endogeneity Concerns 
 
I run a falsification test to determine whether it is likely that operators choose to 
drill where property values are lower and whether my controls (city and school district 
fixed effects as well as property and tract characteristics) mitigate any such findings. In 
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my data, the first nearby horizontal wells appear in Washington County in 2007. 
Although oil and gas companies can lease mineral rights for a number of years before any 
drilling begins, the years 2004 and 2005 are before the big shale revolution in 
Pennsylvania and likely before companies were buying up leases in droves. I match each 
property sold in 2004 and 2005 with the number of horizontal wells that will be drilled 
within a mile of it in the future, and I also generate an indicator variable equal to one if 
any horizontal well will be drilled within a mile of the property in the future. I use these 
variables to see if future horizontal wells are linked to any property-value effects for 
properties sold in 2004 and 2005. 
Table 25 summarizes these results. In uncontrolled regressions, I do find evidence 
of possible endogeneity when I group properties sold in 2004 and in 2005. Properties that 
will have at least one horizontal well in the future (2007 and onward) sold for about 10 
percent less than other properties in 2004 and 2005, without controlling for any other 
property or neighborhood characteristics. When I control for property and tract 
characteristics and use city, school district, and year fixed effects as in my main 
regression, however, I do not find any statistically significant difference in sale prices in 
2004 and 2005. That is, the sale price of properties that will have at least one horizontal 
well in the future is not statistically significantly different from the sale price of similar 
properties that will not have a well in the future. 
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Generalizability of Results 
 
I focus on Washington County in particular because it is the highest shale-
producing Pennsylvania county for which I have property sales data. But, it is worthwhile 
to consider whether the results for Washington County, Pennsylvania are generalizable to 
other counties. Residents of Washington County have experience with conventional oil 
and gas development, which may be why residents do not seek out information about 
vertical well risks. The county also has experienced a significant amount of shale 
development to make estimation of specific results for horizontal wells meaningful. 
In order to lend support to this theory, I test my hypotheses on data from 
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Westmoreland County contributes about three 
percent of total Pennsylvania shale production, which is less than the nine percent 
contributed by Washington County. Thus, the county has fewer numbers of shale wells. 
The county is also more populous (with 366,000 residents compared to Washington 
County’s 210,000) and more experience with conventional wells. Table 26 contains more 
summary statistics for Westmoreland County. As expected, properties in Westmoreland 
County have a much higher number of wells within one mile (11.97) due to the history of 
conventional drilling in that county, but they have fewer horizontal wells within one mile 
on average (0.02). I also did not have data on some property characteristics such as the 
numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms or the presence of a garage, fireplace, or pool.  
Despite these differences, I find similar results for Westmoreland County, 
suggesting that the two counties are similar enough on relevant dimensions, although the 
results for Westmoreland County are not statistically significant. Table 27 summarizes 
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these results using my main specification. I find that horizontal wells may also drive 
resident concerns. In addition, I find that higher numbers of recent EH&S violations are 
associated with property-value losses for properties with nearby horizontal wells. As 
before for Washington County, I vary the spatial and temporal definitions of my variables 
of interest. Table 28 provides the coefficients of interest from these regressions. The 
results are sensitive to these variations, and the coefficients are often not statistically 
significant. The few statistically significant coefficients on the interaction between 
horizontal wells and various violations information, however, have the predicted sign. 
Figure 2 graphs these coefficients of interest. The resulting pattern is similar to the 
pattern revealed in Figure 1, which graphs Washington County’s coefficients of interest. 
These results suggest that residents of other counties with a history of 
conventional drilling that are experiencing rapid shale development, perhaps across 
states, may respond similarly to perceived groundwater risks and information on well 
violations. For example, this might include areas in Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas. 
Future research could determine whether results are similar in counties that are entirely 
new to drilling.  
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Tables 
 
Table 17. Spatial and Temporal Robustness Checks on Coefficients of Interest, 
Washington County. 
A. Horizontal Well Count (Table 2, Equation 4) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
1 mile 0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
0.75 miles 0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
0.049* 
(0.029) 
 
B. Private Water Well and Horizontal Well Interactions (Table 2, Equation 4) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
1 mile -0.014* 
(0.009) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
0.75 miles -0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
 
C. EH&S Shale Violations and Horizontal Well Interactions (Table 2, Equation 4) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells 
drilled before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
1 mile -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.75 miles -0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0007) 
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D. EH&S Violations and Horizontal Well Interactions  
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells 
drilled before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
1 mile -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.75 miles -0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
 
Notes. See graphical representation in Figure 1. 
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Table 18. Results using Well Indicator Variables. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vertical wells w/in 1 mile indicator 
(0/1) (Vertical dummy) 
0.039 0.052 0.058 0.073 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.056) (0.060) 
Horizontal wells w/in 1 mile 
indicator (0/1) (Horizontal dummy) 
0.069 0.095* 0.163** 0.185** 
(0.046) (0.055) (0.068) (0.071) 
Vertical dummy x Private well water  -0.102  -0.105 
  (0.072)  (0.073) 
Horizontal dummy x Private well 
water 
 -0.114  -0.110 
 (0.102)  (0.105) 
EH&S violations   0.002 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Vertical dummy x EH&S violations   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Horizontal dummy x EH&S 
violations 
  -0.003** -0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Private well water 0.095* 0.187** 0.097** 0.191** 
 (0.048) (0.083) (0.047) (0.084) 
     
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 11.220*** 11.267*** 11.203*** 11.248*** 
 (0.273) (0.276) (0.284) (0.287) 
     
Observations 21,987 21,987 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.613 0.613 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 19. Results using Violations Indicator Variables. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price 
(2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Vertical wells 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells 0.019** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Vertical wells x Private well water -0.005 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells x Private well water -0.014* -0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) 
EH&S violations above county average, 6mo before 
sale (0/1) 
-0.025  
(0.022)  
Vertical wells x Above-average EH&S violations  -0.001  
(0.002)  
Horizontal wells x Above-average EH&S violations -0.014***  
(0.004)  
EH&S violations on shale wells above average (0/1)  -0.026 
 (0.025) 
Vertical wells x Above-average EH&S shale 
violations 
 -0.001 
 (0.003) 
Horizontal wells x Above-avg EH&S shale violations  -0.015*** 
 (0.005) 
EH&S violations on conventional wells above average 
(0/1) 
 -0.036 
 (0.031) 
Vertical wells x Above-average EH&S conventional 
violations 
 0.002 
 (0.003) 
Horizontal wells x Above-avg EH&S conventional 
violations 
 -0.009 
 (0.007) 
Private well water 0.126** 0.126** 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
   
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes Yes 
   
Constant 11.259*** 11.743*** 
 (0.253) (0.367) 
   
Observations 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.615 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 20. Results using Well and Violations Indicator Variables. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price 
(2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Vertical dummy 0.064 0.066 
(0.059) (0.058) 
Horizontal dummy 0.154** 0.173*** 
(0.059) (0.058) 
Vertical dummy x Private well water -0.104 -0.104 
(0.072) (0.072) 
Horizontal dummy x Private well water -0.114 -0.112 
(0.104) (0.105) 
EH&S violations above county average, 6mo before 
sale (0/1) 
-0.002  
(0.060)  
Vertical dummy x Above-avg EH&S violations  -0.031  
(0.067)  
Horizontal dummy x Above-avg EH&S violations -0.085*  
(0.044)  
EH&S violations on shale wells above average (0/1)  0.001 
 (0.068) 
Vertical dummy x Above-avg EH&S shale violations  -0.037 
 (0.073) 
Horizontal dummy x Above-avg EH&S shale viols  -0.107** 
 (0.053) 
EH&S violations on conventional wells above average 
(0/1) 
 -0.048 
 (0.052) 
Vertical dummy x Above-avg EH&S conventional 
violations 
 0.027 
 (0.053) 
Horizontal dummy x Above-avg EH&S conventional 
viols 
 -0.028 
 (0.063) 
Private well water 0.189** 0.190** 
 (0.083) (0.083) 
   
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes Yes 
   
Constant 11.286*** 11.778*** 
 (0.280) (0.390) 
   
Observations 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.615 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 21. Results Approximating the Matching Estimator. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Vertical wells 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Horizontal dummy 0.072 0.089* 0.140** 
(0.044) (0.052) (0.054) 
Vertical wells x Private well water  -0.005  
  (0.004)  
Horizontal dummy x Private well water  -0.104  
  (0.099)  
EH&S violations on shale wells above 
average (0/1) 
  -0.033 
  (0.023) 
Vertical wells x Above-average EH&S shale 
violations 
  -0.001 
  (0.002) 
Horizontal dummy x Above-average EH&S 
shale violations 
  -0.098* 
  (0.052) 
Private well water  0.126** 0.097** 
  (0.056) (0.047) 
Well investigations   2.9e-4*** 
   (9.3e-5) 
    
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 11.640*** 11.708*** 11.789*** 
 (0.381) (0.370) (0.380) 
Observations 21,987 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.613 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 22. Shale Versus Conventional Environmental, Health, and Safety Violations, 
Three Months Prior to Sale. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Vertical wells 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells 0.019** 0.018** 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Vertical wells x Private well water -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Horizontal wells x Private well water -0.014* -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
EH&S violations, 3 months -2.4e-4  
 (7.4e-4)  
Vertical wells x EH&S violations, 3 months -4.7e-6  
 (8.2e-5)  
Horizontal wells x EH&S violations, 3 months -7.7e-4***  
 (2.5e-4)  
EH&S shale violations, 3 months  -6.0e-4 
  (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S shale violations, 3 months  -3.5e-5 
  (1.7e-4) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S shale violations, 3 
months 
 -9.1e-4*** 
 (2.7e-4) 
EH&S conventional violations, 3 months  2.1e-4 
  (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S conventional violations, 3 
months 
 2.0e-5 
 (1.2e-4) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S conventional violations, 
3 months 
 0.001 
 (0.001) 
Private well water 0.126** 0.126** 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
   
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes Yes 
   
Constant 9.943*** 11.711*** 
 (0.222) (0.370) 
Observations 21,987 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 0.615 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 23. Controls for County-Level Investigations. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) 
Vertical wells 0.003 
 (0.004) 
Horizontal wells 0.030 
 (0.037) 
Vertical wells x Private well water -0.005 
 (0.004) 
Horizontal wells x Private well water -0.014 
 (0.009) 
EH&S shale violations  -3.8e-4 
 (9.0e-4) 
Vertical wells x EH&S shale violations -2.8e-5 
 (8.1e-5) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S shale violations -4.4e-4* 
 (2.6e-4) 
Well investigations  2.6e-4*** 
 (9.8e-5) 
Vertical wells x Well investigations 4.3e-7 
 (4.6e-6) 
Horizontal wells x Well investigations -1.4e-5 
 (3.9e-5) 
Private well water 0.126** 
 (0.055) 
  
Property Characteristics  Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes 
  
Constant 11.786*** 
 (0.368) 
  
Observations 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicators for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 24. Results using Gas Wells. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) 
Vertical gas wells 0.010* 
 (0.006) 
Horizontal gas wells 0.021** 
 (0.010) 
Other wells -0.005 
 (0.003) 
Vertical gas wells x Private well water -0.003 
 (0.005) 
Horizontal gas wells x Private well water -0.016* 
 (0.009) 
Other wells x Private well water -0.004 
 (0.004) 
EH&S shale violations 0.001 
 (0.001) 
Vertical gas wells x EH&S shale violations -1.4e-5 
 (1.2e-4) 
Horizontal gas wells x EH&S shale violations -4.0e-4* 
 (2.0e-4) 
Other wells x EH&S shale violations -1.1e-4 
 (7.5e-5) 
Private well water 0.110* 
 (0.058) 
  
Property Characteristics  Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes 
Year, City, & School District Controls Yes 
  
Constant 11.220*** 
 (0.273) 
Observations 21,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.613 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions. 
Property and census tract characteristics include the variables presented in Table 2.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 25. Endogeneity Falsification Tests, Washington County. 
A. Uncontrolled Regressions 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
 Sales in 2004 Sales in 2004 and 2005 
Variables  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Future horizontal wells w/in 1 
mile  
0.005  -0.001  
(0.007)  (0.005)  
Future horizontal well w/in 1 
mile indicator (0/1) 
 -0.076  -0.102*** 
 (0.051)  (0.039) 
     
Constant 11.582*** 11.599*** 11.594*** 11.608*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Observations 2,836 2,836 5,849 5,849 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These regressions have no additional 
controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
B. Controlled Regressions 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
 Sales in 2004 Sales in 2004 and 2005 
Variables  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Future horizontal wells w/in 1 mile  -0.005  -0.007  
(0.007)  (0.007)  
Future horizontal well w/in 1 mile 
indicator (0/1) 
 -0.025  -0.044 
 (0.059)  (0.059) 
     
Property Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Tract Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, City, & School District 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 11.932*** 11.980*** 11.431*** 11.441*** 
 (0.423) (0.424) (0.400) (0.407) 
     
Observations 2,831 2,831 5,838 5,838 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600 0.600 0.596 0.596 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These regressions have all of the controls 
that are included in Table 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 26. Summary Statistics – Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. 
Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Property Characteristics   
Sale Price (in year 2012 dollars) 153,423 292,966 
Building Age 37.93 35.32 
Total Living Area (1,000 square feet) 1.75 2.03 
Lot Size (100,000 square feet) 0.42 2.11 
Building Sold in Year Built 0.07 0.26 
Stories (number) 0.41 0.72 
Private Well Water 0.07 0.25 
Distance to Pittsburgh (miles) 24.66 8.12 
   
Census Tract Characteristics   
Median Household Income 53,940 16,632 
Mean Household Income 66,317 19,233 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree 39.77 8.34 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor's Degree 16.67 6.35 
% Unemployed 6.45 3.26 
% Poverty 9.71 7.04 
% Over 65 Years Old 18.61 3.90 
% Under 19 Years Old 22.83 3.81 
% Black 2.87 5.91 
% Latino 0.87 0.97 
   
Shale Well Proximity   
Distance to closest well (miles) 0.68 1.26 
Number of wells within 1 mile 11.97 14.80 
Distance to closest horizontal well 1.21 1.67 
Number of horizontal wells within 1 mile 0.02 0.25 
   
Shale Well Compliance   
Total well investigations in county, 6 months before sale 596.77 185.07 
Total violations in county, 6 months before sale 39.55 25.14 
Total EH&S violations in county, 6 months before sale 24.97 19.83 
Total EH&S shale violations in county, 6 months before sale 2.49 3.47 
Notes. DataQuick did not provide information on the number of bedrooms or bathrooms 
or the presence of a garage, fireplace, or pool for Westmoreland County.  
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Table 27. Main Results, Westmoreland County. 
 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Vertical wells 4.3e-4 2.4e-4 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Horizontal wells 0.003 0.067 
 (0.039) (0.077) 
Vertical wells x Private well water  0.003 
  (0.003) 
Horizontal wells x Private well water  -0.034 
  (0.121) 
EH&S violations in county  2.7e-4 
  (0.001) 
Vertical wells x EH&S violations  -1.3e-5 
  (3.2e-5) 
Horizontal wells x EH&S violations  -0.008 
  (0.006) 
Private well water 0.137** 0.077 
 (0.065) (0.108) 
Building Age -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Living Area (1,000 sqft) 0.041** 0.041** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Building Sold in Year Built -0.216*** -0.220*** 
 (0.057) (0.056) 
Lot Size (100,000 sqft) 0.003 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Distance to Pittsburgh (miles) 0.016 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Median Household Income 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
% Black -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree -0.010** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
% Unemployed -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
% Under 19 Years Old 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Year Controls Yes Yes 
City Controls Yes Yes 
School District Controls  Yes Yes 
   
Constant 10.960*** 10.941*** 
 (0.491) (0.482) 
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 Natural Log of Sale Price (2012$) 
Variables (1) (2) 
   
Observations           7,893           7,893 
Adjusted R-squared 0.406 0.406 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered at the census tract in parentheses. Missing 
variable indicator for property or tract characteristics are included in all regressions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 28. Spatial and Temporal Robustness Checks on Coefficients of Interest, 
Westmoreland County. 
A. Horizontal Well Count (Table 27, Equation 2) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles -0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
1 mile 0.067 
(0.077) 
0.066 
(0.077) 
0.040 
(0.075) 
0.75 miles 0.159 
(0.100) 
0.115 
(0.141) 
0.269* 
(0.137) 
 
B. Private Water Well and Horizontal Well Interactions (Table 27, Equation 2) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles -0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
1 mile -0.034 
(0.121) 
-0.031 
(0.118) 
0.106 
(0.110) 
0.75 miles -0.009 
(0.177) 
-0.084 
(0.154) 
-0.040 
(0.123) 
 
C. EH&S Violations and Horizontal Well Interactions (Table 27, Equation 2) 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles 0.0004 
(0.0018) 
-0.0001 
(0.0018) 
0.0003 
(0.0022) 
1 mile -0.0078 
(0.0055) 
-0.0083 
(0.0058) 
-0.0152** 
(0.0070) 
0.75 miles -0.0343*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0235** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0128) 
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D. EH&S Shale Violations and Horizontal Well Interactions 
 Temporal Variation 
 
Spatial 
Variation 
All horiz. wells drilled 
before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
2yrs before sale 
Horiz. wells drilled 
1yr before sale 
2 miles 0.0005 
(0.0031) 
-0.0008 
(0.0031) 
-0.0014 
(0.0051) 
1 mile 0.0029 
(0.0074) 
0.0049 
(0.0081) 
-0.0044 
(0.0177) 
0.75 miles -0.0590*** 
(0.0210) 
-0.0339 
(0.0245) 
-0.0459* 
(0.0250) 
 
Notes. See graphical representation in Figure 2. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Coefficients of Interest, Washington County. 
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Figure 2. Coefficients of Interest, Westmoreland County. 
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APPENDIX B 
  
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
 
 In this Appendix, I provide additional analysis of anti-fracking actions adopted by 
towns in New York. Specifically, I include controls for towns with different election 
systems and provide more analysis of moratoria adoption. 
 
All Bans and Moratoria 
 
 There were six towns that passed a ban or a moratorium despite not lying in a 
county that intersects with the Utica or Marcellus shale formations. These towns are 
listed in Table 29, but they were not included in any regressions. Finally, there were cities 
and villages that passed bans or moratoria, but these were also not included in any 
regressions in order to keep the observational units the same (towns). A list of some of 
these cities and villages is provided in Table 30. 
 
Ward-Voting Towns 
 
There are thirteen towns in New York that employ the ward system of electing 
councilpersons instead of an at-large voting system. A ward system divides the 
population into wards, typically four, and each ward is responsible for electing a 
councilperson. Hence, in a ward system, each councilperson would be motivated by the 
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median voter from the specific ward that is responsible for his election and not 
necessarily by the median voter of the town as a whole. Six of the thirteen ward-voting 
towns are relevant for this study as they lie in a county that intersects with the Utica or 
Marcellus shale. These towns are Camillus (Onondaga), Ellicott (Chautauqua), Greece 
(Monroe), New Hartford (Oneida), Salina (Onondaga), and Wallkill (Orange). I 
constructed a binary variable that denotes whether the town is one of these six ward-
voting towns. Table 31 presents the main results after controlling for these towns. Ward-
voting towns are associated with about a three percent higher probability of adopting a 
ban on fracking. The qualitative results for other variables remain the same. 
 
Moratoria Results by Duration  
 
To account for moratoria variability, I divide moratoria towns into groups based 
on the adopted duration of the moratorium. Specifically, I separate those towns that 
adopted a moratorium lasting at least one year (long moratoria, 97 towns), and those 
towns that adopted a moratorium lasting less than one year (short moratoria, 26 towns). 
These results are summarized in Table 32. Specifically, the results for towns that adopted 
a long moratorium are similar to the results for towns adopting any moratoria, 
summarized in Table 13. The results for towns that adopted a short moratorium, however, 
are more similar to the results for towns adopting bans, summarized in Table 11. This 
finding may seem surprising, but the data show that a short moratorium is more likely to 
lead to the adoption of a ban. The correlation between moratoria duration and eventual 
ban adoption is -0.27, and in a regression, the coefficient on moratoria duration is 
 146 
negative and statistically significant, as summarized in Table 33. It is possible that towns 
expecting to adopt a ban (perhaps only needing time to draft legislation for a ban) 
purposefully enact shorter moratoria. Alternatively, the need to frequently renew the 
moratorium might increase visibility of the issue in the town, facilitating the 
accumulation of sufficient support for a ban.  
 
Comprehensive Analysis of Adoption of Bans and Moratoria 
 
In this section, I focus on the different ways that towns could adopt a ban or a 
moratorium or both. Table 34 provides a roadmap for the following tables. Basically, in 
Table 35, I analyze the probability of adopting a ban conditional on having a moratorium, 
summarized in equation 1, and the probability of adopting a ban conditional on not 
having a moratorium, summarized in equation 2. And in Table 36, I analyze the 
probability of a moratorium that is eventually converted into a ban, summarized in 
equation 1, the probability of a moratorium that does not lead to a ban, summarized in 
equation 2, and the probability of adopting a moratorium after excluding towns that 
adopted a ban. 
Overall, some patterns emerge. Of towns with moratoria, those with high water 
risks are most likely to covert the moratoria into permanent bans on fracking. The 
coefficients on the county proportion relying on private well water and on the daily 
county water withdrawals for livestock are positive, large in magnitude, and statistically 
significant. Meanwhile, the results for ban adoption for towns without moratoria are 
similar to the results for ban adoption for all towns, except that the coefficients are much 
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smaller in magnitude. The results for moratoria that lead to bans are also similar to the 
results for all bans, previously summarized in Table 11, while the results for moratoria 
that do not lead to bans are similar to the results for all moratoria, summarized in Table 
13. These results suggest that towns with the greatest water risks, a low proportion of 
active Republicans, a high percent of owner-occupied homes, and little experience with 
drilling were most likely to adopt short moratoria on fracking and then replace those 
moratoria with permanent bans. Towns with lower water risks but with a high proportion 
of active Democrats and little experience with drilling were most likely to adopt long 
moratoria that may have been largely symbolic gestures. 
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Tables 
 
Table 29. Off-Shale Town Bans and Moratoria. 
Bans Moratoria 
Red Hook Copake 
Livingston Germantown 
 Oppenheim  
 Taghkanic  
Notes. Both bans were adopted in 2013, and all of the moratoria were adopted in 2012. 
These actions were not analyzed in this study. 
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Table 30. Non-Town Bans or Moratoria. 
Cities Villages 
Albany Altamont 
Auburn Clinton 
Beacon Dolgeville 
Binghamton Hudson 
Buffalo Owego 
Canandaigua Oxford 
Little Falls Penn Yan 
New York City Sharon Springs 
Niagara Falls Trumansburg 
Olean Whitesboro 
Oneonta Wilson 
Rochester  
Rome  
Saugerties  
St. Johnsville  
Syracuse   
Utica  
Notes. This list is not an exclusive list of cities and villages that adopted bans or 
moratoria on fracking.   
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Table 31. Controls for Ward-Voting Towns, Cross-Sectional Probit.  
 Ban Moratorium 
Variables (1) (2) 
Ward System 0.033** -0.068 
 (0.016) (0.081) 
   
Water Variables   
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county 0.014** -0.254*** 
(0.006) (0.094) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.007*** 0.092*** 
 (0.002) (0.027) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by county -0.001 -0.027 
(0.002) (0.042) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000 0.014* -0.064 
 (0.007) (0.170) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000 0.185** -40.553* 
 (0.077) (20.962) 
   
Drilling Variables   
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -0.064** -0.720*** 
 (0.028) (0.269) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -2.626*** -7.075 
 (0.906) (4.354) 
   
Political Variables   
Prop. Active Democrats, by county 0.043** -0.467 
 (0.019) (0.410) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -0.121*** -0.704* 
 (0.024) (0.393) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by county -0.453** -2.201 
(0.229) (3.842) 
   
Recycling Variable   
Recycling Rate, by county 0.037*** 0.616*** 
 (0.012) (0.160) 
   
Demographic Variables   
Logarithm of Median Income -0.010** -0.052 
 (0.005) (0.091) 
Logarithm of Town Population -0.002** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.015) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -0.349** -11.496*** 
 (0.174) (3.641) 
% Age 25 w/ More than a High School Degree/1,000 0.290** -3.601 
 (0.134) (2.902) 
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 Ban Moratorium 
Variables (1) (2) 
% Unemployed/1,000 -0.022 -3.418 
 (0.218) (4.086) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -0.352*** -4.392 
 (0.132) (2.730) 
% Black/1,000 0.275* -7.005* 
 (0.147) (4.070) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 0.206*** 1.187 
 (0.079) (1.618) 
   
Observations 688 688 
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Table 32. Moratoria by Adopted Duration, Cross-Sectional Probit. 
 Long, 12+ months 
(N=97) 
Short, <12 months 
(N=26) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Water Variables   
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, 
by county 
-0.204*** -2.7e-4 
(0.075) (0.009) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.039* 0.013*** 
(0.021) (0.003) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by 
county 
-0.024 -0.003 
(0.033) (0.004) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000 -0.169 0.016 
 (0.127) (0.016) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000 -18.402 -5.172** 
 (14.890) (2.575) 
   
Drilling Variables   
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -0.842*** -0.019 
 (0.251) (0.022) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -3.171 -0.838 
 (3.264) (1.003) 
   
Political Variables   
Prop. Active Democrats, by county -0.913*** 0.108*** 
 (0.332) (0.032) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -0.601* -0.023 
 (0.313) (0.034) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by 
county 
-1.195 -0.199 
(3.093) (0.430) 
   
Recycling Variable   
Recycling Rate, by county 0.360*** 0.044*** 
 (0.123) (0.017) 
   
Demographic Variables   
Logarithm of Median Income 0.031 -0.023*** 
 (0.072) (0.009) 
Logarithm of Town Population 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.001) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -6.747** -0.843** 
(2.904) (0.332) 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor’s Degree/1,000 -3.746 0.183 
(2.386) (0.253) 
% Unemployed/1,000 -3.419 0.045 
 (3.340) (0.350) 
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 Long, 12+ months 
(N=97) 
Short, <12 months 
(N=26) 
Variables (1) (2) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -2.238 -0.319 
 (2.258) (0.237) 
% Black/1,000 -5.123 -0.191 
 (3.300) (0.352) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 -0.466 0.463*** 
 (1.314) (0.176) 
   
Observations 688 688 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a moratorium. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 33. Bans by Adopted Duration of Moratoria, Cross-Sectional Probit. 
Variables Ban 
Moratoria Duration -0.051*** 
 (0.014) 
  
Observations 119 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficient has been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of adopting a ban. The sample includes all 
towns that adopted moratoria. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For towns with moratoria, 
the correlation between moratoria duration and the adoption of a later ban is -0.27. 
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Table 34. Comprehensive Analysis of Bans and Moratoria Summary. 
 All Shale  Estimated Probability N Table 
Ban 58 56 Pr(Ban=1) 688 Table 11 
 Nothing à Moratorium  
à Ban 
27 27 Pr(Ban=1 | Mora = 1) 119 Table 35 
 Nothing à Ban 31 29 Pr(Ban=1 | Mora = 0) 569 Table 35 
Moratorium 123 119 Pr(Mora=1) 688 Table 13 
 Nothing à Moratorium  
à Ban 
27 27 Pr(Mora=1 & Ban=1) 688 Table 36 
 Nothing à Moratorium  
(no Ban) 
96 92 Pr(Mora=1 & Ban=0) 688 Table 36 
 Nothing à Moratorium  
(sample excludes Bans) 
96 92 Pr(Mora=1) & sample 
excludes Ban towns 
632 Table 36 
 
  
 156 
Table 35. Conditional Probability of Adopting a Ban, Cross-Sectional Probit.  
 Pr(Ban=1 | 
Moratorium=1) 
Pr(Ban=1 | 
Moratorium=0) 
Variables (1) (2) 
Water Variables   
Proportion Relying on Private Well Water, by county 0.636*** 2.3e-5** 
(0.244) (8.9e-6) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, by county 0.234** 7.5e-6** 
(0.096) (3.0e-6) 
Crop Irrigation Private Withdrawals, by county 0.195 -3.0e-6 
(0.129) (2.7e-6) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000 -0.470 1.8e-5* 
 (0.547) (9.4e-6) 
Agriculture or Irrigation Wells/1,000 -120.892* 3.6e-4* 
 (67.086) (2.0e-4) 
   
Drilling Variables   
Vertical Well Development/1,000 -2.010** -2.5e-4 
 (0.955) (1.6e-4) 
Horizontal Well Development/1,000 -129.840* -1.5e-4 
 (74.080) (0.001) 
   
Political Variables   
Prop. Active Democrats, by county 2.520* 3.8e-5 
 (1.496) (2.5e-5) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by county -3.327** -1.3e-4*** 
 (1.461) (3.4e-5) 
Prop. Active Greens or Independents, by county -36.167*** -4.2e-4 
(9.976) (3.8e-4) 
   
Recycling Variable   
Recycling Rate, by county 0.916* 3.8e-5** 
 (0.491) (1.6e-5) 
   
Demographic Variables   
Logarithm of Median Income -0.266 -1.0e-5* 
 (0.277) (5.4e-6) 
Logarithm of Town Population 0.007 -2.0e-6* 
 (0.040) (1.2e-6) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School Degree/1,000 -5.170 -2.8e-4 
(6.982) (2.2e-4) 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor’s Degree/1,000 4.542 4.2e-4** 
(4.636) (1.7e-4) 
% Unemployed/1,000 4.084 -3.1e-5 
 (10.299) (2.4e-4) 
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 Pr(Ban=1 | 
Moratorium=1) 
Pr(Ban=1 | 
Moratorium=0) 
Variables (1) (2) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -21.069*** -1.7e-4 
 (5.805) (1.7e-4) 
% Black/1,000 5.429 4.2e-4** 
 (4.678) (1.9e-4) 
% Owner-Occupied Homes/1,000 0.946 2.0e-4* 
 (3.245) (1.2e-4) 
   
Observations 119 569 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 36. Probability of Adopting a Moratorium, by Ban Adoption, Cross-Sectional 
Probit.  
 Pr(Moratorium=1 
& Ban=1) 
Pr(Moratorium=1 
& Ban=0) 
(Moratorium=1), 
excluding Bans 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Water Variables    
Proportion Relying on Private 
Well Water, by county 
0.002 -0.274*** -0.253*** 
(0.004) (0.086) (0.089) 
Livestock Private Withdrawals, 
by county 
0.004*** 0.060** 0.069*** 
(0.001) (0.024) (0.024) 
Crop Irrigation Private 
Withdrawals, by county 
6.0e-5 -0.044 -0.030 
(0.002) (0.039) (0.041) 
Domestic Water Wells/1,000 0.002 -0.099 -0.089 
 (0.007) (0.158) (0.163) 
Agriculture or Irrigation 
Wells/1,000 -2.421** -16.528 -17.249 
 (1.116) (16.123) (17.040) 
    
Drilling Variables    
Vertical Well 
Development/1,000 -0.036* -0.473** -0.577** 
 (0.021) (0.231) (0.246) 
Horizontal Well 
Development/1,000 -1.191* -4.771 -5.722 
 (0.709) (3.681) (3.676) 
    
Political Variables    
Prop. Active Democrats, by 
county 0.036** -0.782** -0.708* 
 (0.015) (0.397) (0.382) 
Prop. Active Republicans, by 
county -0.045*** -0.266 -0.659* 
 (0.016) (0.360) (0.373) 
Prop. Active Greens or 
Independents, by county 
-0.460** 0.336 -0.332 
(0.210) (3.427) (3.446) 
    
Recycling Variable    
Recycling Rate, by county 0.025** 0.403*** 0.565*** 
 (0.011) (0.136) (0.160) 
    
Demographic Variables    
Logarithm of Median Income -0.003 -0.025 -0.061 
 (0.004) (0.082) (0.083) 
Logarithm of Town Population -2.6e-4 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.014) 
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 Pr(Moratorium=1 
& Ban=1) 
Pr(Moratorium=1 
& Ban=0) 
(Moratorium=1), 
excluding Bans 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
% Age 25+ w/ High School 
Degree/1,000 
-0.306* -7.388** -8.383** 
(0.167) (3.193) (3.331) 
% Age 25+ w/ Bachelor’s 
Degree/1,000 
0.038 -2.998 -2.031 
(0.132) (2.609) (2.641) 
% Unemployed/1,000 0.141 -4.752 -5.762 
 (0.189) (3.573) (3.633) 
% Under 19 Years Old/1,000 -0.359*** -0.556 -1.278 
 (0.127) (2.374) (2.422) 
% Black/1,000 0.063 -9.585** -10.210*** 
 (0.146) (3.791) (3.961) 
% Owner-Occupied 
Homes/1,000 0.164** -0.282 -0.172 
 (0.075) (1.504) (1.474) 
    
Observations 688 688 632 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal effects on the probability of a moratorium. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
 
 In this Appendix, I provide details about the risks to water from drilling 
contaminants that may be released during various stages of shale development. Ordinary 
risks of drilling include contamination from blowouts, improper waste disposal, and 
inadequately sealed abandoned wells, the cumulative environmental effects of which 
could be significant. Shale drilling techniques also come with uncertain risks of 
groundwater and surface water contamination from fracking fluid, fracking wastewater, 
or methane gas that could pass through underground fracture pathways into drinking-
water aquifers or that could get spilled on the surface and seep into the water supply. 
Below, I briefly describe the possible contaminants and explain the pathways for soil and 
water exposure.115 
 
Contaminants 
 
Nearby water or soil can become contaminated when fracking fluid, wastewater, 
or methane gas migrates through fractures, seeps through improperly cased wells, or 
spills on the surface during drilling activities, to name a few pathways. By far the most 
feared contamination is drinking water contamination by fracking fluid or by flowback 
wastewater (the fracking fluid that returns to the surface when drilling pressure is 
                                                
115 Wiseman (2013) provides a thorough description of risks that arise at different stages of the drilling 
process. 
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released).116 Fracking fluid itself is made up of mostly water (at least ninety-eight 
percent), sand for propping open fractures, and chemical additives for reducing friction 
and other purposes (U.S. Department of Energy 2009). Although the overall 
concentration of chemical additives in most fracking fluids is between a half and two 
percent, these chemicals have been at the center of much of the fracking controversy 
because they may present a risk to populations.  
A 2011 report by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
Commerce found that some commonly used chemical additives were hazardous 
pollutants or known or possible human carcinogens (U.S. House of Representatives 
2011). Exposure to these chemicals could lead to a host of adverse health outcomes, from 
eye irritations to cancers (Colborn et al. 2011). In fact, a sizeable spill of fracking fluid 
might trigger emergency response action under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), even though the purposeful 
injection of fracking fluids for well stimulation is not federally regulated.117 There are 
also no federal fracking-fluid disclosure requirements for oil and gas operators, and state 
disclosure requirements vary (Richardson et al. 2013). These inconsistencies mean that 
some state regulators do not know the kinds of hazards that these wastes may contain. To 
combat public fear that stems from the uncertainty surrounding the chemical additives, 
however, some operators have voluntarily disclosed the chemicals used in their fracking 
                                                
116 Fracking wastewater often also contains traces of materials from the shale formation itself, such as salt, 
oil and grease, and naturally occurring radioactive material (Hammer and VanBriesen 2012). 
117 In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress amended the definition of “underground injection” under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act to exclude the injection of fracking fluid in the fracking operation itself, unless 
the fracking fluid contains diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 300h. Hence, generally speaking, no federal permit is 
required for fracking activities. Some refer to this exception as the “Halliburton loophole,” as it was 
promoted by then Vice President Cheney, who was a former Halliburton Chief Executive Officer (Burger 
2013). 
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operations on an online database called FracFocus.118 Other companies are trying to 
eliminate toxic chemicals from fracking fluid and even make fracking fluid 
environmentally friendly.119 Of course, as fracking fluid becomes less toxic, fracking-
fluid contamination will also become less of a concern.  
Water can also become contaminated with methane gas, which is volatile and in 
high concentrations can increase the risk of explosions. In the anti-fracking documentary 
Gasland, for example, a man is shown lighting his faucet water on fire with great 
theatrical flare. But, methane in drinking water is not just anti-fracking propaganda. High 
methane concentrations have been identified in private water wells in a few Pennsylvania 
counties, and residents suspect that drilling activities on the Marcellus shale are to blame. 
For example, in 2010, Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. settled for $4.1 million with residents of 
Dimock, Pennsylvania over gas found in their water after state environmental regulators 
determined Cabot contaminated the aquifer underneath their homes with methane.120 
Operators, meanwhile, contend that methane concentrations either preexist drilling 
operations or stem from gas leaks within the home. Scientific studies to date are mixed. 
One recent scientific study found that drilling activities are the likely sources of much 
nearby methane contamination in Pennsylvania (Osborn et al. 2011), but another 
Pennsylvania study that tested water wells before and after drilling found that much 
contamination preexisted drilling activities, at least in the short run (Boyer et al. 2011). 
Natural gas and petroleum are exempt from the definition of “hazardous waste” under 
                                                
118 FracFocus, http://www.fracfocusdata.org. 
119 Steve Hargreaves. 2011. “Clean Fracking: Moving to Replace Chemicals.” CNN Money, November 16; 
Joe Carroll. 2012. “Chesapeake Testing ‘Green’ Fracking Fluids in Shale Wells.” Bloomberg News, 
October 2. 
120 Mary Esch. 2012. “Nationwide Insurance: Fracking Damage Won’t Be Covered.” Huffington Post, July 
12. 
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CERCLA, which suggests that any contamination by methane would not be subject to 
remedial action under CERCLA.  
 
Contamination Pathways 
 
There are five pathways by which water could become contaminated during shale 
development: (1) drilling- and fracking-related pathways; (2) blowouts; (3) surface spills 
or leaks; (4) wastewater disposal; and (5) abandoned wells. Aside from contamination 
that stems from the fracturing process, the other risk pathways are shared by conventional 
drilling activities. Shale development, however, adds fracking fluid as a potential 
contaminant and results in a scaling up of all risks due to the scope and scale of 
development. The expected magnitudes of harms are uncertain, but likely vary with 
characteristics of the shale formation, the size of the nearby population, and the 
population’s vulnerability to water contamination.  
 
Drilling- and Fracking-Related Pathways 
There are at least three theoretically possible ways that fracking fluid or methane 
gas could migrate into groundwater sources through the fracturing process (Osborn et al. 
2011). First, the fluid and gas could, over time, move from the formation and into 
drinking-water aquifers. But because thousands of feet of highly pressurized rock 
separate methane gas and fracking fluid from water sources, drilling-induced natural 
migration is unlikely. Most scientists agree that this first pathway is further implausible 
given the short time horizons for fluid and gas movement involved in current cases of 
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alleged contamination.121 If anything, this risk pathway could result in water 
contamination that may manifest years later.  
Second, fracking could create new fractures or enlarge existing fractures that 
could then connect to a system of fractures that eventually lead to drinking-water 
aquifers. Most scientific evidence suggests that single fractures are too short and end at 
each new rock layer, making it unlikely that they would reach drinking-water aquifers 
(Davies et al. 2012). But recent scientific evidence suggests that there are significant 
natural fracture pathways in Pennsylvania that connect deep shale formations to shallow 
drinking-water aquifers, and fracking activities could increase connections to these 
fracture pathways and exacerbate the risk of water contamination by methane gas (N. R. 
Warner et al. 2012). Hence, the likelihood of this risk pathway is disputed, but it would 
depend on the geology of the particular shale formation and its surrounding area.  
Third, improperly cemented or cased wells could be a source of methane 
contamination of aquifers. Osborn et al. (2011) argue that faulty cement seals around 
wellbore portions that pass through aquifers, or pass through fracture systems that 
connect to aquifers, are the likely causes of contamination that they identified in 
Pennsylvania counties. Considine et al.’s (2013) analysis of environmental violations 
issued to operators on the Pennsylvania Marcellus shale from January 2008 to August 
2011 confirms that such leaks attributed to operator error do occur. The authors identified 
two methane-migration violations in which improper well cementing and casing were 
found to affect water supplies for thirty-five families, resulting in total fines to operators 
                                                
121 For example, Osborn et al. (2011) state that their results are not consistent with rapid movement of 
formation materials to the surface. One study, however, argues that fracking could reduce the transport time 
for fluids and gas to reach the surface from tens of thousands of years to within ten years (Myers 2012). 
 165 
of about $2.8 million. Large-scale shale development could increase the incidence of 
such costly operator errors if appropriate safeguards are not in place. 
Despite the public attention to possible contamination from fracking activities, 
there has not been a confirmed case of drinking water contamination by fracking fluid 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011). One study by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), however, concluded that groundwater (but not drinking water) 
contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming was best explained by hydraulic fracturing 
operations (U.S. EPA 2011). This situation in Wyoming might be somewhat unique as 
the monitoring and water wells were relatively deep and the shale formation relatively 
shallow, thus decreasing the usually large distance between the two. The EPA has since 
dropped its investigation of the contamination at Pavillion, Wyoming.122 Other 
communities have also alleged water contamination by fracking fluid, and the EPA is 
currently investigating their claims.123 
 
Blowouts 
Uncontrolled pollution releases could also occur during well blowouts. Blowouts 
are essentially explosions that occur when operators encounter an unanticipated level of 
pressure when drilling. The explosion could release drilling fluids or methane gas into 
surface waters or groundwaters, such as what happened in Clark, Wyoming. Blowouts 
are not uncommon drilling events. Chesapeake Energy, for example, was involved in a 
                                                
122 Mead Gruver and Ben Neary. 2013. “Pavillion, Wyoming Fracking Pollution Study Dropped By EPA, 
Investigation Turned Over To State.” Huffington Post, June 20.  
123 U.S. EPA, Case Study Locations for Hydraulic Fracturing Study, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/case_studies.cfm. The EPA also still 
plans to release a report on fracking’s potential impact on drinking water sources in 2014. U.S. EPA, EPA's 
Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources, 
http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy. 
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few high-profile blowout incidences in 2011 and 2012. In April 2011, a blowout at a 
Chesapeake Marcellus shale well spilled thousands of gallons of fracking fluid in 
Bradford County, Pennsylvania.124 The blowout took six days to control, and the fracking 
fluid flowed into a nearby creek. In January 2012, the company made headlines when a 
well near Sweetwater, Oklahoma blew out, and the well did not have a blowout 
preventer.125 In addition, an internal review found that the unanticipated pressure zone 
that led to the blowout was likely caused by a production casing that previously failed in 
one of the company’s nearby wells. And again in April 2012, another Chesapeake well, 
this time one drilled in the Niobrara Shale near Douglas, Wyoming, suffered a blowout, 
releasing methane into the atmosphere and leading to the evacuation of more than sixty 
residents.126 Although these examples involved the contamination of soil, air, or surface 
waters, it is possible that an underground blowout could contaminate groundwater.127  
 
Surface Storage or Transport 
There is also the possibility that water or soil could become contaminated through 
surface spills from drilling activities, especially the improper storage of fracking 
wastewater. Fracking wastewater is often stored on site in pits, at least temporarily, and 
then transported for treatment or for injection into a disposal well. Spills could occur 
when wastewater is transported between onsite containers or when it is improperly 
enclosed in a storage container. Considine et al. (2013) identified almost one hundred and 
                                                
124 Edward McAllister. 2011. “Chesapeake Stems Flow from Blown Pennsylvania Gas Well.” Reuters, 
April 22. 
125 Paul Monies. 2012. “Chesapeake Pays $75,000 Fine For Problems that Led to Oklahoma Well 
Blowout.” NewsOK, July 21. 
126 Selam Gebrekidan and Joshua Schneyer. 2012. “Chesapeake Well Leaks in Wyoming, Residents 
Evacuate.” Reuters, April 25. 
127 John Wright Co., Part 6—Underground Blowouts, http://www.jwco.com/technical- litterature/p06.htm. 
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fifty violations for minor spills (spilling less than four hundred gallons) and nine 
violations for major spills in Pennsylvania between January 2008 and August 2011. 
Wiseman (2012) similarly found that surface spills accounted for about twenty-five 
percent of violations in Michigan and almost forty percent of violations in New Mexico. 
If spills or leaks are not cleaned up, then contaminants can migrate into groundwater 
sources. In New Mexico, a state study found that between the mid-1980s and 2003 there 
were about 7,000 cases of soil and water contamination and 400 cases of groundwater 
contamination caused by watewater leaked from drilling pits.128 
In fact, when Resources for the Future surveyed experts in government, industry, 
universities, and nongovernmental organizations about the risks of shale gas 
development, surface water contamination through spills emerged as a risk of high 
concern (Krupnick, Gordon, and Olmstead 2013). Under CERCLA, operators must report 
qualifying spills of hazardous substances,129 but states are responsible for ensuring that 
proper regulations are in place to prevent such spills, and these state regulations vary 
widely. Some states, for example, have prohibited the use of pits, require secondary 
containment around storage tanks or pits, or mandate setbacks from sensitive resources, 
while other states do not have such preventative regulations (Richardson et al. 2013). 
There are also concerns that some state regulators lack the resources and the knowledge 
to enforce these specific regulations.130  
 
                                                
128 Laura Paskus. 2012. “New Mexico’s ‘Fracking’ Legacy.” KUNM, July 11. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2013). 
130 Gayathri Vaidyanathan. 2013. “Pits for Fracking Waste Often Fall Short of Standards in W.Va.—
Report.” E&E EnergyWire, March 22. In addition to accidental spills, operators can engage in purposeful 
illegal dumping of fracking wastewater. For example, Ohio regulators are currently investigating two 
companies that dumped thousands of gallons of drilling wastewater into a sewer system that linked to a 
public water system. Ellen M. Gilmer. 2013. “State Revokes Company’s Permits After Wastewater 
Dumping.” E&E News, February 8. 
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Improper Wastewater Disposal 
In addition, risks to water could arise during the disposal of drilling wastewater. 
Ordinarily, Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provides 
“cradle to grave” management of hazardous wastes.131 When Congress amended RCRA 
in 1980, however, it exempted oil and gas wastes pending a study of the wastes by the 
EPA.132 In 1988, the EPA concluded that regulating these wastes under RCRA is not 
necessary in part because “existing [s]tate and [f]ederal regulations are generally 
adequate to control the management of oil and gas wastes,” despite noting that 
“regulatory gaps do exist” (U.S. EPA 1988). Ultimately, the EPA worried that RCRA 
regulation would cause an economic crisis because of the importance of energy to the 
economy. Instead, the management system that now controls fracking wastes combines 
state regulation with some federal oversight under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).  
Most operators dispose of drilling wastewater in underground injection wells that 
are regulated as Class II wells under the SDWA’s Underground Injection Control 
program, requiring a federal permit. Recent violations data show that thousands of 
disposal wells fail mechanical integrity requirements.133 When not properly constructed, 
these wells could become a source of underground pollution.134 In Midland, Texas, for 
example, a disposal well leaked wastewater into an aquifer, and the company responsible 
                                                
131 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2013). 
132 Id. § 8002(m). 
133 Abrahm Lustgarten. 2012. “Injection Wells: The Poison Beneath Us.” ProPublica, June 21. 
134 Many experts are also concerned about earthquakes caused by disposal wells used for underground 
injection of fracking wastewater (Frohlich 2012). I do not discuss that risk here because the risk of 
earthquakes is not commonly considered to be a risk to water. I note, however, that at least some experts 
believe that earthquakes might be preventable, or at least mitigated, if proper safeguards are taken by those 
operating drilling and injection activities. 
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for the maintenance of this well went bankrupt.135 Injection wells may also cause nearby 
rock layers to fracture, thereby allowing the wastewater to migrate over time.136 
The CWA prohibits operators from directly discharging wastewater from shale 
gas wells to surface waters, but operators could send their wastewater to treatment plants 
that receive special permits from the EPA.137 These treatment plants, however, might not 
be equipped to properly handle and sufficiently treat the wastes.138 These plants would 
then release the partially treated water into surface waters when the wastewater could still 
be hazardous to ecosystems, wildlife, or human health.139 The Natural Resources Defense 
Council estimates that in Pennsylvania in 2011 about sixty percent of wastewater went to 
privately owned water treatment plants and about one percent went to publicly owned 
wastewater treatment plants (Hammer and VanBriesen 2012). In May 2011, the 
Pennsylvania agency charged with regulating oil and gas activities requested companies 
to voluntarily stop sending their drilling wastewater to treatment plants,140 which 
improved the quality of the treatment plants’ effluent discharges (Ferrar et al. 2013). 
Other researchers have also found that the treatment and release of drilling wastewater by 
permitted facilities upstream is associated with poorer quality surface water downstream 
(Olmstead et al. 2013). As a result, more states, such as New Jersey, are discussing 
                                                
135 Kate Galbraith and Terrence Henry. 2013. “As Fracking Proliferates in Texas, So Do Disposal Wells.” 
TexasTribune, March 29. 
136 Abrahm Lustgarten. 2012. “Whiff of Phenol Spells Trouble.” ProPublica, June 21. 
137 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1311, 1342 (2013). 
138 This is not just a concern with shale gas drilling, but could be an issue with all oil and gas drilling. Mike 
Soraghan. 2013. “Drillers Send Conventional Brine to Treatment Plants.” E&E EnergyWire, March 20. 
139 A Delaware wastewater plant, for example, processed over a million gallons of drilling wastes in 2009 
and 2010 and then released the processed wastes into a nearby waterway, raising these fears. “Fracking 
Wastewater Makes Way to State, Stirring Debate on Regs.” 2012. E&E EnergyWire, May 22. Ellen M. 
Gilmer. 2012. “With the Right Permit, Treated Brine Can Head to Ohio Rivers.” E&E EnergyWire, July 9. 
140 Pennsylvania has since passed regulations that contain permitting standards for these wastewater 
discharges from treatment plans. 
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whether to prohibit municipal treatment plants from accepting drilling wastes.141 The 
EPA is considering setting standards for fracking wastewater that must be achieved 
before the wastes could go to a treatment facility, and it hopes to issue a proposed rule in 
2014.142 Going forward, the hope is that most wastewater will be recycled and reused in 
future drilling activities. 
 
Unplugged Abandoned Wells 
Finally, operators may abandon wells without properly plugging the wells 
(usually by sealing the well with cement) and otherwise ensuring that the well site is 
restored. This risk arises because operators may not have a financial incentive to engage 
in these activities after they finish production at the well. More worrisome, however, is 
that even properly plugged wells can leak and contaminate soil and water over time. 
  
                                                
141 The New Jersey legislature, for example, voted in June 2012 to ban treatment of fracking wastes within 
the state, although Governor Christie vetoed the bill. Mireya Navarro. 2012. “New Jersey Senate Bans 
Treatment of Fracking Waste.” New York Times, Green Blog, June 25.  
142 U.S. EPA. 2011. “EPA Announces Schedule to Develop Natural Gas Wastewater Standards.” October 
20. http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/91E7FADB4B114C4A8525792F00542001. 
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